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20 April 1982

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL MEETS ISRAELI MINISTER--Jerusalem, 28 Mar--Admiral (Jalal Fahmi), the chairman of the Alexandria Port Authority, who is currently touring Israel as the guest of the ports authority, was received for an introductory meeting this afternoon with Transport Minister Hayim Corfu in his Jerusalem office. At the meeting, which was attended by the chairman of the ports authority Mr Tzvi Qeynan, the Director General of the Ports Authority Mr Izi Rahav and the Chairman of the Airfields Authority Mr Arye Grossberg, the minister of transport reviewed the activities of the ports of Israel, while the Egyptian admiral spoke about the port of Alexandria's activity. The various possibilities for increasing cooperation between Israel and Egypt in the fields of shipping and ports were also discussed. The Egyptian admiral invited the minister of transport to visit the port of Alexandria as his guest. [Text] [TA281856 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1710 GMT 28 Mar 82]

CSO: 4400/209

PLO'S 'ARAFAT ON LIKELIHOOD OF ISRAELI ATTACK

PM261505 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 24 Mar 82 p 15

[Al-Watan correspondent interview with PLO executive committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat in Beirut--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] What are the possibilities of negotiations between the Palestinians and the State of Israel?

[Answer] First I would like to say that I do not think that negotiations will take place between the Palestinians and the state of Israel. Israel has occupied our land and expelled 60 percent of our population, who now live in misery, while the remaining 40 percent live under persecution. Moreover, the Israelis ignore the existence of the Palestinian people and the UN resolutions regarding our rights to return to our home, to autonomy and to establish a Palestinian state. Don't forget that Begin and Shamir are wanted by Interpol, according to the British authorities documents and files.

[Question] Do you believe that the Camp David agreement will remain in effect after Sinai's return to Egypt?

[Answer] Many European leaders have admitted that the Camp David agreements have led to a dead end. Some U.S. leaders have admitted the same, like former Presidents Ford, Carter and Nixon.

[Question] Is there an alternative solution to Camp David?

[Answer] Yes: The UN declarations on the Palestinians' rights.

[Question] What have Mubarak's policies achieved since he assumed office?

[Answer] We prefer to wait and see how President Mubarak's policy will develop.

[Question] Do you think that an invitation should be sent to Mubarak to attend the next Arab summit?

[Answer] The most important thing is to wait and see what his policies will bring. We hold no grudge against anybody.

[Question] Let us be more specific: Should Egypt be invited to the next Arab summit?

[Answer] Yes, it should be invited if it changes its policy. I have great respect for the Egyptian people because they are a fighting people who have great influence on the Arab cause.

[Question] Do you have proof that Israel is likely to launch an attack on Southern Lebanon? [Question ends]

'Arafat answered in a loud voice, and the expression on his face suggested that this was the most important thing occupying his mind. He said: Yes, we are expecting that. The Israeli fortifications on the Southern Lebanese borders are so numerous. The Israeli Navy is effectively blockading the Lebanese coasts thanks to the go-ahead given to it by the U.S. 6th Fleet. We must not forget that Israeli aircraft daily violate the airspace over Beirut and the South.

[Question] Do the Palestinian forces rely on backing from any Arab country in the event of an Israeli attack in the South?

[Answer] All that we can say is that with the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces we shall fight with all our strength against the Israeli enemy.

[Question] Have you noticed any change in U.S. relations with Israel and with the PLO?

[Answer] Yes, there are changes, but they are negative. Israeli policies have prevailed over U.S. policies, and the proof is the announcement of the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance in the political, military, and economic fields, so that Israel will be able to continue its policy of aggression against the Palestinian people and all the Arab nation.

CSO: 4400/208

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FATAH OFFICIAL'S INTERVIEW

JN022015 Monte Carlo Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1730 GMT 2 Apr 82

[Interview granted in Paris by Khalid al-Hasan, senior advisor to PLO leader 'Arafat, Fatah Central Committee member and chairman of the Palestine National Council's Foreign Affairs Committee, and carried in the weekly program "It Happened Tomorrow"--date not specified; recorded.]

[Text] [Question] We always go back to the basic topic in the Middle East issue namely the Palestinian state. Israel rejects the establishment of this state. It has declared this several times and reiterated it yesterday at the conclusion of the British foreign secretary's visit to Israel. Yitzhaq Shamir told him, verbatim: We utterly reject the establishment of the PLO state in an area which has witnessed the birth of the Israeli nation. In light of this reality, efforts are being exerted and the search is continuing to establish this state, or to find a way to establish this state. In view of this Israeli rejection, what, in your opinion, is the way to force Israel to accept the establishment of the Palestinian state?

[Answer] Actually, the answer is contained in the last sentence of your question where you wonder about the way to force Israel. If the use of the word force was intentional, then it shows a real and deep awareness of the Zionist philosophy of the Zionist military establishment ruling Israel. Through such mentality and philosophy as well as the power made available to them by U.S. support in particular and the Western stand in general, these people cannot possibly give anything. Consequently, things have to be taken from them by force.

This calls for two inter-dependable factors: The first factor is the U.S. position which must change so as to become an instrument of pressure on the Zionist military establishment ruling Israel. Second, for this change to take place, the Arabs must be in a position to put pressure on the United States, through a unified solid stand with clear objectives, to which everyone is committed. The main base for the Arab stand, which will press for a change in the U.S. stand which, in turn, will force the Zionist enemy to yield what we want, is the continuation of the Palestinian struggle. Without the Palestinian struggle, there will be no Arab stand; and, without an Arab stand, there will be no change in the international position. Consequently, there will be no exploitation of the Palestinian struggle.

[Question] On the Palestinian side, for instance, the inhabitants of the occupied territory declared a long strike in the West Bank and Gaza. Still,

the Israeli authorities dismissed several mayors and tried to break the strike. As a matter of fact, they achieved some success in breaking the strike in some towns in the West Bank. The West Bank inhabitants have resisted, and are still resisting, but for how long? Is the resistance of the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants sufficient to establish the Palestinian state?

[Answer] The subject of the resistance of the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants is not essentially linked to the establishment of the Palestinian state. As I said, the establishment of the Palestinian state necessitates several factors--the Arab stand, the Palestinian stand, the Western stand, the U.S. stand and, of course, the stand of our friends in the world such as the USSR and others.

But the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territory at this particular phase is linked to a real political confrontation with the Zionist enemy. The steadfastness manifested in the recent upheaval was not like the previous one. The previous steadfastness was a strategic one to hold tenaciously to territory and existence. The recent battle was a turning point from negative resistance to positive resistance. It was a headon clash with the short-term Zionist policy represented by Begin's concept of autonomy. Therefore, the battle was a complete and clear expression of the Palestinian people's rejection of Begin's autonomy concept, of what we term the autonomy conspiracy and of the plan supervised by the university professor brought by Begin to the West Bank to form village leagues which, Israel thought, would oppose the PLO and the Palestinian people on the question of autonomy.

Therefore, the Palestinian stand in this political battle had a clear and definite objective, it was to foil Israel's desperate attempt to apply the Israeli autonomy concept on the Palestinian people which actually meant the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel. This explains the special significance of this steadfastness.

As for our people's ability to remain steadfast, I believe this has become a daily custom and a characteristic of this people. You must have noted that the Palestinian people did not use arms in this resistance and in the confrontation against the occupation authorities and their repressive measures, although they could have used them. Why was that? Because, we were not after a military battle. We were after a political battle to prove the Palestinian people's willpower to hold to their rights, homeland and territory and to prove that the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Zionists claimed that the 1976 elections which brought in the mayors were rigged. Yet, the Zionists themselves spoke highly of those elections at the time. They are critical of the elections because they brought in pro-PLO mayors. The Zionists are, thus, contradicting themselves. Our people have proved that the PLO cannot be destroyed. Although an organization, the PLO manifests the Palestinian identity. In other words, it has become an idea which cannot be destroyed. It is not a man who can be killed or imprisoned or an army that can be destroyed. Our people wanted to prove to the world that dealing with PLO means dealing with the Palestinian national identity. Some have tried to persuade the Palestinian people to use arms, but reason has prevailed in the end. I believe that we have succeeded in achieving a world-wide political gain by

exposing Zionism and its designs and establishing that the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, especially since the strike you mentioned.

The strike met with great response. Of course, in some small areas repression cancelled the strike, because stores were opened by force. But this overwhelming response has shown that there is a real relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian people and that the PLO is the representative of this people by the way they obey its instructions. There are also the continuous resignations from the village leagues. All these things show that despite the material loss suffered, losses which we deeply acknowledge and respect, our people have scored a political victory which is bound to have a great impact on the world public's view of the Palestinian people and a step toward the Palestinian state, God willing.

[Question] But there is one point. For instance, Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj, who of course recognizes the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, has renewed his call in the Egyptian weekly AL-MUSAWWAR for mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinians. He said: Ten years hence, the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and elsewhere will have nothing left to negotiate about with Israel. Frayj made this statement after the recent incidents and the general strike in the West Bank and Gaza. What is your explanation of this statement?

[Answer] My explanation of this statement is that Ilyas Frayj is not aware of the true nature of the current situation. He thinks that his statement could save something for the people and the land. Our people are under enormous pressure. And, due to his inability to endure this pressure, Ilyas Frayj made his statement which contradicts the nature of the enemy. The enemy rejects recognition of the PLO in the first place. We should recall that when he was asked if there were negotiations between his party and the PLO, Menahem Begin said: Such negotiations have not taken place, will not take place and we will not allow them to take place. The Zionists have often said: We do not want anyone to recognize us, because our existence is not linked to anybody's recognition but to our own power.

This Zionist mentality resembles Nazi mentality. It reminds us of Hitler when he used to say that Germany's boundary is where the German soldier stands. The Israeli chief of staff said the same thing after the 1967 war. He said that Israel's boundary is where the Israeli soldier stands. One cannot negotiate with people with such mentality. A stand based on such mentality is un-negotiable. A mentality which wants to take the land, expel its people and send them out bare-footed and naked as in 1948 if possible, is useless to negotiate with it. Such mentality only understands force; whether military force or pressure by those who can influence it. The primary responsibility here falls on Washington, if the Arabs adopt a unified stand, as I said.

[Question] It has been noted that events in the occupied territory were not accompanied by any Palestinian action outside the territory; by this, I mean a Major Fedayeen operation. What was the reason? Was it a tactical move, or were there other reasons?

[Answer] No, it was not a tactical move. We just did not want to give the enemy any excuse. We did not want to divert attention from our people's struggle and political victories by an operation which would not have a political victory by an operation which would not have a political impact similar to that by our people's heroic steadfastness in the occupied territory. Any Fedayeen operation of the type you are speaking about would have diverted attention from the main cause. Israel and the Western media would have seized the opportunity and described the Palestinian military activity as an act of terrorism. Therefore, we had to preserve the purity of this astounding popular resistance in the occupied territory so it could produce the correct political results. I believe that this astounding upheaval has achieved a significant political results.

[Question] Earlier in the interview, you told me that the establishment of the Palestinian state called for certain factors and efforts. You spoke about Palestinian, Arab and international efforts. Regarding Arab efforts, do you expect sudden developments after Israel's complete withdrawal from Sinai, especially in Cairo?

[Answer] There are two sides to the question; one linked to Arab nature and the other to Israeli withdrawal from Sinai on 25 or 26 April. I really cannot understand why people expect miracles after 25 April. It is as if matters could change so quickly and 25 April would be our hope and dream. The truth is, nothing will change on 26 or 27 April, May or June.

Nothing will change for the very simple reason that al-Sadat chained Egypt in such a way that it would not be able to change quickly, despite the fact that the Egyptian people rejected the accords concluded by him. There are certain circumstances which prevent a quick change. However, we are confident that there will be change in Egypt in the end, but not so soon. Perhaps, it is our strong love for Egypt and our acknowledgement of its natural leadership of the Arab world that make every one of us hope to see Egypt back soon in the Arab fold.

But matters do not always happen in this way. The matter calls for a change of policy and this requires time. Therefore, Egypt will return to its natural position in the Arab world when the change takes place, not before that. This is as far as the first part of the question is concerned. With regard to the second question which speaks of sudden developments, we Arabs are used to surprises. If you review the events of the past 30 years, you will find that whenever matters reached a tragic moment, the Arabs met and not only patched up their differences but also turned them into solidarity. These are the characteristics of the current Arab frame of mind and emotional state which confuses the world. This is also why the world no longer trusts our agreements or disagreements. No sooner do we agree than we differ, and no sooner do we differ than we agree. There have been many such surprises. Therefore, I do not rule out the possibility of Arab solidarity in the coming period. Many efforts are being exerted in this regard. I hope I will not be disappointed this time about the required speed. Arab solidarity is bound to materialize in the end, because Israeli belligerency has become unbearable. If Arab solidarity is not achieved from the top, many changes will begin from the bottom.

[Question] Pending Arab changes, alliance and solidarity, what is expected on the international level? If the Arab arena is witnessing a waiting period, is the international arena also witnessing a waiting period?

[Answer] The problem is, the international arena is waiting scientifically, while we are waiting emotionally. We hope we also will turn scientific. The West is not prepared to change its stands unless its interests are threatened. Therefore, if the economy is not linked to politics through a common stand and objective, forcing the West to choose between its interests with us and its interests with our enemy, the West will not change. Western philosophy is based on interests. If the interests are not affected, the West will not change its stand. He who can affect interests can effect change. This is an Arab decision and not a Western decision.

With regard to the Arabs, we hope matters will return to what they were in the past. We are experiencing a situation resulting from past colonial rule and obvious backwardness due to cultural strife during the colonial era. We are a nation fighting on several fronts. The nation is fighting to regain its cultural identity, rebuild its economy, achieve its political freedom and liberate Palestine, the most serious front. We are aware of the circumstances of this situation, although we reject many of them. We believe we can do much despite the situation we are in. As I said, matters can no longer be endured by the Arab masses.

[Question] This was what I was trying to arrive at. If I understood you right, we are in a state of waiting on the Arab and international levels. But there are other problems. Do you think they can wait? Take the situation of the people in the occupied territory for instance. Can it wait for a long time? [Remainder of question indistinct]

[Answer] Despite the Arab people's endurance ability, there is a limit to patience. Matters are interlocked. With Arab solidarity, most of these matters can be tackled. Undoubtedly, the Palestinian resistance will be stronger qualitatively and quantitatively in the presence of a unified Arab stand.

With regard to Lebanon, I will repeat an earlier statement that the key to the solution in Lebanon is Lebanese. If the Lebanese agree, the Palestinians are not an obstacle. An outsider cannot be an obstacle. The important thing is for the Lebanese to agree among themselves without being affected by outside factors. The Lebanese will find that a correct solution will come quicker than they imagine.

I would like to reassure everyone that the Palestinians will never be an obstacle to such a solution. On the contrary, they will help achieve it. They cannot but be a factor of stability for Lebanon, but the Lebanese must take the first move. If each Lebanese side continues to receive instructions, ideas, support and assistance from outside Lebanon and shows loyalty to outsiders, then the region will remain in conflict. Consequently, there will be no common objectives and no Lebanese national accord. If there is no Lebanese accord, the situation will remain unresolved.

[Question] At any rate, there is no need to proceed any further with this argument, because a great deal has already been said for and against the subject. Therefore, let us move to the next topic. There has been some optimism following your meeting with Amin al-Jumayyil. Can we know the reason behind this optimism?

[Answer] As far as we are concerned, the meeting showed our goodwill. It showed that the Palestinians in Lebanon are not a party to the dispute in Lebanon. We are not against the maronites, the orthodox, the phalangists or sham'unites. We are also not siding with any other party for any reason whatsoever. We are with Lebanon. If previous circumstances have led to the emergence of two conflicting fronts in Lebanon, and, consequently, if the Palestinians were compelled to adopt a stand, this does not mean that they are for or against anyone. Everyone was in a position of self-defense. Mistakes were made by all sides. The steps we have taken are for the purpose of proving to everyone that we place Lebanon's interests above all other considerations, that we are ready to come to an understanding with everyone and that we place Lebanon's interests above all other considerations, that we are ready to come to an understanding with everyone and that we are not a party to the internal Lebanese game. We are ready to come to an understanding, but such an understanding cannot be one-sided.

[Question] But what were the justifications for the optimism after the meeting with Amin al-Jumayyil?

[Answer] The justifications were that a man like Amin al-Jumayyil was talking sensibly and showing far-sightedness. The meeting was not just with Amin al-Jumayyil. [Lebanese speaker] Kamil al-As'ad also said things which I never heard before in my life. He showed good and noble intentions. Such a dialogue is bound to create a thaw. The important thing is for the phalangists and their supporters to understand that the Palestinians are not hostile toward anyone in Lebanon for sectarian, religious or political reasons. They only stand for their cause. When the whole of Lebanon supports the Palestine question, the Palestinian revolution will also support the whole of Lebanon.

[Question] Let us go back to the topic we started with; namely, the Palestinian state and Israeli rejection of this state. In short, are you optimistic about reaching your objective, and to what extent?

[Answer] Right now, I am not perturbed by the question of the establishment of the Palestinian state. This is because I am optimistic about my people's ability to continue to resist and struggle in order to achieve their short-term objective; namely, the establishment of the Palestinian state. When it will be achieved is immaterial. As I said earlier in the interview, it calls for several factors. Middle East factors tend to have a strange effect. If these factors become immediately available, their effects will also be immediate and sudden. This is how I always knew the Middle East throughout history. Therefore, my optimism is based on this people's ability to resist and struggle. Such a people are bound to achieve their rights in the end. This is the logic of history.

Therefore, we are not viewing the subject through a timetable, because our question is still an economic one. It is a long popular struggle. We must triumph in the end. We hope to shorten the time to victory so as to lessen the burden and sacrifices of our people. A unified Arab stand will help us. If it does not, then we will be the conscience motivating the Arab masses, which will change those who reject change.

[Question] As Khalid al-Hasan said, change is bound to come, but when? It is clear that we have to wait. True, some can wait, but others cannot. They will try, but for how long? But I say until the next Friday [program].

CSO: 4400/208

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

'MONTE CARLO' INTERVIEWS FATAH LEADER

JN261959 Monte Carlo Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1730 GMT 26 Mar 82

[Radio Monte Carlo's interview with Fatah Central Committee member Khalil al-Wazir, identified by his nom de Guerre Abu Jihad, in the weekly program "It Happened Tomorrow"--date and place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Abu Jihad, nobody doubts that you are foremost among those concerned with the current situation in the occupied territory, your presence in Jordan within the framework of the Jordanian-Palestinian joint committee is clear proof of this concern. What agreement has been reached with Jordan to tackle the situation in the occupied territory?

[Answer] What is taking place in the occupied territory these days is strongly felt by all strugglers and all Palestinians and Arabs everywhere. Therefore, there is complete interaction within the Palestinian leadership and among all strugglers everywhere in the Arab nation with what is taking place in the occupied territory; this might national resistance which ORU Palestinian people are putting up against the savage and terrorist Zionist onslaught represented by the repressive measures taken by the Israeli authorities to disband the al-Birah Municipal Council, to dismiss the chairman of this council, Brother Ibrahim al-Tawil, and also to dismiss Brother Bassam al-Shak'ah and Karim Khalaf, mayors of Nabulus and Ramallah.

All this proves the fumbling of the Begin, Sharon and Shamir Government and its actions, which show complete disregard for all human laws, norms and rights as well as the world public and prove that the Israeli authorities are determined to force the civilian administration on our people. However, our people in the occupied territory are also determined, with the same violence and ferocity, to resist Israeli plans. Naturally, all Palestinian leaderships are interacting with and experiencing every moment and hour of our people's uprising and heroic stands.

Thus, we in the joint committee, which is concerned with backing the resistance in the occupied territory, had to hold a special session for this purpose. It has now been decided to keep this session open to follow the national uprising in the occupied territory and to discuss all the means required to strengthen and maintain the national struggle in the occupied territory against the Zionist military occupation. The situation is constantly under review. We

set aside all secondary issues and gave top priority to the question of following the uprising. We in the joint committee have been following all the details: The measures taken by the Zionist Government and the civilian administration, the stance taken by our people and our duties toward all this as well as the possibilities of a collective confrontation of these growing Israeli measures in the occupied territory.

It was decided in these meetings to constantly follow the situation. Thus, we formed a standing working committee to follow developments daily and to fulfill its obligations.

[Question] What can Jordan give at this stage within the framework of these obligations?

[Answer] As we said, Jordan is in direct contact with the gateways to the occupied territory. This area is important for direct contact with our people. Jordan has pan-Arab obligations just like the rest of the Arab nation. The stand of continuous support declared by Jordan, Syria, the Gulf, North Africa, the Maghreb and other Arab countries expresses the solidarity of our nation.

[Question] However, some people may see contradiction between the current Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation and Palestinian-Syrian cooperation.

[Answer] Allow me to say that this is a pan-Arab battle, those who talk about such contradictions only seek to create rifts. The pan-Arab battle against the common enemy calls on Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the whole of our Arab nation to face this enemy which is threatening the Golan, the West Bank, Baghdad and the whole of the Arab world. All this calls on our nation to sense the real danger threatening all Arabs. Therefore, we believe that our nation cannot differ on this pan-Arab cause and the stand required. The PLO can, perhaps, serve as the element rallying all Arab efforts against the enemy. We seek the support of every country in the Arab nation.

[Question] Actually, the situation is very serious. Some Palestinian militants have apparently tried to infiltrate into Israel from Lebanese territory. How true are these reports on this infiltration, which Israel considers a violation of the cease-fire?

[Answer] The joint Palestinian-Lebanese leadership has issued a statement saying this was a false Zionist claim. Those who followed Israeli reports and analyses on the subject could see that the Israeli enemy was trying to make this issue a justification for aggression. As we said, we are fully committed not to carry out any military action from Lebanese territory. We stressed this point on previous occasions. The Palestinian leaderships have also stressed this stand everywhere. Of course, the joint Palestinian-Lebanese leadership has issued an official statement that there was no operation and that no Palestinian leadership has officially approved any action in this respect.

[Question] Do you believe that Israel is embarking on an operation to deport Palestinians from the occupied territory?

[Answer] We expect anything from the Zionist enemy. The ruling clique in the Zionist entity is acting emotionally. It is showing disregard for the entire world public. We expect anything. At any rate, we are confident that Israel will have to pay the price. Our people are confronting, struggling and challenging. Our people expect anything, still they hold to their land. In a few days, we will commemorate the day of the land when the masses will express their willpower in confronting the Zionist enemy and holding to their land. The time has passed when the enemy was able, through persecution and terrorism, to intimidate the masses and make them leave their land.

Our people's struggle these days is a struggle to defend the land with all the means in our power. Our people prefer to be buried in their land than to budge an inch from that land. Our people will not tolerate such a situation, because they know what it means to be displaced and to be away from this homeland. Therefore, our people hold to their land just as the patient strugglers in Galilee and the Negev, the parts of Palestine occupied in 1984. Very soon, those people, who hold tenaciously to their land, will express their indignation on the day of the land. Nobody will leave his land even [if] he is buried in it. This is more honorable. This is the slogan of every Palestinian and Arab under occupation.

[Question] Thank you, Abu Jihad.

CSO: 4400/208

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO OFFICIAL DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS, LEBANON

Kuwait, AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 731, 24 Feb 82 pp 30-33

[Interview with Abu Mahir al-Yamani, member of the PLO Executive Committee by al-Qadas Baras; in Beirut: "We Do Not Believe in Nor Are We Obligated by What Is Inconsistent with the Armed Struggle"]

[Text] What is required is that illusions about coexistence with the racist, Zionist entity be discarded and a revolutionary alternative proposed.

It is necessary to form a standardized security operations room to command security action on the national scene in Lebanon.

We have arrested some of those who are guilty of perpetrating the Beirut explosions; it is not in [our] interest to reveal who they are at the present time.

The conversation in the interview with Palestinian official Abu Mahir al-Yamani, member of the PLO Executive Committee, member of the Political Office of the Popular Front and member of the Supreme Security Committee revolved around two points. The first point was Palestinian and included a number of questions that were pending on the agenda of the Palestinian Revolution at the next stage. The second point had to do with the center of security which concerns the results of the investigations into the wave of explosions that Lebanon has experienced. In addition, it concerns the question of the formation of the Lebanese National Movement's secret military company and the dispute around that matter with the Amal Movement.

With regard to the cease fire agreement between the Palestinian Revolution and the Zionist enemy in south Lebanon, Abu Mahir declared that guerilla activity from South Lebanon has not ceased. "We have declared objectives that advocate the use of armed struggle. As long as we proclaim these slogans, we must practice them. We do not believe, nor are we obligated by anything other than those slogans."

The text of the interview follows.

The First Point: Palestinian

[Question] What do you think about the PLO's political choices in the period after April, the time for the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai?

[Answer] There is no doubt that next 25 April is considered the beginning of a new political phase in the history of the Arab-Zionist struggle with regard to the Zionist enemy's ability to establish firmly his political and economic penetration into the heart of Egyptian society.

This is considered a success of the enemy's policy of isolating Egypt from its Arab surroundings. It is a situation that creates the suitable background for the growth of reactionary movements that are opposed to Egypt's Arab and national affiliation. These movements push Egypt further into the arms of U.S. imperialism. This situation accompanies the policy which the Egyptian regime, with its new president, Husni Mubarak, is still pursuing. It is a policy that revolves around the fact that "the peace process" with the Zionist entity will continue even beyond the phase of 25 April 1982.

The Egyptian regime is not prepared to enter into any war with the Zionist entity, in case a war does break out between [Israel] and Syria or any other Arab country, or in case Israel occupies south Lebanon.

The Egyptian regime is not prepared to give up its good relations with the United States even if its relations with the Soviet Union were to improve once again.

The fact that the reactionary Egyptian authorities have proclaimed their insistence on these principles even after the phase of 25 April proves that the Egyptian regime will not change the positions and policies to which it committed itself in the Camp David agreement. These are obligations which the present Egyptian regime cannot alter due to the political or economic commitments by which it has become bound.

In all this talk the political choices that remain in front of the PLO manifest themselves in [the following]:

First, the PLO is to continue opposing and resisting the basis of the Camp David conspiracy since that constitutes the onset of a treacherous and a totally capitulatory course that has realized success on the Egyptian side. The firm posture of opposition to the Camp David conspiracy applies to everything that has resulted from the implementation of that conspiracy on the Egyptian scene in so far as breaking diplomatic relations, stopping all forms of communicating and doing business with the Zionist enemy, preventing the passage of the Zionist enemy's ships from the Suez Canal and suspending media and cultural dealings with the Zionist enemy.

Second, the PLO is to oppose firmly and unequivocally the administrative autonomy conspiracy around which the talks of the parties to Camp David are being conducted so that solutions that are consistent with the wishes of those parties can be produced.

The Palestinian position is defined by the PLO's continued rejection of that conspiracy and by the fact that it is using violence and force to prevent any Palestinian figure who attempts and tries to join these talks from doing so. Recent statements by al-Shawa and Ilyas Farij are nothing but examples of the willingness of those people to enter the conspiracy. This makes it necessary for the PLO to put an end to these capitulatory positions of theirs.

Third, the PLO is to continue our presence in the Opposition and Defiance Front and to reinforce this presence by playing the role that is required of us in setting this front into action on the political scene and making a contribution to the settlement of any conflicts that may stand in the way of building the front's executive organizations. Such a role would strengthen the presence of this front and strengthen its political and practical effectiveness in confronting the parties to Camp David.

Fourth, the PLO is to oppose staunchly the policies of the reactionary Jordanian regime inside and outside the occupied land, and it is to expose that regime's plans. In its efforts to create alternatives inside the occupied land, the Jordanian regime is trying to implement its plan at the expense of the PLO, and it is rejecting the Zionist plan and Palestinian identity as well in preparation for acceptance of the Jordanian role which imperialist and Arab reactionary circles are trying to reveal at the appropriate time so it can become the common denominator for getting out of the crisis. This point coincides with the plans of the Zionist labor party and the intentions of the Jordanian regime which are being hidden involuntarily for the sake of the present stage of Camp David.

Fifth: the fifth choice is the most important one. It has to do with the PLO's position on plans that have been proposed. Chief among those is Prince Fahd's plan which is considered to be another Camp David. It differs from the former only in the language in which it is written. It is necessary that all Palestinian parties collectively resist this plan. The destiny of this plan depends on the collective Palestinian position to reject it since the organization's position would be the basic one in case of ambiguity in the collective Palestinian position.

In this regard possibilities will most certainly be numerous, different and perhaps even poor at the same time.

We reject the Saudi plan, not because it is Saudi, but because it is one of the plans that squander and betray the right of the Palestinian cause. In essence the Saudi plan does not differ from the Camp David plans. Rejecting and resisting the Saudi capitulatory plan, if it is proposed again, would get political relations among the factions of the Palestinian Resistance started. These relations would force the factions of the Palestinian Resistance into a process of building Palestinian national unity and would keep them from sinking deeper again in some of the political mazes that do damage to the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian Revolution. The danger and the consequences of the political mazes which Arab reactionaries are trying to force us into may increase. [They are trying to force us into these mazes] to create division on the Palestinian scene, and this is something that we must resist, reject and oppose quite forcefully and resolutely.

No to Fand's Plan

[Question] Where do you stand on current Arab efforts to pass Fahd's plan as an Arab peace plan under the heading of Arab solidarity in the light of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights?

[Answer] The step taken by the Zionist enemy, which has to do with the annexation of the Golan, has raised numerous questions about the feasibility and effectiveness of the political proposals and plans that were presented to solve the crisis of the Arab-Zionist struggle, especially since the Zionist enemy continues to exist. The Zionist enemy is insisting on his aggressive settlement policies which constitute the core of the racist Likud government's position. The annexation of the Golan is neither the last nor the first step in this policy. The racist Zionist government had proclaimed the annexation of East Jerusalem and considered it the capital of its so-called state. The organized settlement program whose implementation on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip has made significant strides is an indication of the gravity of the course that is being pursued by the Zionist enemy. It is my judgment that these steps are preliminary to the more comprehensive annexation for which the Zionist government is making preparations. It is waiting for the appropriate political condition to announce that annexation.

This means that the Zionist enemy will go on implementing his aggressive, expansionist plans while the Arabs assume a posture of indifference and expectancy as they race after illusions and solutions that are being presented from here and there to liquidate their cause. Instead of wasting time and effort in proposing Arab plans under different names, with various colors, from more than one president and official, publicly and secretly, we should get rid of illusions of coexistence with this racist entity and propose a revolutionary alternative that would oppose its presence and its being. If there are some disagreements about the content of this alternative, the slogans that say no to negotiations, no to peace and no to recognition would constitute the basis for an agreement among all the Arab national and progressive forces.

The Open Battle

[Question] Under the auspices of the so-called cease fire between the Palestinian Revolution and the enemy, what does the organization think about the possibility of resuming military action inside Lebanon without giving Israel an excuse to launch a sweeping raid of south Lebanon?

[Answer] Guerilla action from south Lebanon and elsewhere has not ceased so as to begin. We deal with the Zionist enemy as we would with an entity that is occupying all the territory of Palestine and is committing scores of violations every day. Our battle with the Zionist enemy is an open-ended one: it does not stop, and it has not stopped since the outbreak of the revolution. We have proclaimed goals which advocate the use of armed struggle for the realization of our goals. As long as we proclaim these slogans, we must practice them. We are not obligated by anything else, and we do not believe in anything else. Furthermore, the Zionist enemy needs no excuse to attack south Lebanon, the Golan Heights or the occupied land. Careful scrutiny of this aspect would prove

that Zionist decisions to attack were made to implement Israeli political decisions for carrying out aggressive plans. They were not reactions to Palestinian guerilla actions. This is a fact that must not be denied, concealed or lost sight of.

A Major Problem

[Question] Don't you think that this situation poses a major problem to the Palestinian struggle in the coming stages, since under present Arab conditions any military action has become a precursor to a major unequal war?

[Answer] It is true that we are part of the Arab national liberation movement and part of the liberation movement in the world. Due to these ties we are affected by that situation negatively as well as positively. But our ties with this liberation movement's strong link and chain must push us forward and not restrain us, for the self-acting factor remains the foundation of the process of change and development that is taking place. This applies to the objective situation of the question of the Arab-Zionist struggle. It is true that the balance of military powers favors the imperialist camp in the area, but the deteriorating and regressive conditions which Palestinians and Arabs have created are playing a role in the fact that this situation has become oppressive and has been portrayed as permanent.

Any step that runs counter to that situation or against it appears to be somewhat embarrassing and insane, whereas the process of changing the balances of power in the area is not a mechanical process as much as it is one in which self-created powers and conditions interact to create the accumulation of factors that creates the balancing process. Part of this revolutionary process whose creation in the area is being called for is the escalation of both the quantity and the quality of guerilla activity. This process would not then be in a position where it can become an unheeded and an uninfluential part; it would become a principal part of a process that cannot be overlooked, ignored or eliminated.

The Second Point: the Security Situation

[Question] Explosions have reappeared in various parts of Lebanon. Who are the parties that are responsible for them? Is the process of "keeping the perpetrator under wraps" as Muhsin Ibrahim has said, going on? Is it using the fact that Israel's clients are accused of these actions an excuse for not defining the responsibility of the agencies that are carrying out these actions?

[Answer] The process of detonating timed bombs in residential neighborhoods in the national areas is one of the dirty ways which the enemy utilizes through his agents who are planted in the national areas or who can be present in those areas for a period of time. The question is not one of "keeping the perpetrator under wraps;" the perpetrator is known even though he may be able to conceal the tools of his crimes.

The Zionist enemy and his agents, the Fascist forces that are cooperating with him and the agencies that are being built to oppose the national tide, are the

ones that are planning the explosion operations and accordingly, forcing their functionaries to carry them out. Joint security agencies have often been able to thwart and scuttle the explosion operations. Many times they were also able to arrest those who had been assigned the task of committing criminal acts, and some of them have publicly confessed to the operations they carried out or those which had been assigned to them. Press conferences were held more than once, and those misguided clients appeared at these press conferences and spoke quite candidly about these dirty acts and about the agencies that stand behind them. By questioning those who were arrested by the joint security agencies, it became evident that the Zionist enemy or the Fascist forces and the agencies that have relations with them were the ones behind these operations.

A Security Plan

[Question] In the opinion of the Security Committee, what are the measures which will stop the wave of explosions?

[Answer] The most important measures which the Security Committee thinks can confront the wave of explosions are:

1. Developing citizens' sense of security so that each citizen would become a watchman guarding the security of other citizens as he guards his own. He would watch over the security of his street and that of his home and his store. This [takes] intense and continuous awareness.
2. Setting up a standardized security operations room furnished with people who are aware and technical tools that would enable it to command security action in the national areas and help security men perform their function effectively.
3. Adopting common security measures in accordance with the unified security plan so that responsibilities for security in specific locations can determine the execution of the part that has to do with the security plan at that location.
4. Dividing the national area into neighborhoods and having all the parties and national forces cooperate in ensuring that citizens' comfort is being watched over, thereby seeking the assistance of neighborhood residents in monitoring the neighborhoods and watching over them.
5. Operating security patrols whose function would be to patrol and monitor the neighborhoods and communicate with the joint security operations room to inform it of anything they find suspicious. Accordingly, promptly exposing the truth about matters that are [thought to be] suspicious.

The Clashes and the Democratic Dialogue

[Question] The Amal Movement refused to take part in the security company which is subject to the National Movement. As a result of this refusal broad clashes between Amal and the labor organization took place. How will the Security Committee solve this problem vis a vis Amal's logic which thinks that the formation of the security company is a divisive proposition?

[Answer] The Amal Movement is a national force that is taking part in the National Action Coordination Committee in Lebanon and in the committees that have sprung from it. It is also taking part in the Supreme Security Committee and in the committees that have sprung from it in the governorates. It has its own independent opinion on participating in the joint security company and the role and functions of that company. Our duty is to intensify the democratic dialogue so that a formula about which everyone will agree can be achieved. As long as we are working to serve citizens, we will have to reach an agreement about the formula that would provide the objective which we are seeking. If we do not achieve this today, we will do so tomorrow, and if not tomorrow, then the day after that. What matters is that we keep up the democratic dialogue, intensify the agreement and interaction and stop all infighting operations within the national rank and all actions that would fragment the national rank.

There are damaging elements, and there are forces trying to benefit from every damage. Let us fight continuously to create a fighter who works tirelessly. If he offends, we would call him to task; that would be part of his education and his development.

[Question] The National Movement and the Resistance have arrested a number of persons who are accused of perpetrating the recent explosions. Why has their identity not been revealed, and why haven't they been put on trial?

[Answer] With regard to exposing those who were arrested, this has been done in more than one case. As we said, press conferences were held to reveal who some of them were. With some others, however, the Security Committee thinks that it is in [our] interest not to expose them, for security reasons.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES DAILY INTERVIEWS PLO'S ABU IYAD

GF261717 Doha QNA in Arabic 1130 GMT 25 Mar 82

[Text] Dubayy, 25 Mar (QNA)--Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad, member of the Central Committee of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah, has lauded the ability of all of the groups of unarmed Palestinian people in the occupied territories to confront the Zionist enemy. He said the Palestinian people are facing the bullets of occupation with their chests, including children and women, at the time when we see that the racial balance between the enemy and us is absent on the level of the Arab regimes, whether the confrontation states or those farther away. [sentence as received] Moreover, he said, the Palestinian stand in the occupied territories is unified in rejecting the occupation. This stand is looking to the right of self-determination and to an independent Palestinian state without gambling away the historic rights of the Palestinian people.

In a statement to the newspaper 'AL-BAYAN' published today, Abu Iyad warned of the serious deterioration of the Arab stand in confronting the Zionist enemy. He said, "The Palestinian resistance under the leadership of the PLO has been confronting the enemy with a unified political platform for more than 4 years, while an Arab stand is lacking. Although I am not pessimistic, the Arab situation in 1948 was better than our current situation in which we possess money, modern weapons, treaties with friends and other weapons that are much stronger than what Israel possesses. However, the minor wars and secondary battles among the Arab countries all affirm that the Arab situation has never ever been worse than today."

He also said the Arab fragmentation is reflected in the Palestinian arena. Nonetheless, the Palestinian people, with their customary strong-armed revolution against the enemy, have intrinsic strength because they bypass all factors of despair, fragmentation and dispersion.

In his statement Abu Iyad demanded that the Arab countries pressure the United States so that the Palestinian people will be assured of their national rights. He said the Arab countries are requested to support the Palestinian stand of revolting against the occupation with more than just financial aid and to adopt a stand on the United States, "which is the main enemy that supports and refuses to pressure Israel, in order to do justice to the Palestinian people."

Abu Iyad explained that the formation of village committees is an ancient Zionist idea which was laid down as a substitute plan for the Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories. However, the Palestinian people have proved that this plan was an unsuccessful experience like the experiences of all people who were under the yoke of occupation, whether Nazi or otherwise.

Abu Iyad affirmed that the purpose of these repressive procedures of the Begin Government is the large-scale deportation of Palestinians so that they will eventually become a minority--a fact that will expedite the usurpation of all Palestinian land by the Israelis. Abu Iyad announced that Israel is preparing for a comprehensive war to strike at all Arab forces.

Abu Iyad said the Zionist plans do not include the Palestinians alone; they include the confrontation and neutral Arab countries as well. He also said the next step in the enemy's plan will not only include Southern Lebanon but all of Lebanon and militant Syria, through its forces in Lebanon. And if need arises, the enemy will enter Syria during that battle. The enemy will also strike at Jordan, and consequently the Israelis will have formed a security zone around Israel similar to the Sa'd Haddad zone.

Abu Iyad affirmed that the Palestinian revolution will fight with all its strength to thwart the enemy's plans, whether inside the occupied territories or in Southern Lebanon, pointing out that the enemy will lose much more than he imagines, whether inside the occupied territories or elsewhere.

Abu Iyad expressed hope that Egypt will return to the Arab fold following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai on 25 April, pointing out that this return should not be accompanied by the Camp David accords. He said we cannot ignore the great value of Egypt and its people in leading the Arab situation.

In his statement Abu Iyad also dealt with the Lebanon crisis and reports on a link between its solution and the solving of the Middle East crisis. He said that the Phalange Party is responsible for linking the Lebanon and Middle East crises in order to serve Israel's [word indistinct] and that the Lebanese should realize that Israel links the Lebanese problem and the Middle East problem the way the United States and Kissinger's policy did in 1975.

Abu Iyad said: "We are not against initiatives and plans for solving the Lebanese crisis and achieving national reconciliation, but we will struggle to liberate Palestine even if the entire Palestinian people are sacrificed for achieving that target," nothing that Israel, after settling its affairs with Egypt, will launch a comprehensive war to strike at all Arab forces.

He described the European initiative on peace in the Middle East as being a "lie," expressing the belief that the Europeans do not have the courage to oppose the U.S. will.

Regarding Palestinian-Arab relations, particularly with the Arab Gulf countries, Salah Khalaf affirmed the existence of ancient, historic relations, noting that the Palestinians do not deny that the region's countries are supporting the Palestinian cause and offering it financial aid.

In conclusion Abu Iyad affirmed that the Palestinians, as Arabs, are concerned about the security of the region and are ready to defend it against any external invasion. They also care about safeguarding the sovereignty of any country in the region. He referred to residence problems which the Palestinians face, expressing hope that these problems will be solved.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

'AL-RIYAD' INTERVIEWS PALESTINIAN MAYORS

PM061501 Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 30 Mar 82 pp 8-9

[Report on Ahmad Husayn al-Yami telephone interviews from New York with Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah, Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf, al-Birah Mayor Ibrahim al-Tawil, Hebron Mayor Fahd al-Qawasmah, 'Anabta Mayor Wahid al-Hamadallah, Qalqilyah Mayor Hajj Amin al-Nasr, Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj, Tulkarm Mayor Hilmi Hannun, and PLO spokesman Mahmud al-Labadi: "The Day of the Land in Occupied Palestine--A Palestinian Feast"--date of interviews not specified]

[Text] Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah said: The present conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are very severe and the occupation authorities are still trying to put down the uprising by various brutal, terrorist and sinister methods. The occupation authorities are killing, wounding and detaining young people on a large-scale. Administrative orders have been issued for the detention of students and their guardians. Communications between the towns have been disrupted and families are being provoked. Vengeance is also being wreaked on the municipal councils. At present the Nabulus Municipal Council members are having to work from morning to evening at the military government department under fascist threat. Members of al-Shak'ah family, my brothers and sisters and their spouses are in detention. As I speak to you now I can see my 70-year old brother--my eldest brother--trying to enter the house but they are not allowing him to enter. The professional unions' leaders have also been detained and are given abominable treatment. The municipal employees have announced that they will not cooperate with the military in the discharge of municipal duties. They have been brought to the offices by force but they still refuse to sit at their desks. Now they are summoned and detained from morning to evening. Despite all this, the Nabulus municipal workers are still refusing to cooperate with the military authorities, and so are the Ramallah and al-Birah employees who have also been summoned by the military authorities and forced into their offices. They refused, nevertheless, to cooperate. The result was that they [the authorities] let them go.

On the possible continuation of the uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, al-Shak'ah said: You must realize that our people have no choice but to stand fast, struggle and defend their rights against the plots and practices, because the Zionist fascist campaign against us is a campaign

against the human individual, his freedom and even physical survival and safety. They have in practice annexed the land and all that remains for them to subdue now is the human body and will. So our masses now must either stand fast or surrender. Surrender would mean negation of our existence. From experience we say that occupation is no justification for cowardice. Our people's uprising will continue until it assumes Pan-Arab dimensions and until it reaches the farthest human limit and depth, so that our Arab peoples and governments may move to confront the danger threatening us all in the region and threatening world peace.

Our uprising will continue under all circumstances. If the occupation authorities manage, with their fascist methods, to deal any blow to this uprising, there will be more and stronger uprisings. We realize that our continuity and our achieving results depend to a large extent on our Arab nation and on our Islamic world. They must move before the danger engulfs them. The safety of the region depends, not on the safety of the governments and rulers, but on the safety of life itself and the safety, unity and solidarity of the people of the region. I hope that the newspaper AL-RIYAD will echo our strong call to all our Arab brothers not to show interest only in Bassam al-Shak'ah, because Bassam al-Shak'ah, Karim Khalaf and Ibrahim al-Tawil are now under house arrest. Tomorrow you may not find me to answer the telephone. Let your concern be for the Palestinian Arab children who are now short of milk and whose future is in doubt.

Referring to the current UN Security Council meetings, Bassam al-Shak'ah said: On behalf of all the municipal councils and national establishments in the occupied territories, we have appealed to the Security Council to prevent the liquidation of our people, to prevent the physical liquidation of our masses in the occupied territories. This fascist onslaught we are now facing necessitates that we seek a clear international stand to match the clarity of the situation itself. Our national and human rights and our right to self-determination can no longer be doubted. Equally, the Zionist racist and fascist policy is now quite clear and it has been condemned and is self-incriminating. World public opinion should urge the United States to see the situation as it really is, and the Arab world in particular should bring the United States face to face with the facts and also face to face with an Arab world that knows its interests and defends these interests, and an Arab world that wants to know where it stands as far as the rest of the world is concerned. Is international resolve going to remain at the mercy of the U.S. veto and European hesitation? Will the world and mankind continue to suffer from the U.S. policy and arrogance? We believe that the situation now is different. There is no justification whatsoever for the lack of a clear stand regarding the present realities. We must face the United States so that it may face itself and think about its future and its relations with the Arab world.

Speaking about the mentality of Menahem Milson, head of the so-called civilian administration which the Zionist occupation authorities are trying to impose on the people of the occupied territories by force of arms, al-Shak'ah said: From my experience with Menahem Milson when he was political adviser to the commander in chief, I can say that he is a man who does not respond to

anything, a man who only knows what is in his head. He never changes and never responds. He is a professor but he is the captive of the racist ideas filling his head. He knows nothing about democracy and about dealing with others and with the realities. Menahem Milson exposed his real face during his recent [press] conference in which he made it clear that the civilian administration stems from military decisions and is a part of the military rule. Of course he wants to give the civilian administration the military strength to ensure its continuity and to justify the repressive and terrorist measures aimed at giving his civilian administration a free hand and breaking our people's will to reject this administration and reject the annexation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. Naturally, his interpretation of democracy and the recent elections was clearly a Zionist fascist interpretation. He claimed that the elections were held under the threat of the PLO. The elections were in fact born of the will and desire of the PLO, and the occupation authorities have no right to change the laws and social conditions in the occupied territories. In the beginning the general view was against the elections but the occupation authorities in 1972 forced the municipal councils to participate in the elections. The councils in 1972, of course, proved that they were with the people. The 1976 election [results] were an extension of the same patriotic line. We support the PLO, not out of fear or hypocrisy and not on tribal or sectarian basis, but as an expression of our people's deep unity and common destiny under the leadership of the PLO which represents us soundly and democratically. Like Sharon, Milson wants to nullify what is legal as being illegal. In their eyes it is illegal to belong to the PLO. To Sharon and Milson this illegal body stands against their rule and against their military laws, their occupation and annexation of the territory.

Referring to the recent claim by the enemy's minister of aggression, Sharon, that what is going on in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is a war between Israel and the PLO and not between Israel and the Palestinian people because, terrorist Sharon says, the Palestinian people do not unanimously recognize the PLO, al-Shak'ah said: It was not only Sharon who claimed this. Milson said the same thing. They have in fact confirmed their intentions to wage a genocidal war against our Palestinian people, because there is nobody in the occupied territories who does not believe that the PLO is his sole and legitimate representative. Sharon and Milson are trying to justify their war to annihilate the Palestinians.

On the importance of the Saudi role at this stage of the Palestinian struggle and steadfastness in the occupied Arab territories, al-Shak'ah said: There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is playing a major role on the Arab and international levels. I am certain that Saudi Arabia is playing an important part at this severest phase in the history of the Palestinian and Arab causes, because Saudi Arabia has an influence in the world. Naturally the Saudi role should form the basis of a unified Arab stand against the fascist and Nazi danger. In the occupied territories, in southern Lebanon and in the Golan Heights there is a danger threatening our existence, our nation, our safety, our peace, our stability and progress. Saudi Arabia should play a pioneering role in our hot confrontation with fascism. It is actually playing a pioneering and important role. Nobody doubts the importance of what the kingdom is doing.

Karim Khalaf, the Ramallah mayor who was dismissed by the Zionist authorities after the escalation of the popular uprising in the villages and towns of the West Bank, spoke to AL-RİYAD from his home in Jericho where he has been placed under house arrest by the occupation authorities to prevent him from participating in the people's uprising in Ramallah and the rest of the occupied territories. Karim Khalaf said: The popular uprising is continuing. Our young people and our women, children and elderly people are defying the occupation authorities and their repressive measures. The authorities are causing the escalation because they want to impose the so-called civilian administration by force. The popular uprising has extended to all the towns and villages of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Our masses are still confronting the troops, tanks and bullets of the occupation authorities and resisting the military occupation machine. We thank God for our magnificent young people and we are proud of our masses. Our dismissal from our posts was an illegal move to get rid of the Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories who openly support the PLO. The authorities want to replace us with the so-called village leagues which our masses reject.

Referring to his removal from Ramallah to Jericho, the Ramallah mayor said: This step was taken to prevent me contacting and mingling with the Ramallah masses and Municipal Council members, and also to prevent me from coordinating with them. The authorities do not seem to realize that I have so far received over 2,000 people from Ramallah who have come to visit me.

On Menahem Milson and the civilian administration, Khalaf said: Milson is a general in the occupation army and a professor who wants to prove that he is the strong man who can annex the West Bank and implement the autonomy scheme in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and who can annex the territory without the population. We, however, as municipal councils legally elected by our masses, have resisted him and we decided not to meet with him, whatever the cost. We placed these decisions on record in the minutes of the official meetings of the municipal councils, and we all signed them, each council separately. This was a slap in the face for chief civilian administrator Menahem Milson. He is a man bent on flexing his muscles internally and internationally. Internally, he wants to demonstrate that he can succeed where the military governors have failed. Internationally, he wants to show the world that the Palestinian Arab people can live with the occupation. This theory has failed. It has been foiled by our masses. Our people have frustrated Milson's aims and aborted his policy, and they have marched forward supported by us against the civilian administration. The fact that seven people were martyred and over 35 people wounded in the occupied territories only confirms this.

Commenting on terrorist Sharon's claim that the current conflict in the occupied territories is between Israel and the PLO, not Israel and the Palestinian people, because the Palestinian people do not unanimously recognize the PLO, Karim Khalaf, the mayor of Ramallah, said: All the Palestinian people in the occupied territories support their leadership, the PLO. The real battle is currently between these Palestinian Arab people in the occupied territories and the Israeli offensive, not defensive, army. This army is armed to the teeth with tanks, armored vehicles, planes and other weapons, and we are unarmed, but we are defying and confronting it with all

our strength, because God is with us and our will is strong. If the Zionists have managed to occupy the land, they will never conquer our will and our dignity.

Asked if the Zionist campaign to liquidate the patriotic leadership represented by the mayors of the towns and villages of the occupied territories will continue, Karim Khalaf said: Actually, the target at the beginning was the three mayors who have been dismissed, but now there are others who are awaiting the same fate as us, if, God willing, they prove to Menahem Milson that they are just the same as Karim Khalaf, Bassam al-Shak'ah and Ibrahim al-Tawil. We have seen what the authorities have done to Brother Wahid al-Hamadallah, mayor of 'Anabta, and what they are still doing to him. They have brought him to trial and then the trial was postponed. This is one way to get rid of Brother Wahid al-Hamadallah. He will be the next mayor to be dismissed by the Israelis. They think that they can replace us by the so-called village leagues, but I assure you that nobody will be able to, or will dare to, enter the municipalities of Nabulus, Ramallah and al-Birah to occupy our posts because our masses would trample underfoot whomsoever might do so.

Commenting on the Arab and international reaction to the current uprising in the occupied territories, Karim Khalaf said: We have been watching these reactions. What is important for us is the unity of Arab ranks and the unity of Arab attitude. We pray God to guide our kings, presidents and amirs so that they may stand as one man and work in earnest with all their resources--not just by issuing statements--to help their brothers who are living under the yoke of the occupation and against whom all kinds of unprecedented bestial repressive measures are being used. On behalf of our masses in the occupied territories, I appeal, through the newspaper AL-RIYAD, to the Arab leaders, from the [Persian] Gulf to the [Atlantic] Ocean, to realize well that Zionism is the enemy of all people. It is the enemy of the Palestinian people and the Arab people as a whole. It is also the enemy of the Jews. The Zionist ambitions do not stop at the borders of Palestine, but cover the entire Arab world. We must prove to the whole world that we have the manpower as well as the material, mental and technical capabilities necessary to steer the world in the direction we wish, not vice versa. We can put all kinds of pressure on all states in the world, through the means we possess, with the aim of saving our brothers in the occupied territories against whom all kinds of brutal repressive measures are being used.

Referring to the U.S. policy on the Palestine question and to the current UN Security Council debate on the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf said: First of all, I personally do not have any faith and will never have any faith in U.S. policy. This policy is now quite clear. The United States defends Israel and works day and night to encourage Israel to confiscate our land and homeland, and to build settlements and repress us. Before I was dismissed from my post I summoned all the U.S. and European consuls in Jerusalem, informed them of the seriousness of the situation and told them that their states would be held fully responsible if they remain passive vis-a-vis the measures taken against our people. They promised to pass on the message, and American and European public opinion began to move, but the attitude of the United States is now known to every Palestinian and Arab brother.

Talking about UN resolutions, Karim Khalaf said: Like all other UN resolutions, the Security Council resolution will be shelved and left to collect dust. If you dig into the UN archives you will find scores of resolutions urging sanctions against Israel, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, and so on. All this is useless as long as the Arab states are divided. If the Arab states do not stand united we will all be lost. In the name of Arabism, of Arab blood and of all the Arabs, I appeal to our nation to unite its ranks in support of their brothers who, as I have said, are living under the worst conditions known to man. Rest assured that we will die clinging to our land even if we have to subsist by eating grass.

Asked about the reasons that prompted the occupation authorities to exacerbate the situation at this particular time and to try to impose civil administration by force, Karim Khalaf said: This escalation is a first step in annexing the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip by getting rid of the elements resisting the plans of the authorities. Thank God we have foiled their plans and we will do so in the future. The occupation authorities have come up with the so-called village leagues, and through the village leagues they want to impose the civil administration and thus perpetrate the occupation, annex the territory and regard us as inhabitants with no homeland, workers to serve them in the Zionist state. Our masses will never allow the village leagues to implement the plan. As I have said, the Zionist plan is to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To be honest with you, I say that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are de facto annexed to Israel. Israel wants to apply its laws to the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, not people, and wants us to rule ourselves so that we would not become citizens with a right to vote and with political rights to our land. This is the Zionist design and it is the first step toward the implementation of the Camp David agreements rejected by our masses.

On the Saudi role in these difficult circumstances in the life of the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied territories, Karim Khalaf said: We are proud of our Saudi brothers and we are very confident that the Saudi role is the most effective Arab role in the world. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the richest countries in the world and it has sincere men who can brandish the oil weapon against all the states that stand against the cause of their Palestinian brothers. We are confident that our brothers in the kingdom will respond to this call. They are all pioneers of Arab world, especially his majesty King Khalid and his royal highness Prince Fahd and all the Saudi officials. We expect them to take a firm stand toward the United States and the European states which are always against the Palestine cause and are always supporting the Zionists against the Palestinian Arab people who are part of this Arab nation and whose country, Palestine, is part of the greater Arab homeland.

In conclusion, Karim Khalaf had this to say to the Arab people: In the name of our masses inside, I greet the Arab brothers one by one, and I tell them that the stones in the occupied territories are moving and are fighting the occupation, but the planes, tanks and troops of the Arab nation remain silent.

Ibrahim al-Tawil, mayor of al-Birah who has been dismissed with all the members of the al-Birah Municipal Council and who is now under house arrest in al-Birah, said that the people in the occupied territories strongly resent the Israeli measures and attitude. He added that Israel has escalated its acts of aggression against the nationalists in the West Bank. The municipal councils have refused to work with the civil administration representing the military administration. The people also refuse to have any dealings with them.

He also said that the aim of the policy of collective dismissal of mayors is to promote certain solutions and to impose the civil administration in order to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel.

As to why Israel is carrying out such actions at this time in particular, al-Tawil says: In my view this is an attempt by the Israelis to gain, having lost in Sinai because they consider their withdrawal from Sinai as a loss and now they want to gain elsewhere.

Regarding terrorist Sharon's statements that what is taking place in the occupied territories is a war between Israel and the PLO and not between Israel and the Palestinian people because generally the Palestinian people do not recognize the organization, al-Tawil said that Sharon himself knows the answer to this. This problem is between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and not between the government and the PLO because it was the Israelis who in the first place started this battle; the PLO has nothing to do with this matter although 99 percent of the people in the occupied territory support the PLO.

As for how long the uprising against the occupation will last, al-Tawil said: I cannot give a date as to how long the uprising will last because of my confinement at my residence imposed on me by the authorities and the scant information I have as to what is going on outside. All the initiative is now that of the people who are taking decisions and putting them into effect by the means they deem fit. I have absolutely nothing to do with this but there is tremendous, strong nationalist feeling and the people reject Israeli maltreatment.

Addressing a word to the Security Council now meeting in New York to discuss the situation in the occupied territories, al-Tawil said: We hope the Security Council will see the truth; there is no doubt it knows the truth and therefore it must base its resolution on right and justice.

Regarding the Saudi role in the present situation facing the occupied territories inhabitants, al-Tawil said: The Saudi role is important and effective and we hope that the Saudi stand will strongly back the Palestinian stand inside the country. We do not forget the Saudi backing but we want more of such backing--political and moral backing rather than just financial. We are attaching great hopes to the Saudi role because the Saudi Arabian kingdom is a substantial power and widely respected in the world. It should exploit this power in all the international arenas, in the United Nations and in its dealing with the United States in particular.

Fahd al-Qawasimah, the mayor of Hebron [in exile], speaking from his residence in Jordan, hailed the uprising in the occupied territories. He said: Any words, however eloquent, are inadequate to express our greetings to our kinsfolk in the occupied territories, the people who have been struggling since the Balfour declaration and up to the present. They never tire and never falter and to date they are still offering victims and making sacrifices for the achievement of their right to life and freedom in their own homeland. These people have been in a state of uprising for 10 days and today this will culminate in a general strike in observance of the "day of the land." This will show that the people will not end their uprising until the civilian administration is brought down, the agent village leagues are removed and the people's aspiration for freedom and independence are realized. Although our people are suffering extremely because of the barbarous and fascist methods the enemy uses against unarmed citizens, their will is nevertheless stronger than all the arms the enemy is using daily in an attempt to subjugate our people in the occupied territories. A thousand greetings to all the people of the occupied territories--in Hebron, Nabulus, Jerusalem, Gaza, the Galilee and the Golan--and to every Arab fighting the occupation with every means at his disposal. With our bodies and blood we are standing against a heavily armed enemy; we only have two weapons, belief in God and belief in the country. Our weapons are more powerful because we believe in God and because our cause is just. The honorable fighters who are resisting the enemy plans and who yesterday brought about the downfall of the village leagues and who will tomorrow bring about the downfall of the civilian administration, which is trying to undermine our people and our cause, will eventually triumph. I believe that victory will be ours at the end.

Discussing the reasons of the Israeli arbitrary measures against the nationalist and leading personalities in the occupied territories, Fahd al-Qawasimah said: There is no doubt that occupation has for a long time been planning to get rid of the nationalist movement and its leadership, and above all the mayors. On 3 May 1980 I was expelled from the occupied homeland and later the occupation authorities tried to kill some of our fellow mayors but they failed. They now have begun to use new methods, the latest of which being what they did last week, namely to dissolve al-Birah Municipal Council and dismiss the mayors of Ramallah and Nubulus. The aim behind this is to eliminate the leadership in the West Bank. The authorities think that if they can silence Bassam al-Shak'ah, Karim Khalaf and Ibrahim al-Tawil, the West Bank will calm down or that they can achieve their objectives. But their hopes have been frustrated. Throughout their long history thousands of Palestinian leaders have been sacrificed but this people has never stopped producing and putting to the fore new leaders. All Palestinian people in the occupied territories are a Bassam al-Shak'ah or a Karim Khalaf. The occupation thought that by silencing the voice of the mayor of Hebron it would be able to take control of Hebron but now the voice of the mayor of Hebron is being heard on a larger scale. In the past we were able to move only inside the occupied territory boundaries but today we are moving within the boundaries of the whole world. The people of Hebron, although they have lost their mayor, are struggling even harder and have become stronger and more resolved behind their leadership. The aim of the occupation is to get rid of this leadership thinking that through the village leagues which it

manufactured and created can control the West Bank and Gaza. The British mandate in 1930 and 1938 tried to use the same methods but it failed then and so will the Zionist plan.

Regarding terrorist Ari'el Sharon's allegations that the people's uprising is a war between Israel and the PLO and not between Israel and the Palestinian people because these people, according to him, do not recognize the PLO, the banished mayor of Hebron Fahd al-Qawasimah said:

This talks is unacceptable. Time and time again we have proved by all means available to us that all the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territories are behind their PLO leadership. We proved this in a practical manner when we sent to Palestine National Council [PNC] Chairman Khalid al-Fahum petitions signed by all the elected municipal councils, the village councils, the elected professional unions, the chambers of commerce, the charitable societies and all the citizens concerned with political matters--that is, petitions signed by more than 2,000 elected persons inside the occupied territories--expressing support for the PLO. If Ari'el Sharon refuses to admit that the Palestinian people believe that the PLO is their sole legitimate representative then I challenge him from here, from Amman, to hold a referendum or new municipal council elections to see who represents the Palestinian people. If the outcome was not 100 percent then he will have been right. But I challenge Sharon's and Menahem Milson's allegations because the Palestinian people consider the PLO their legitimate and sole leadership not only today but ever since it came into being in 1964.

As to how long he expects the uprising of the Palestinian Arab people to go on, the mayor of Hebron said: Our people's uprising began in 1967 and has passed through various levels of tension. Today the uprising in the occupied territories takes the form of direct clash and total confrontation with the enemy. It will continue; sometimes it calms down and other times it erupts, depending on the behavior of the enemy and the subjective conditions of the Palestine problem. I believe that this time the uprising will last for a long time and might extend until after 25 April.

Speaking about the Arab and international reaction to the present general situation in the occupied territories, al-Qawasimah said: There is no doubt that Arab and international reactions have been good but we demand more. I might be satisfied with the international reaction but there is need to consider a better Arab reaction. I believe that at this stage we need to hold an Arab summit whose sole topic will be the occupied territories, how to support our people there, how to enable them to remain steadfast, and how to face up to the Israeli arrogance which knows no bounds and which can no longer be tolerated. I believe that at this stage we need a thorough Arab reevaluation; we also need to get together, to close ranks and to adopt one and the same stand. What is happening in the West Bank and Gaza is an attempt at the complete Judaization of the area and the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza sector so that the whole Palestinian territory becomes the land of Israel. After which the enemy will go on to annex other lands.

[Al-Qawasimah continues] We and all the Arab regimes are now called upon at this stage to make a correct evaluation because the plans, designs and attempts of the enemy know no limits and will not stop or cease until the West Bank and Gaza are completely annexed--an annexation that will be followed by the expulsion of the Palestinian people from their land by overt and covert means. The enemy is now trying to implement the ugliest kind of collective punishment against our people in order to force them to leave the country; he is imposing unprecedented taxes so that the citizen will be unable to bear the tax burden and thus leave the country so that the land will be left without inhabitants, in which case the enemy will claim the right to settle on it. Therefore, in view of this firm stand by our people in the occupied territories and their resistance to occupation with all their means the Arab nation is called upon at this time in particular to go examine its conscience so that we may ask ourselves what our duty is in the face of this challenge. Is making statements of support and condemnation enough? Is it enough to say that our kinsfolk in the occupied West Bank are brave? Is it enough to applaud the blood that is daily flowing from our sons there? Is it enough to applaud them and sing their praise on the radio and television and in the newspapers?

We might accept such a thing from the European countries and might accept it from non-Arab peoples, but the attitude of the Arab nation should be quite different. We must think how we can save these people who have been suffering for 35 years and resisting all the methods of occupation in the forefront of the Arab nation and defending the Arab nation's honor and dignity. If the Palestinian people fall then the Arab nation's honor and dignity as well as the Palestinian land will fall. This is the crux of the matter on the basis of which we, as a nation, should act.

With regard to the current Security Council discussions on the situation in the occupied Arab territories, al-Qawasimah said: With due respect to the United Nations and all world bodies I would like to say that I, as the mayor of Hebron, obtained three unanimous resolutions from the Security Council, the latest of which was on 20 January 1980 confirming my right to return to my country and requesting Israel to implement it. But the Israelis, with their usual arrogance, rejected the resolution and have not allowed me to return even some 18 months after the resolution. Supposing we succeed in obtaining a resolution from the Security Council condemning the Israeli actions and demanding that Israel abrogate its decision, I am sure that they will reject such resolutions and not a single one of them will be implemented. Therefore, what can the Security Council do and what more can we ask from it other than condemnation. If we ask the Security Council to impose sanctions on Israel in accordance with the laws, the United States will block such a resolution as has happened in the case of the Golan Heights. Therefore, the problem will not be solved at the Security Council and there will be no more than condemnation. The real solution should come from the Arab capitals and stem from within the Arab nation so that we can thank our friends and tell our enemies: "We stand against you because you stand against the justice of our causes."

We demand justice and right; we demand just peace; and we demand the application of the international law which all the world has recognized and which the United States has endorsed. But this new entity, Israel, rejects all this. Is the Security Council able to reinstate al-Shak'ah in his post? Is the Security Council able to reinstate Ibrahim al-Tawil in his post? Is the Security Council able to stop colonization and the building of settlements? Is the Security Council able to stop the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan? Is the Security Council able to stop the daily changing of laws and regulations that is taking place in the occupied territories. I am sure that the Security Council is impotent and its impotence is due to the total U.S. bias in favor of the Zionist entity. And as long as this bias exists, the Security Council will have no prestige or power. Therefore, we must deal more with our cause within the Arab capitals than inside the international organizations because if we deal with it honestly and seriously within the Arab capitals then this will force the United States to change its policy so that it becomes more evenhanded and the Security Council will likewise become more evenhanded, in which case we will be able to achieve positive results.

[Al-Qawasimah continues] With regard to the Saudi role in the current Palestinian Arab struggle in the occupied Arab territories which has been heightened by the popular uprising, al-Qawasimah said: There is no doubt we feel that the Saudi Arabian kingdom is showing deep interest in our cause and in the occupied land. But we demand stronger stances in order to bring about a change in the U.S. posture so that it will become more balanced. We realize the weight of the Saudi Arabian kingdom and its great influence on changing U.S. policies. Therefore, although we feel that the Saudi brothers are aware of this, we ask them to do more because the sufferings of our people in the occupied territories have reached a point where silence can no longer be maintained. We demand that our Saudi brothers make more moves via all channels in order to stop what is happening in the occupied territories by bringing pressure to bear on the United States not only through condemnation but also through [Saudi Arabia] changing its attitude, imposing its presence in the arena and exploiting its capabilities in order to stop what Israel is doing, because as long as the United States is backing the Israelis and helping them financially the Israelis will not go back on their decisions. The Saudi Arabian kingdom and all the Arab countries are called upon to tell the United States: "Either you stand with justice or you are against us; if you will not stand with justice then we will use all our resources and weapons that are capable of changing the U.S. stance."

With regard to Wahid al-Hamadallah, the mayor of 'Anabta, who is now facing charges in an Israeli military court that might lead to his dismissal from his post, he dictated to AL-RIYAD the following statement which he prepared 3 days before appearing before the military court on Tuesday on the charge of having left the town of 'Anabta to visit Tulkarm and Ramallah contrary to the Israeli authority's decision banning him from leaving the town. In his statement to the Palestinian people in the occupied territories al-Hamadallah says:

First I would like to draw attention to the fact that, as a Palestinian Arab and not just as a mayor, I should not stand idly by while daily seeing

the most fundamental rights being violated on our land by the Israeli military authority. I consider it my right to resist occupation, colonization, violence, and aggression which is being committed against my great Palestinian people, despite the fact that I carry no gun. But we are facing such actions with faith and a strong will just like all conquered people in the world do. In the light of the above, I would like to make the following remarks:

1. A military order that is issued against me or against a Palestinian citizen is not a divine and sacrosanct right that must be obeyed. Rather it is my right to self-expression that is sacrosanct.

2. The Israeli occupation of my country by the force of arms is an act of aggression that the world community has condemned. It was not logical argument and the demand for rights that was condemned.

3. I would like to tell those who use the gun as a toy and who use it to kill our sons and daughters every day that a gun that is not backed by right cannot subdue a people, regardless of the situation. Also all the inhuman actions that they commit daily cannot silence a voice that is seeking freedom and which considers that its existence depends on its unfaltering struggle.

4. As a Palestinian, I tell those who have been blinded by power and domination that although they can imprison me or deport me from my country or even kill me they can never silence in me the voice of freedom that will continue to be heard loudly whether inside or outside the municipality and to be heard from all sons of our heroic people who say with one voice: "Hands off my homeland; no! to occupation, no! to colonization, no! to bloody violence, no! to violation of the people's right, no! to repressive measures, no! to Camp David and no! to the civilian administration; yes! to honorable peace based on justice and yes! to the independent Palestinian state on the holy Palestinian land."

5. I would like to ask the Israeli people the following: By what right can you talk angrily about Nazism and its actions against you at a time when your leaders are committing actions far worse than you suffered at the hands of Nazism.

Finally, I would like to greet the heroic Palestinian people and tell them: I pledge to you my loyalty and love and I promise you that I will remain an honorable and strong struggler with you in order to preserve your honor and dignity to my last breath. I promise my beloved country that I will prevent its being auctioned off as a commodity in the imperialist market and I pledge to remain forever one of the honorable sons of this country. God is great. Honor to my great people and country.

Discussing the situation in the occupied territories, al-Haj Amin al-Nasr, the mayor of Qalqiliyah in the West Bank said:

The Nazi methods which Israel is using against us will only strengthen our belief and adherence to our just cause. Israel has confiscated our lands, expelled and imprisoned our children, imposed exorbitant taxes and fines on

us, limited the consumption of water for our orange groves and robbed us of our freedom. But what it could not rob us of is our national spirit and the air we breathe. The disbanding of al-Birah Municipal Council and the dismissal of the mayors of Nabulus and Ramallah and the trial of 'Anabta Mayor Wahd al-Hamadallah are only part of Israel's plan to evict us from our country and impose the civilian administration on us, the administration which we have refused and continue to refuse strongly. We will accept no alternative to the PLO as our representative inside and outside the country and we will not accept as a substitute for the establishment of our Palestinian state the solutions devised by Carter, al-Sadat and Begin and which they are trying to impose on us.

We appeal to the Arab and Islamic worlds to save us from this catastrophe which has befallen us. Some 2 million people appeal to the Arab and Islamic world to save them because we are going to be liquidated in this country. We hope that world conscience will awaken and support our just cause. We, the Palestinian people, are qualified to establish our own independent Palestinian state. Our uprising will continue. We have set the end of this month for it [as published] but if our demands are not met and the tough measures are not lifted we will go on with the uprising and we appeal to our Arab and Muslim brothers to support us.

Mayor of Bethlehem Isyas Frayj said that the situation in the occupied territories is very difficult. Strikes are being staged throughout the West Bank, businesses and schools are closed, there is a sense of outrage and the citizens feel that the Arab reaction to the situation is weak. They feel that nothing good will come out of resorting to the Security Council because it will only adopt a mild condemnatory resolution and will leave unchanged the painful reality in which we are living. We want a practical evaluation of the situation as statements of sympathy are not enough.

Regarding the Saudi role in the present stage of the Palestinian struggle, Frayj said: I highly appreciate the well-balanced and calm Saudi policy and I suggest the holding of an Arab summit in Riyadh and not in any other place so that the Arab leaders will come out with practical, effective and realistic resolutions.

Talking about the current situation in the West Bank and Gaza sector Tulkarm Mayor Hilmi Hannun told AL-RIYAD: The situation is extremely bad following the decision by the Israeli occupation authorities to dissolve the al-Birah Municipal Council and to dismiss the mayors of Ramallah and Nabulus. There are demonstrations throughout the West Bank and Gaza, the students are demonstrating everywhere, and military rule is tightening its grip on the West Bank and Gaza. All the terrorist measures which the Israeli authorities are taking are of no avail in the face of the Palestinian people's resistance. The uprising will continue as long as the Israeli Government insists on dismissing the mayors in retaliation for their demand for the right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territory under PLO leadership. As long as Israel continues to pursue this policy and refuses to meet any of the Palestinian people's demands I believe that the situation will get worse.

At the conclusion of AL-RIYAD's interviews with leaders of the Palestinian struggle, Mahmud al-Labadi, the PLO official spokesman in Beirut greeted the people's uprising in the occupied territories. He said: We can say that this mass uprising in the occupied territories is a source of pride and honor for the Palestinian people and all the Arab nation. It is a battlefield in which our unarmed people have fought with rocks against heavily armed Israeli soldiers. This uprising caused Arab and worldwide repercussions and moved the masses of the Arab nation. We have received letters of support for the PLO and for Brother Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] from all the Arab countries without exception. Demonstrations marched in Damascus, Beirut and Amman expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people. Demonstrations were also staged in Europe condemning the Zionist repressive measures against our people. There were demonstrations in France and Britain and even in the United States. However, the condemnation was not strong enough in that it condemned violence on both sides. Of course, we reject the idea that the people's uprising against occupation should be called violence. Today, which is the "day of the land" our people will come out in a general strike. Our people in the territories occupied since 1948 have agreed to stage a general strike on the "day of the land" in protest against the policy of land confiscation and of Zionist colonization in the occupied territories. Referring to the Security Council debate on Israel's barbarous measures, al-Labadi said: The Security Council is in the hands of the United States because it has the power of veto. We are not very optimistic about U.S. policy toward us because this policy is still hostile to us. The United States has no independent policy and all it does toward us is to follow the Israeli attitude; it adopts the Israeli attitude blindly and does not dispute it. It even seeks to impose it on our Arab nation and Palestinian people.

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ARAB INVESTORS' ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR INTERVIEWED

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[Interview with Ma'mun Ibrahim Hasan, director general of the Arab Investment Insurance Organization: "[Movement] in the Direction of an Arab Pool for Insuring Arab Exports Against Political Risks"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Arab Investments Suffer from the Problem of a [Bad Investment] Climate and from a Shortage of Expert Personnel.

The Ta'if Arab Investors' Conference Is a Practical Framework for Discussing the Problems of Investment in the Arab World.

Financing and Business Risk Insurance Are a Necessary Step to Strengthen the Competitive Capability of Arab Exports.

The first Arab Investors' Conference will be held next March in al-Ta'if, under the joint sponsorship of the Arab Investment Insurance Organization--the group which called for the conference to be held--the Economic Secretariat of the Arab League, and the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture in the Arab Countries. In an effort to shed some light on the purpose of this conference, which is the first of its kind, and in order to clarify the status of Arab investment and the role of the Arab Investment Insurance Organization and its projects, we conducted this interview with its director general, Mr Ma'mun Ibrahim Hasan.

[Question] What are the objectives of the Arab Investors' Conference which is to be held in al-Ta'if? What is the form which this conference will take?

[Answer] The basic objective of the conference is to provide a practical framework for discussing the problems of Arab investment in the Arab countries. In this regard it is necessary first of all to have the investors become better acquainted with each other and interact with each other better. Each of these investors has had his own experience, has his own point of view, and is making his own contribution. There should also be interaction and frank

and constructive dialogues between these investors and those who set the policies and create the articles of legislation which regulate investment in the Arab countries. In order to guarantee a practical orientation for the conference in al-Ta'if, we are endeavoring to have the discussions take place on the basis of studies which, starting today, are being prepared by teams which have been in the field [making field studies]. The studies will deal with the status of Arab investment in particular Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, and Somalia, which have been chosen from among those countries which are receiving investments. High officials from these nations will be invited to attend the conference and to participate in discussing the results of the studies and the remarks made by the investors. Everyone will have ample opportunity to express his points of view and make his suggestions. It should be mentioned that about 500 Arab investors who operate in various economic sectors will be attending the Ta'if conference and that the Federation of Arab Chambers [of Commerce] will perform the secretarial functions of the conference.

Developments in the Organization

[Question] At what stage is the Arab Investment Insurance Organization right now? And what have been the latest developments in its work?

[Answer] Work in the organization is going along quite well. We have accomplished a good deal in the field of insurance transactions. As for the areas of stimulation and guidance of investment, we have accomplished a great deal in the realm of collecting and processing information and studying the legal and actual situation which governs Arab investment in each country. It has now become possible for us to emerge into the limelight and play an effective role in making information available, increasing the awareness of the investors, and providing guidance for these investors.

For example, we have begun to publish serious studies and to provide practical help in the field of insurance and in the field of investment for businessmen. Furthermore, at the beginning of the new year we are going to begin the preparation of an encyclopedia of Arab investment laws which will include the investment laws and regulations, as well as the laws which supplement these investment laws and regulations, in every [Arab] country. We will also be publishing any amendments to these laws and other additions [to these laws and regulations] in the form of a permanent supplement to this encyclopedia. This will be done after we have published the guide to Arab investment laws. In addition to this, the organization has undertaken to draw comparisons between the advantages available in each country for foreign investment and the Unified Arab Investment Insurance Agreement which, in our view, constitutes the necessary minimum for stimulating Arab investment in the Arab countries, particularly by the private sector. One of the objectives which we are striving toward by making these comparisons is to help standardize the laws dealing with investment in the Arab world. We want to do this by means of bringing them more and more in line with the agreement, by standardizing the language and concepts used, and by standardizing and simplifying [investment] procedures. We are in contact with the ministers of finance in the Arab countries, and we are constantly discussing this orientation with them.

[Question] In your view, what is the basic problem faced by Arab investors?

[Answer] In a number of Arab countries you have the problem of a [negative] investment climate, especially the [lack of] incentives, insufficient development of legal and financial frameworks, bureaucracy, and inadequate infrastructures. Another great barrier is the lack of qualified personnel to administer investments. That is, there is a lack of persons who are specialists in the technique of preparing, implementing, and following up on [investment] projects. This barrier makes it necessary to expand the domain of those working in these areas within the Arab organizations so that they become tools to create expertise. Also, more training should be carried out in this field by educational institutes.

[Moving] in the Direction of Risk Insurance

[Question] How far has the activity of the organization in the field of insurance progressed in terms of its development?

[Answer] The most important event in this regard has been the organization's plan to insure exports against political risks. When such insurance contracts are introduced, they will play an important role in stimulating Arab trade. The merchants certainly want to cooperate, and they have an interest in doing so, in view of the fact that political problems between the Arab countries more than once have affected avenues of trade and the movement of commodities, capital, and persons. Naturally there still remains the problem of having to finance exports or insure them against business risks. These risks are generally not covered by insurance companies. In fact they are covered by government institutions such as Coface in France. This situation causes an inequality in competitive capability between foreign exporters and Arab exporters. Foreign exporters do not have a liquidity problem because it is possible for them to discount the value of the transaction at a favorable interest rate with the [government] organization involved, which also insures them against the risks of non-payment or failure to collect fees. These exporters are also able to immediately switch over to other operations and continuously move their goods. Naturally, the Arab exporters who do not have such backing (with the partial exception of Morocco) cannot compete with the foreign exporters.

[Question] Do you have the necessary expertise and informational capabilities in order to engage in providing insurance against political risks?

[Answer] We have come to have both expertise and a lot of good experience in providing what could be called an "Arab system" or "Arab model" for insuring investments. It is the only international investment system which includes several nations and which is applied in practice. Many international attempts have been made (about 15 projects) to establish investment insurance systems, but they never went beyond the realm of theory. Our system is the only one that has really begun to make headway. Naturally it was not easy to reach this degree of specialization. This is particularly true because political risks, as such, constitute a vast and complicated matter, and this matter requires information, precise definitions, and clarification of details in

order to avoid ambiguity and differing interpretations of contracts. Suffice it to say that the insurance policies against political risks which we write out are almost as thick as books because of all of the provisions, conditions, and provisos which they contain.

[Question] What plans do you have for expansion?

[Answer] There is no doubt that our capital has become too small for the size of [our] operations and for the potential for expansion which we sense due to the increasing demand for investment insurance contracts. More importantly, our capital has become too small for the risks in [individual] countries. In some countries the size of the risks which we are covering through our insurance approximates our total capital--which amounts to 25 million Kuwaiti dinars. This situation, in addition to the needs of the market itself, naturally requires an increase in the organization's capital. Also, one of the means which greatly increases the organization's margin of maneuverability is reinsurance of the risks which it accepts. However, the problem which we might face is the fact that the international market does not cover political risks. And if it does so, it does so at high prices. For this reason our objective now is to contribute toward the establishment of an Arab pool and toward getting Arab reinsurance companies to enter the field of political risk insurance in order to have the risks distributed as widely as possible.

[Question] How can Arab reinsurance companies, without disregarding rules of safety, provide reinsurance against these risks at a rate lower than that imposed by the world markets?

[Answer] There are several reasons why. In my opinion, the most important reason is the political backing which the Arab reinsurance companies enjoy due to the fact that most of them are either government companies or joint Arab companies. Any investment risk pool consisting of them will have great capacity. Furthermore, this pool will have means of intervening and means of achieving influence which foreign companies do not have. This will lessen the actual probability of the risk and consequently will allow the setting of lower premiums.

Lack of Expertise--A General Phenomenon

[Question] Have you been able to overcome the problem of [lack of] expertise and qualified personnel in the insurance field?

[Answer] Lack of expertise is a general and overall phenomenon in the insurance sector. This may be true because this sector grew so fast that its rates of growth sometimes were more like leaps. This created a great demand for this expertise before the market was prepared to furnish this expertise in a short period of time. One of the qualities which our personnel must have is that they must be people who are more versatile than normal insurance agents. They must be educated, must follow the course of the economy, must be familiar with the political situation, and must have the ability to analyze. In any case, we have been able to put a good team together. However, we do have a

certain rate of turnover in personnel. Some of those working in the organization are perhaps thinking about returning to their own countries in the near future or else they, like others, may become the targets of competing and tempting offers.

Training Can Only Do So Much

[Question] Does training not close this gap?

[Answer] Training can only accomplish so much, and it also has its problems. First of all, it does not solve the problem of our immediate lack of basic skills and qualified personnel. We need these skills right now, and we cannot afford to wait while they are being created. When one wants to attract such skills, one needs to invest [in them], and for this one needs resources. As for those employees on the beginning level, they must be selected from among the university graduates in certain fields such as, for example, business administration or economics. Usually there is a great demand for people who are outstanding in these fields. The competition for them occurs not [only] between insurance companies, but also between all the various business sectors. However, it is possible for us to attract [good] people. This is particularly true in view of the establishment of insurance institutes and in view of the increasing awareness of our university graduates of the opportunities for development which are provided by work and specialization in this field.

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CSO: 4404/238

FOREIGN LABOR COMPETITION HURTS ARAB WORKERS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1315, 15 Jan 82 pp 45-46

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "The Arab Labor Organization Faces an Asian Demographic Invasion of the Gulf Countries!"]

[Text] Millions of Arab Workers Are Unemployed Because of Foreign Competition.

According to estimates made by the UN and the International Labor Organization, the size of the Arab labor force by the end of 1980 was 45 million workers. Studies predict that this figure will increase to 60.5 million by the end of the eighties and 81 million by the year 2000.

The size of the Arab labor force is considered small in comparison to the total number of inhabitants [in the Arab countries]. The reason for this is that many of those capable of participating in the production process are not doing so, and also because of the enormous percentage of minors [in the Arab world]--a percentage which is as high as 50 percent, whereas this percentage does not exceed 28 percent in the industrial countries.

The Arab world, taken as a whole, represents the sixth-strongest [economic] power in the world after the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain. It is in fourth place in terms of gross national income and number of inhabitants, in second place in terms of total area, in first place in terms of reserves of the current principal source of energy, which is oil, and in terms of population growth. This latter item, in turn, has been a factor responsible for the rates of growth in the Arab labor force which vary between 2.5 percent and 3 percent annually. This is one of the highest growth rates in the world. In addition to this, Arab women are participating more and more in the production process.

So the Arabs possess surplus capital from their oil and, at the same time, they have a labor force. These two things are the basis for any development process. However, the question to be asked is: Is the available labor force large enough to meet the needs of development in the oil-producing countries?

In the context of explaining the level of employment in the non-oil producing Arab countries, Muhammad al-Amin Faris, one of the experts in the Arab Labor Organization, refers to the following points:

1. The existence of disguised unemployment in the agricultural sector, especially in Egypt, where such unemployment affects 45 percent of the male agricultural labor force (that is, 1.5 million unemployed persons).

2. Widespread disguised unemployment in the civil service sector in particular, especially in Egypt, Syria, and to some degree in Iraq. There is also unemployment in the marginal [economic] sector, especially in Tunisia and Algeria where people migrate from the countryside and proceed to work at low-paying jobs while they are waiting to get more profitable work in the modern economic sector.

3. Outright unemployment. In Morocco, for example, it was estimated that 11 percent of the labor force--that is, 550,000 persons--were [completely] unemployed at the end of 1977. University and labor union sources estimated this figure as being 1.2 million unemployed persons.

In addition to this unemployment, there is the matter of the Arab emigration to Western Europe. In all, more than 1 million workers, or about 2 million persons, have emigrated. Eighty percent of them are in France. These people are threatened with dismissal by various means (arbitrary dismissal, nominal compensation, and fictitious vocational training). The problem becomes more intense when there is a large percentage of unemployment in the countries they have migrated to (between 5 and 7 percent in Europe).

Thus in the Arab world there is a reserve labor force estimated to total millions of persons. Since the doors of immigration to Europe have been shut due to the unemployment problem which Europe is suffering from, transfer of the labor force remains the [only] effective means of achieving relative harmony between supply and demand. But here we run up against the political problem.

For more than 3 years dozens of economic and social agreements have arisen within the framework of the Arab League. Nearly all of them have provided for freedom of movement, residence, and work for Arab citizens in any Arab country. However, due to political reasons this freedom has never been put into practice. The reason has been the fear that increasing numbers of incoming Arab workers would come to dominate the politically-active groups and production installations and facilities in the countries that they go to work in. But it appears that what has actually happened is even more dangerous than this. This dangerous phenomenon is the increase in the Asian labor force in the Gulf area. A new study prepared by Dr 'Ali Labib, another of the experts in the Arab Labor Organization, points out that the percentage of Asians is continually increasing as compared with the percentage of Arab workers coming to the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and perhaps also Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, for example, incoming Arab workers represented 45 percent of the total foreign residents in 1971. This percentage decreased to 14.31 percent by 1977. On the other hand, the percentage of incoming Asians increased from 45.7 percent to 67.6 percent. Foreign Asian residents in Qatar represent 62.8 percent of all of the foreign residents, whereas foreign Arab residents amount to only half of this percentage.

What makes the situation more dangerous is that the demand for foreign Arab workers has decreased by 3.5 percent. At the same time, the demand for Asian workers has increased by far more than 3.5 percent. Some Western experts conclude that the only way the Arab countries which are rich in capital can continue to engage in economic expansion in the future is to resort to using an Asian labor force. This is based on the view that Asian workers are more skilled, more productive, less expensive to employ, are able to put up with tough living conditions, and do not intend to settle [in the Arab countries where they work!]

Dr Labib had the following remarks in response to this:

1. Arab development should depend upon its own capacities. A number of nations have tried this experience and have benefited from it. Also, it is not reasonable to bring in a foreign labor force when there is an estimated 4 million unemployed persons in the Arab world and the size of the Arab labor force is increasing by 1.5 million persons per year. No matter how much the Arab countries expand economically, it is not an easy matter for them to create additional work opportunities for all of these new workers.

2. The economies of the Arab countries are dominated by the agricultural sector. This is a sector which is not in need of intermediate-level skills. The services sector is a sector which performs services which rely on very low skill levels. At the same time, the industrial sector is still a modest one in most Arab countries and does not require a large percentage of the labor force. This is particularly true with regard to the petroleum sector since most of the petroleum is exported in the form of raw materials and since such petroleum, when processed, requires only a small and highly-skilled labor force. The fact is that the oil-producing countries are still engaged in building their economic infrastructures (roads, housing, etc.). All previous experience has demonstrated that the work done to build these infrastructures does not require a skilled labor force. Such work requires only an ordinary labor force of an intermediate skill level. This type of labor force is available in the Arab world. In addition to this, there is a surplus of skilled workers in some Arab countries, such as Tunisia, where the number of people seeking skilled labor jobs constitutes 30 percent of the total number of persons seeking work. We should also bear in mind that it was recently decided to establish, in Tripoli, Libya, the Arab Center for Vocational Training and for the Training of Vocational School Teachers.

3. There is no justification and no proof for the view that Asian workers are more productive than Arab workers. It is more likely that the social circumstances, cultural isolation, climate, and various other factors [in the Arab countries] make the Asian workers less productive than their Arab counterparts.

4. The Asian workers get paid less than the Arab workers. Nevertheless, no matter how small these wages [of the Asian workers] are, they represent a portion of economic benefits which are taken away from the native people of the Arab world and sent abroad.

5. The experience of the Western European countries indicates that foreign workers do not want to return to their own countries because they are afraid that their economic situation will be worse after they go back. This is what has been happening in all Western European countries since the seventies. This made it necessary to resort to the use of all types of arbitrary administrative and police means to compel the immigrants to go back to their own countries after it was demonstrated that the approach of trying to entice them to return home did not work. The process of expelling these workers has become a difficult and complicated matter, and because of this it is feared that the presence of the Asian labor force in the Arab countries will lead to problems of the same sort.

Some of the Western European countries have avoided the dangers of this immigration by carefully distributing the foreigners geographically and professionally. An example of this is the fact that both West German law and Austrian law have determined that the percentage of foreigners shall be no more than 15 percent of the total population in any district. In the smallest of the Arab countries, however, this percentage [of foreigners] is far higher. Experts do not consider it unlikely that the increase in foreign immigrants is taking place according to a prescribed plan to gradually, and without waging war, achieve domination over the area by means of demographic invasion.

Some of the dangers associated with this are the following:

1. Elimination of the national identity of the Arab inhabitants. This would take place by means of turning them into a minority group within the population which would no longer be able to determine the fate of the region after foreigners have come to constitute an overwhelming majority there.
2. Efforts by the foreigners to weaken the ties which link the Arab citizens--the natives of the country to which the foreigners are coming--to the rest of the Arab world. The foreign colonies might do this because they consider Arab nationalism to be a threat to their interests and to their existence as colonies.
3. Direct influence [by these foreigners] on the language. In the future this would lead to the creation of a new hybrid language which would have nothing at all in common with the Arabic language. This would weaken the national and cultural ties of the Arab Gulf countries to the rest of the Arab world. After reviewing the problem, along with the dangers involved in it, the question remains: What is the solution?

The director general of the Arab Labor Organization, Mr al-Hashimi al-(Bnani), considers that the only solution is to replace the foreign labor force with an Arab labor force. The Arab ministers of labor have made a series of decisions in this regard, but so far they have not been implemented.

The initial reason for thinking about creating an Arab agreement which would regulate the labor force in the Arab world was the fear of the danger of infiltration from Iran and the increase in Iranian immigration to the Arab Gulf countries during the sixties. The first conference of Arab ministers of

labor, which was held in Baghdad in 1965, called upon the Gulf nations to issue legislation which would guarantee limiting non-Arab immigration, encourage the movement of an Arab labor force to the Gulf area, and give this Arab labor force employment priority. The conference of Arab nations also demanded that the [Arab] labor force be encouraged to move to the Gulf area and demanded that missions be sent there to explain the danger of the non-Arab immigration to the Gulf countries. The second conference of Arab ministers of labor again discussed this subject and recommended that the legislation of each Arab nation contain provisions which would guarantee that the Arab labor force would have employment priority over the foreign labor force (Decision Number 22 2/D of 1966). The most important thing in this decision was the appeal to conclude bilateral agreements and prepare a multilateral agreement which would have the objective of facilitating the movement of the [Arab] labor force within the Arab world. Then the third conference of Arab ministers of labor gave its approval to the agreement in 1967. It was also ratified by the Arab League's Council in 1968, and after that it was ratified by six nations, most of whom are exporters of labor. It was ratified by Egypt in 1969, Jordan in 1970, Syria in 1970, Iraq in 1970, Sudan in 1972, and Libya in 1974. It was not ratified by any of the nations which are importers of labor--which means that it was not ratified by any of the Gulf nations. After further discussions and contacts it was decided to modify the agreement so that it would then deal with the matter of transfer of the labor force from the point of view of regulating this labor force transfer rather than from the point of view of "freedom of movement of the labor force." This is a realistic view which is made necessary by the desire to have the agreement implemented and have the countries be committed to it. [The agreement] concentrated on demanding that the member states set an immigration and labor force transfer policy which would have the objective of encouraging the transfer of the Arab labor force and gradually replacing the foreign labor force with an Arab labor force. This would be done by means of having a tripartite body conduct consultations with the three parties involved (the governments, the employers, and the workers).

In spite of the fact that a quorum of nations was attained for ratification [of this agreement], and although it was prescribed that a committee to follow up on the implementation [of the agreement] be formed, these steps were not taken. The reason for this is that some countries, especially the oil-producing countries, put Arab workers in the same category as foreign workers. There may be political reasons for this. Nevertheless, the Arab Labor Organization is continuing with its efforts and it is struggling to convince them to change their minds in this regard, and perhaps it will achieve its objectives.

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180; 4404/238

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS URGE CONTINUED UPRISING

NC281314 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1058 GMT 28 Mar 82

[Statement issued by the Palestinian National Institutions in the occupied territory]

[Text] At a time when our triumphant uprising is escalating to include all parts of the occupied homeland; at a time when the scope of total strike is expanding to all the villages, towns and camps and at a time when our enormous uprising has begun to cause confusion in the ranks of the neo-Nazis and disturb them and their village league collaborators, the generals and experts of repression are continuing their arrogance and are exerting their utmost efforts to silence us and to peddle their fascist schemes represented by the so-called autonomy preparatory to liquidating our just, legitimate cause which enjoys extensive international support.

Masses of our great people: Our sacred and legitimate uprising, which has inundated our land with chaste blood, has created a clear crisis in the ranks of the racist government and has shaken the throne on which terrorists Begin and Sharon and Nazi Milson and their small henchmen like Dudin, Qumsiyah and al-Khatib are sitting. This uprising shall be recorded in prominent letters in the history of our Palestinian struggle. Therefore, this uprising must continue and expand to overthrow all the plots and liquidationist schemes. Only by expanding and continuing our violent uprising can we compel Milson and his lackeys to gather their papers and leave for good, put an end to all the suspect and liquidationist conspiracies and schemes, and achieve all our inalienable national rights.

Our Palestinian masses: Let the strike deepen and expand. Let us join hands with the compatriots who are on strike in the Golan and who are insisting on attaining their just demands by their courageous stand so that we may realize our aims of liberation and of establishing our sovereign independent state under the leadership of the PLO, our legitimate and only representative. Let our uprising coincide with the day of the land on 30 March. Let our rendezvous be on the day of the land.

Our masses in the West Bank, Gaza, Galilee, Sakhnin and Golan, as well as in the Zionist detention camps: While we emphasize national cohesion, we call on the workers in all parts of the occupied land not to go to work on that day

and to participate in commemorating the day of the land. We also call on the masses of our Palestinian people abroad and the Arab people to join us in commemorating this day by holding festivals, marches and other activities.

Masses of our great people: While saluting your courageous uprising against the practices of the neo-Nazis and their henchmen, we reemphasize the need for continuing this uprising and expanding it and for its cohesion with the Golan and the day of the land. We are called upon today more than any time before to achieve more cohesion and to continue the march until we achieve all our people's aims, which are stipulated in the Palestinian national charter. All the national forces in the occupied areas must stand against occupation and its repressive practices, which are represented by the closure of Bir Zayt University, the disbandment of the municipal councils and shooting at the unarmed compatriots who only have faith in their cause.

It is only through national cohesion can all the plots aimed against our cause be frustrated and all the Zionist practices against our masses rejected. Let our people's uprising be a practical slogan for our national unity.

Long live the struggle of our heroic people; glory and immortality for the martyrs of the Palestinian people; disgrace for the neo-Nazis and their lackeys in the villages leagues; long live the struggle of our heroes in the Golan; long live the glorious 30-March, the day of the land; long live the PLO, the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Signed: The National Institutions in the Occupied Territory; [dated] 27 March 1982.

CSO: 4400/208

BRIEFS

EGYPTIAN-IRAQI MILITARY COOPERATION--Arab diplomatic sources have told AL-MAJALLAH that the number of Egyptian volunteers fighting alongside the Iraqis against Iran now exceeds 3,000. They added that the Egyptian volunteers include regular troops and that they are transported by special planes from an Egyptian airport to Baghdad. The same sources say that Egypt has also sent 250 military experts to Iraq to participate in the fighting, but Egyptian sources have refused to confirm this report. It is quite clear that Egyptian-Iraqi relations are now "stronger" than they appear to be on the surface. For example, in a press interview published last week President Mubarak said that his country supports Iraq in its war against Iran, and he criticized the Arab states taking sides against Iraq in this war. Meanwhile, Iraqi officials have expressed satisfaction that the question of holding the nonaligned summit conference in Baghdad in September has been settled in Iraq's favor. They said that 50 states, not counting the Arab countries, have notified Iraq that they will attend the conference. They added that the Arab states which have notified Baghdad that they will attend will be represented by their heads of state, and 25 other states will be represented by the second most important official. It is recalled that Iran launched a large-scale campaign in the nonaligned countries to prevent the holding of the nonaligned summit conference in Baghdad. Syria joined in this campaign recently. [From the "AL-MAJALLAH Correspondents" feature] [Text] [PM261027 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 27 Mar-2 Apr 82 p 10]

MAYORS CALLED TO STEP DOWN--Sidon, South Lebanon, 28 Mar (AFP)--George Habash, leader of the popular front for the Liberation of Palestine, called today on Arab mayors on the Israeli-occupied Jordan West Bank to step down. Dr Habash asked that the mayors adopt a position in solidarity with Mayors Bassam al-Shak'ah, Ibrahim Tawil and Karim Khalaf, who were removed for non-cooperation, and that they cease all contact with the Israeli administration. The PFLP's secretary general was addressing a meeting of solidarity with the West Bank Palestinians' protest movement at the refugee camp of 'Ayn al-Hulwah (?in Sidon) in his first public appearance after a long convalescence following brain surgery. Habash also called for an end to the collaboration of the main-line Palestine Liberation Organizations with Jordan on a joint commission monitoring the West Bank situation, recalling past Jordanian actions against the Palestinians. Another speaker at the same meeting representing the Marxist Democratic Front for the liberation of Palestine in South Lebanon, Abu Ziyad, called for an end to the ceasefire in that area concluded with the Israelis and the re-opening of fronts on the Israeli-annexed Syrian Golan Heights and in Jordan. [Text] [NC282158 Paris AFP in English 2137 GMT 28 Mar 82]

LOAN TO MAURITANIA--The Arab Economic and Social Development Fund signed a loan agreement with Mauritania in Kuwait today. The fund will extend a 1.5 million Kuwaiti dinar loan to Mauritania for financing the maintenance of the (Boghe Kihidi) road. The agreement was signed by Dr Muhammed al-'Imadi, the fund's director general, and by the Mauritanian ambassador to Kuwait. [GF221317 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1105 GMT 22 Mar 82]

CSO: 4400/208

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ANTINARCOTICS CONFERENCE ENDS--Medina, (KUNA)--The Islamic antinarcotics conference ended here yesterday after adopting several proposals to deal with problems of narcotics, alcoholism and smoking. The forum stressed the need for dealing with these problems on radio and television and resolved that the dangerous habits of Muslim youth were the direct result of the present spiritual vacuum. Delegates to the conference recommended the coordination of educational and social programmes for youth activities and called for inter-Islamic cooperation in that respect. The conference called on all Islamic states to prohibit production and import of alcoholic drinks, narcotics and tobacco and the creation of an international fund to help fight the menace. The meeting stressed the need to protect Muslim minorities in other countries against the after-effects of drugs, alcohol and narcotics. [Text] [GF271420 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 27 Mar 82 p 1]

CSO: 4400/205

PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

KUWAIT DAILY CARRIES BISHARAH INTERVIEW

GF310520 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 29 Mar 82 pp 8, 18

["Exact test" of interview with GCC Secretary General 'Abdallah Bisharah by Dr Muhammad al-Rumayni, telecast on Kuwait's "The Gulf Today" program on 20 March 1982]

[Text] [Question] Brother 'Abdallah, we welcome you to "The Gulf Today." Now that the GCC is officially almost 1 year old, many resolutions have been issued and many meetings have taken place. What, in your opinion, is the citizen's direct benefit? Has the Gulf citizen benefited directly from the GCC?

[Answer] Thank you, doctor. I am very pleased to be with you in this episode. I always say it is very useful to intensify our contacts, talks and dialogue about the GCC. I say this as a result of my belief that there has to be a Gulf public opinion to reach an understanding with the GCC, discuss and attempt to establish some sort of debate with the council on its usefulness, progress and benefits. Without this public opinion--which is a sort of unseen and quasi-constitutional parliament in the modern term--the GCC would become some kind of an intergovernmental channel bypassing public opinion and the region's popular channels. This kind of meeting, I believe, meets our requirement for establishing a useful, dialoguing, observant and searching public opinion.

You asked me what the GCC has achieved during its 1-year or 8-month March. I say in complete honesty that there has been an achievement that may even be considered a miracle. In my opinion--not in my capacity as the secretary general, but I say this objectively as a Gulf citizen--this is true for two reasons. The first is visible. The philosophy of the GCC is, as it was when the council was formed, integration, cooperation and coordination among the member states in all fields. That excludes no field, whether political, pertaining to life or even concerning amusement or anything else. This is aimed at promoting Gulf unity. That is, the GCC is integrating, coordinating and cooperating with the aim of achieving the ultimate goal of unity. Good. The march of Gulf action started through the cooperation council's commercial and economic framework that is felt daily by the citizens. Immediately following the signing of the GCC's agreement on 25 May 1981, the finance ministers met and formulated a comprehensive economic agreement that would transform the Gulf region into what resembles an united economic community according to which

all barriers that separate citizens in Kuwait from those in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be removed. The agreement formulated in this way by the finance ministers was then submitted to their majesties and highnesses the leaders of our council during their meeting in Riyadh in November. The agreement was signed by their majesties and highnesses and will be effective in a few days because its enforcement takes effect 4 months from the day on which it was signed. In fact we did not wait for that date on which the agreement becomes effective. The finance and economy ministers met recently because they were the ones who formulated the agreement and they are considered its godfather. They met for the second time and did what? They allotted responsibility for the agreement. They gave each minister his responsibility in order to adopt the executive measures for implementation of this economic agreement. As a result of the finance ministers meeting, the petroleum ministers met and discussed their share of the agreement and adopted general steps. They agreed on petroleum industry coordination and perhaps political integration as well. This was the share of the petroleum ministers. The ministers of commerce will meet soon in order to discuss and receive their share of the agreement. The ministers of housing will also meet. The ministers of industry have met and taken their share. They have also laid down the framework for industrial cooperation that will ensure homogeneity and avoid duplication and contradiction. This is in the commercial, financial and economic field which represents the millstone and backbone of the GCC.

Then we came and said: Good; this is beautiful and this is what the citizen wants. However, the citizen may say: What is the benefit of economic progress, development and prosperity if this is not accompanied by security, stability and ability to implement the principles affirmed by their majesties and highnesses, who are our leaders? These principles firmly adhere to non-alignment and opposition to the presence of the superpowers in the region, opposition to infiltration, a principled opposition, and this confuses the Gulf citizen. We said: In this case, since the Gulf citizen possesses prosperity and we want to secure this prosperity, there has to be security and a framework of stability for this prosperity in order to secure the citizen's tranquility. Thus the defense ministers and interior ministers met. What did the interior ministers do? They agreed--and in my opinion this is a very important matter, no less important than the economic agreement--to sign a comprehensive security agreement among the six states. They requested the general secretariat to draft this agreement. We are now in the process of drafting it. It will be submitted to the interior ministers in October in order to initial it prior to submitting it to the supreme council.

The defense ministers also met and formulated the defense framework of the GCC states. We must not exaggerate in the defense field. They discussed only means to recognize areas of weakness and strength and means to coordinate among the member states and recognize the security and defense capabilities of each state. They laid down this framework.

In fact we proceed in parallel paths that are based on financial and economic cooperation and complementary security and defense cooperation. I believe we have made big strikes. As I see it, we may be in more of a hurry than is justified.

[Question] Brother 'Abdallah, this is a comprehensive idea about coordination steps and various meetings. It gives the viewers a lot of information. But the viewers and newspaper readers who are more or less in touch with what is taking place in the Gulf see and read daily that there are, for instance, different economic and petroleum policies, as you know, particularly as regards the issue of production. The GCC members have different views on this issue. There is also disagreement on some border questions as was mentioned in the press recently. When the citizen encounters this kind of information that is published by the Gulf and world media, he asks: What is meant by the GCC? Is it only meetings and documents to be signed or there are practical matters that must take place. We hope you will talk about the oil issue as well. Are there unified policies on it?

[Answer] Brother, this pleases me. As we said, our march in the GCC began 8 months ago. The council includes sovereign states that had for quite some time been pursuing policies that stemmed from their own convictions. Suddenly, we found ourselves within the framework of the GCC. In fact it takes time to coordinate these states within a single integrated framework. It also takes time to give up many prerequisites of national sovereignty. I can talk in detail about this issue, but I say briefly that we have entered the stage of collective work. This stage means that each state should relinquish many of the requirements and distinctions of national sovereignty because sacrifices and concessions are involved in collective action. In fact we have begun to accept the stage of concession in order to achieve the goal of integration. Concerning the question of oil and petroleum, of course, there were no different policies but, on the other hand, the policies were not integrated or united. However, when the petroleum ministers met in Riyadh in January they discussed this issue and came up with a unified framework for their petroleum policies, whether regional, Arab or international or on the question of production. I am confident that as a result of this a big stride has been taken toward achieving integrated coordination. Naturally we cannot achieve 100 percent of what we need all of a sudden because even on the concept of sovereignty we are still tentative. The concept of sovereignty is a Western concept and we still, in fact, adhere to it to the maximum. Due to the fact that collective action is new to us, there may be some gaps. We admit that. In spite of all this, in my opinion, the oil ministers achieved a good framework of integration and coordination. The oil policies of the GCC states have become much closer, whether in rationing internal oil consumption or in their stands toward regional, Arab and international questions and even in the industrial integration of oil products. Now they have entered the stage of production.

You have raised a point that I must consider and that was the question of border differences. Yes, there are differences but these are differences of our legacy. In fact that legacy was the result of individual action and the result of the Gulf's historic and political circumstances.

I have come from Riyadh, from the GCC ministerial council and foreign ministers conference, where the disagreement between Qatar and Bahrain over Hawar Island was discussed in detail. It was said that originally this dispute should not have been raised so long as we are within a huge and gigantic framework, the framework and dynamism of the cooperation council, which does not accept a dispute that is formal in appearance but in fact is inherited and which contra-

dicts the dynamism, hugeness and size of the cooperation council. In fact, it took only one session--I don't want to say the dispute was reduced--to resolve this dispute which suddenly erupted between Bahrain and Qatar. I was with the foreign ministers in the ministerial council. In just a brief session, the crisis was resolved as a result of the spirit that prevailed. In fact that spirit is an outcome of the GCC. This outcome may not be visible but one can feel it, particularly those who work in politics or on other questions. The cooperation council was born and has in fact created a unified spiritual framework in the Gulf. The council has given its citizens a kind of reinforcement--not only a political reinforcement but also a kind of an invisible support on which they could rely. It has also given them comfort. When this point was discussed during our meeting in the ministerial council, I kept silent but I was watching the dynamic consiliatory power that was enforced on the ministerial council, on the Bahraini foreign minister and the Qatari foreign minister. This crisis will disappear and be eliminated. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia was charged with resuming its efforts immediately as the party which was involved in the problem for some time. I am confident that in view of the huge accomplishments, interjoining interests of the Gulf citizens, the elimination of barriers and the organization and bolstering of the Gulf home, all these issues will end.

There are differences, doctor. We know that. But we also know that Mecca was not built in a day and we know that the concept of sovereignty is an imported concept to which we fully adhere. We also know that collective action requires sacrifice. We must make this sacrifice and obey its requirements or else we shall not be able to achieve collective action. However, I am certain that we have achieved, in spite of these concepts that we adhere to--and these are deep-rooted concepts--that there is serious, determined and spontaneous acceptance of the requirements of collective action.

[Question] Brother 'Abdallah, referring to the issue we spoke about a short while ago--that is, the issue of economic and petroleum coordination--it seems that many problems have started to be solved including border problems. However, some people raise an important question which is also related to coordination in the Gulf home as you call it. This question is on the differences in foreign policies and the various judgments in foreign policy within the framework of this single Gulf home. There are, for instance, some countries which contact or offer facilities to superpowers in the region. It seems that some other states don't desire this kind of facility and approve it only unwillingly. In fact the question here is not a matter of a border problem that can be solved between two parties and not an economic problem that can be settled. In this case there might be a third party. Thus the question may be more difficult and less easy to solve. Has a discussion within this framework taken place in the GCC?

[Answer] An extensive discussion has taken place on this issue. In fact, we have to admit that the GCC is not a flower garden at present. I admit this. It is a garden in which there are flowers. These flowers are the military cooperation among its members--military cooperation not in the form of an alliance or bloc but to preserve these principles which are emphasized by their majesties and highnesses. Good. We said it is military cooperation that means

we cannot allow a country to depend on foreign powers. This principle has been accepted. The problem is: When will this Gulf military force which is being formed be an alternative or when will it engender convictions for some countries to dispense with foreign powers? We are trying to take the steps necessary to create a Gulf military force to be the substitute for any possible dependence on foreign powers. This is not easy. I tell you frankly this is the subject of the inaudible dialogue currently going on among the GCC countries: How can we achieve this intrinsic Gulf strength? We said: Let us start with modest steps. Now every Gulf country is sitting doing nothing. We are now getting acquainted with each other's potentials. We did not form NATO, or the Red Army, or the Warsaw Pact. We are conscious of our strength and we know very well that our potentials are limited. Yet we say: Why are we uttering noble principles without being able to preserve them? Why do we say we do not want foreigners at a time when we do not provide the force to replace a foreign presence? Consequently, not only a kind of conviction but a kind of awareness and determination to set up this Gulf force has been engendered.

This is why the chiefs of staff will meet next week. Indeed, I will leave in 2 days to meet them in order to discuss these steps. I tell you frankly we have to be forgiving on some issues. Perhaps we cannot achieve all we want all of a sudden and with a stroke of the pen. We have to be forgiving and understand Oman's circumstances. Oman has its circumstances and this issue was discussed by the GCC foreign ministers in Riyadh 2 days ago. These circumstances didn't arise today but are very old. Perhaps I should blame many people for this. I blame the Arab countries for it. I also blame other countries which have traditional convictions such as the policy of self-reliance and the policy of dependence on foreign diplomacy to solve problems. These are convictions. I do not tell you that we have one conviction on this issue but we are now trying to fulfill one conviction: How to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the members. Is it through diplomacy, international contacts or dependence on friendships? Will it be through dependence on intrinsic Gulf strength? In fact, this question is open for discussion at present and it is not easy to answer it.

Some people say we have traditionally practiced this side--friendships, international diplomacy and inter-Arab diplomacy. We believe this framework of preserving principles is good. Others say this is good talk with good intentions but these intentions cannot preserve principles and an intrinsic Gulf strength must be achieved. In fact, this firm theory has been engendered: setting up an actual intrinsic Gulf force, and we decided to adhere to it. Give us time. Perhaps in another meeting the situation will be better.

[Question] We are trying to move away from general Gulf policy. As a politician, you know that foreign policy is the other side of domestic policy. Within the GCC countries or within the one Gulf family, there are numerous directions in domestic policy. For example, some people, like those in Kuwait, apply political participation and shoulder this responsibility. In other countries this [fragment as published] this versatility in the directions of domestic policy will first give the peoples in these countries the chance to seek a better experiment, and thus there is a domestic motive. This is

possible. Second, there may be some expectations this experiment will be practiced in other places. Perhaps a clash of opinions will occur. Is there any viewpoint or attitude within the GCC to avert this, particularly since you know that domestic participation is part of security, meaning that when there is internal security and political participation there will be better foreign security?

[Answer] Dr Muhammad, I want to say something which may not please some people. In the GCC our work tries to cater to the citizen's needs. We are aware that the citizen wants economic work and intermingled interests and therefore we concentrate on these issues. We are also aware that the citizen wants stability and protected economic prosperity and therefore work concentrates on internal security and on foreign military defense. We say that you are trying to raise the issue of Kuwait's experiment. You are one of those who want it to be applied to the Gulf. You lecture and say that it is the key to security. I say this is a luxury. In fact, the theory is that Kuwait's experiment is the key to security. I believe there is a kind of luxury in this theory. No doubt the key to security is solidity of the domestic front. But solidity of the domestic front does not mean and is not confined to a parliament. Yes, it is true that it is a kind of direct dialogue. No doubt this dialogue is fruitful but it will not be an alternative to solid internal security forces or strong foreign defense forces. I cannot say that. I have read theories by some brothers in the Gulf which state that the GCC countries must not meet through interior or defense ministers; Kuwait's experiment is the best alternative for these meetings. I do not agree with this opinion and, as I have said, there is some luxury in it.

I say it is good to have dialogue. In fact, there is always dialogue between citizens and officials in the Gulf. It has been a traditional historical dialogue: the dialogue of divans, councils and contacts. This is a real tradition. The dialogue of councils is known; that which is there in Najd and the Gulf is known here in Kuwait. This is good. In Kuwait this meeting of councils has changed and developed into a new nature: the constitution. In fact it is a development for the council dialogues--from traditional councils to a dialogue which takes place in the form of elections, and so on. I think the principle of dialogue between citizen and official in the Gulf is there. Indeed, foreigners are surprised to see this direct contact. Yes, the difference now is how to develop these traditional channels into modern channels like those in Kuwait. I don't think this is an urgent issue. What is urgent is to continue dialogue because estrangement is a catastrophe. I admit this. I believe that whatever defense estrangement achieves and whatever means of internal security it fulfills, it will lead to disaster. [Sentence as published] However, I cannot agree that there is an estrangement in the Gulf. I cannot accept this. The dialogue currently going on in the Gulf, of which you are one party, is not on whether or not there is an estrangement. The dialogue is now how to develop this contact, contact between the councils and officials. You, in Kuwait, have developed this dialogue and it has taken a modern form. It has not taken this modern form in other countries for many reasons. Kuwait's geographical position is different, perhaps because foreign Western winds reach it more than the Gulf, there are many reasons for this. Nevertheless, I am confident that there is dialogue

between officials and citizens. Yes, we differ on channels. I am sure this dialogue is solid. Yet it cannot be an alternative to the defense or security cooperation now taking place. Some university theoreticians say there is no need for this and that channels must lead to dialogue between citizens and officials, meaning parliaments. I am sure there is some exaggeration and luxury in this.

[Question] Excuse me. In your experience, is this also being said in the Gulf?

[Answer] Yes, it is being said in the Gulf.

[Question] Brother 'Abdallah, let us move to the Arab level. A main and basic point is being raised in the press on this issue. A direct question: Is there any possibility that other members will join the GCC, particularly since there are some Gulf institutions similar to the GCC in which there are members besides the six GCC countries? What are the prospects for the entry of new members in the GCC?

[Answer] I rule out the entry of new members. We have talked a lot about this issue in the press. I have frequently been asked about this issue. My opinion has been: It is not fruitful or good to discuss it. Let us respect and preserve the dignity of other countries and GCC countries because, in fact, the six GCC countries created conditions for the GCC on firm bases of integration in everything. The GCC foreign ministers concluded their meetings yesterday. I attended. All of them make up one family. They are one family because they are relatives; they are one family because they are cousins who married long ago. The family expanded and each family lived in a place different from the others. It is in fact one family. This integration, solidity, unity and correlation can be applied to countries outside the six Gulf countries. Consequently, the requirements for the six Gulf countries cannot apply to another country in order to join the GCC caravan.

There is another thing: In fact, membership in the GCC is not the important thing. The important thing which we urgently call for is: The Gulf must remain solid, firm, strong and united because Gulf strength, solidity, unity and efficiency all serve the Arabs. Therefore, we feel there is no justification for saying aloud or in an undertone that the GCC is a kind of bloc, estrangement or axis or something like that. We emphasize that the GCC is the means to preserve the Gulf's Arab character, its independence and sovereignty. Its strength is ultimately Arab strength because might for the Gulf is might for the Arab nation. This is the important thing.

[Question] What about the second issue, Brother 'Abdallah? I think you made a statement that Gulf stability is linked to the Palestinian issue. There has also been talk about the upcoming FES summit, the future Gulf role and the role of the Gulf home in it. Is it possible to shed light on this?

[Answer] In fact this is not a personal conviction but an undeniable and indisputable fact. Stability in the Gulf cannot be achieved without a just and

dignified solution to the Palestinian issue. I also attribute this to strategic, national and political linkage. How can we say that the United States can establish relations with the Gulf countries, relations of honey and love, while its relations with Syria and the PLO are not good? How could this be? Yes, we emphasize this point and thus you see that all Gulf initiatives and contacts are devoted to promoting a solution of the Palestine issue.

The more complicated the Palestine issue becomes, the more divided the Arab world will be. The more divided the Arab world becomes, the less likely Gulf stability is. Therefore, we in the Gulf feel relaxed and comfortable under Arab solidarity.

Perhaps our stability will be completed when this problem is resolved. Yet I do not see any chance of solving this problem. Yes, Gulf stability cannot be achieved without a just and honorable solution to the Palestinian issue. This is a fact and not a theory; neither is it political ostentation. It is a fact which we always tell the United States: How can you expect cooperation with the Gulf in isolation from this issue? This cannot be.

As for the Gulf role in Arab issues, I tell you, doctor, we must be aware that the Gulf is bearing a huge political, material, psychological and moral burden on Arab issues. I don't know whether this is because of Arab negligence or because the circumstances were already there. The Gulf now is the political bridge between the countries of the Arab Maghreb and the Arab Mashriq. This bridge is being used for the Palestinian issue and other urgent Arab issues. It is devoted not only to Gulf issues but to other Arab issues. Consequently, the Gulf role has developed greatly, it was always supportive, even before it had any material. It was supportive without being a participant. Now, it has become a participant in the Arab political decision, whether we accept this fact or not. Perhaps this issue is being refuted by others and some professors and theoreticians do not accept it, this is possible, I do not insist on a consensus on this issue. Yet, this is a fact and I feel it. I will give examples if you want me to.

The Gulf is developing politically. It has become a party which speaks on behalf of some Arab countries for the sake of the Palestinian issue and its solution and which speaks about how to deprive Israel of the chance of picking the fruit of aggression; thus, it has adopted the view of some Arab countries toward the Western countries, the United States and Western organizations. Due to its strength and political firmness and its political relations with the world, and also due to its clear vision [sentence as published]. The Gulf vision is clear because it has not been affected by Arab conflicts, party ideologies or inter-Arab differences. This vision has remained very clear. I believe this is another asset. In my view, the Saudi initiative on the Middle East is a Saudi Gulf initiative which was the outcome of the Gulf's development from the status of supporter to participant. There are many other issues I do not want to talk about. The Gulf is now being visited not for material gain but for political consultation. I know this fact very well.

[Question] Brother 'Abdallah, let us now move to the international level: The issue of balance toward the East and the West. Some members of the Gulf family--as I have called it--believe that there should be some balance, some political contact with the Eastern Bloc. It seems this idea is not widely supported. Is it not logical to have balance between the Gulf countries and the West and the East in order to embody this nonalignment which we are talking about?

[Answer] Doctor, you have to be very patient with what I want to tell you on this issue. So many people outside the Gulf and many Gulf people talk about balance. We reject this term because its use implies that there is no balance in the Gulf. This term implies that some of those in the Gulf are thrown in the lap of the superpowers. I believe that in saying so we do some injustice and some kind of damage to the people of the Gulf. Frankly, the people of the Gulf are leaders by instinct. The term balance does not reflect the truth. Truth is reflected in the term nonexistence of diplomatic relations; this is true. The nonexistence of diplomatic relations between some of the Gulf states and the socialist countries does not mean nonalignment and neither does it mean that the Gulf has thrown itself in the lap of the United States and the Western countries, but it means that there is a Gulf conviction. I can perhaps say that the role of the socialist bloc is not one of initiating international questions. It is a role that can hinder and deprive but it cannot initiate or impose some kind of a real international participation.

I say this as a result of my experience at the United Nations. The role of the socialist bloc is to hinder and block; this is possible, but it lacks the ability to initiate and impose a conviction on the Gulf. Thus, a dialogue with the socialist bloc according to the traditional meaning of the word dialogue does exist. There is a dialogue through Kuwait and through the direct contacts of embassies. There is no danger from such contacts. However, doctor, there is a conviction that the socialist bloc--generally--lacks the ability to impose initiatives. There is only an ability to hinder. There is a conviction by some of the Gulf states that the Soviet Union itself is involved in problems that were imposed on some of the Gulf states. Naturally this is the judgment of some states.

Take Oman as an example. Oman says very frankly that the Soviet Union has a role in the dispute between it and the PDRY. Thus, there is no danger against the socialist Marxist ideology in Oman, there are relations between Oman and China. So, there is no danger against the socialist ideology. However, there is a lack of conviction that the Soviet Union is neutral in the dispute between the sultanate of Oman and the PDRY; actually it is part of it. This is Oman's view. Hence, this view may be characteristic of Oman, some agree with it and some don't.

There is another view saying that establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean establishing a balance because we don't believe that we are in the West's lap. We believe that this balance will benefit the Soviet Union and will not benefit us at all.

It is true that the Soviet Union is a socialist state that participates in making international decisions and it is true that it is a superpower, but its role lacks the ability to adopt initiatives. Perhaps its role hinders these initiatives. There is more than a dialogue on this issue. I am confident that many opinions have drawn closer. After seeing and listening to the foreign ministers discuss this issue recently, and after noticing the rapprochement, I am confident that this will become better in the near future. I am confident that even this apprehension and this judgment in viewing the Soviet Union as a part of the problem will end gradually. However, we here in the Gulf should assume that this is valid and should promptly give the problem the attention it deserves. The Gulf cooperation council was established only 8 months ago. It is very useful to respect the states' sovereignty at this stage. We will receive the price of the collective action gradually. I say we must not be hasty in establishing diplomatic relations with the socialist countries because the establishment of diplomatic relations with these countries is not important now. The pressing issue now is communication, and I am confident that this is taking place.

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SUBSTANTIVE PLANS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION NOTED

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[Interview with Dr 'Abdallah al-Quwayz, deputy secretary general for economic affairs in the GCC: "The Nations of the Gulf Cooperative Council Begin Economic Cooperation"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Abolition of customs duties among the Gulf Cooperative Council [GCC] nations and a uniform foreign tariff are expected to be implemented ahead of schedule. The possibility of merging the development funds of the member nations is being studied. The member nations are committed to providing each other with oil and money if any member is faced with a sudden problem in production or marketing.

The work of the Cooperation Council of Arab Gulf Nations is proceeding in two complementary directions. One is political, military and strategic, the other economic, financial and relating to oil. One might not be able to separate the two directions which derive from one source, but by way of simplification it might be possible to view each of them independently.

The following is a conversation with Dr 'Abdallah al-Quwayz, deputy secretary general for economic affairs in the council, on the economic progress that has been made so far.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: The terms applied to the economic activity within the GCC seem to differ widely. Some call it a "Gulf common market." Others call it a "union" or an "economic federation." Still others--but by no means the minority--use the expression "economic cooperation and coordination." Even the concerned officials and ministers in the GCC countries differ in the words they use on the subject. What in your opinion is the most appropriate or most precise term for this activity on the basis of official documents and the actual progress the council is making?

Al-Quwayz: I don't think terminology is all that important. Even from a scientific or theoretical standpoint it is not firmly resolved. Regardless of whether some use the term "Gulf common market" while others use "union" or "federation" the important thing to the nations of the GCC is the unified economic agreement which outlines the general framework of the council's economic activity and describes the general lines of economic cooperation among its nations.

This agreement defines several important specific goals, and enjoins specific policies to achieve these goals.

For one thing, these goals and policies relate to working towards uniform petroleum policies for the member states in various stages, beginning with production and ending with marketing, and including pricing, transport, refining and processing.

For another thing, they concern unifying the development plans of the member states in order to achieve uniformity, to fill their needs in light of their capabilities, and to avoid harmful similarities that sometimes lead to duplication.

From a third standpoint they relate to outlining a unified policy of industrial development and creating a single market out of the member nations.

To accomplish this they inevitably call for the creation of common industrial and agricultural projects. They also concern linking the member states with direct lines of communication and transport on both land and sea.

From a fourth standpoint they relate to devising a common agricultural policy to accomplish what can be done to achieve food security for the member nations.

In short, to answer those who want a specific expression to describe or name all this it can be said that it is something less than an economic union in the theoretical sense, although it may actually be that in practice. However, the activities, goals and procedures enjoined by the unified economic agreement relate to transforming the member states into something more than a Gulf common market.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: There are those who, although it is a simplification, like to speak of the activity of the European Common Market as an index or yardstick with which to compare common economic enterprise in the Gulf. What in your opinion are the legitimate areas for comparison with regard to similarities and differences?

Al-Quwayz: There may be many areas for comparison in this connection, both for noting similarities with the European Common Market and for noting the differences between its circumstances and ours. But without entering into too much detail--technical for the most part--the most distinctive observation in this connection may be that common economic enterprise involving coordination and creation of a common market may be easier for the nations of the GCC than for the nations of the European Common Market, particularly if the comparison is made with regard to the period of initial activity in each of the markets. There are many reasons for this.

First of all, the economies of the members of the GCC are much more homogeneous in geographic, physical and human features than the economies of the nations of the European Common market.

Secondly, the member nations of the GCC resemble each other more than the nations of the European Common Market resemble each other with regard to the level of development each of them has attained, or has approached, when they embarked on coordinated or unified economic cooperation.

Thirdly, the members of the GCC are more similar with regard to their social and political structure, which makes it easier for the political authorities to make and implement decisions.

On the basis of this point in particular we in the council may be able to make faster progress in economic cooperation than the nations of the European Common Market whose commissions, institutions and committees hold more than 500 meetings a year. That is an average of more than two meetings a day considering the fact that there are fewer than 250 business days per year for the nations of the European market.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Within these general frameworks what is your opinion of the outcome of the meetings held by the GCC so far, and the specialized ministerial conferences? I'm referring, of course, to economic matters.

Al-Quwayz: The fact is that we are just starting out. But that doesn't mean that we have not made great strides the importance of which is evident in view of the short period which has elapsed since the work began.

Our accomplishments, or the stages through which we have gone, can be divided into two parts.

The first part includes the operational steps being taken by the GCC, its secretariat general and its organizations to complete the outline of work to be done and to define the channels of activity. In this connection we point in particular to the ministerial conferences which are being held within the framework of the council, which began with the conference of ministers of industry, followed by the conference of ministers of finance and economics, and the conference of oil ministers. These are to be followed by conferences of ministers of planning, communications, agriculture and others.

These conferences are clearly important in view of the fact that each of them is concerned with actually implementing the provisions of the unified economic agreement in its own area, and with selecting the appropriate methods for embodying these provisions in uniform policies, programs and projects.

The second part stems from the first part and includes the steps resulting from the aforementioned ministerial conferences: uniform decisions and recommendations to be implemented.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Can we point out or discuss some of these concrete steps?

Al-Quwayz: Some of these steps and the achievements of some of the conferences have not so far taken the form of specific programs or projects, and are still in the process of being studied and having

technical scientific reports prepared for them. But these still unscheduled results are no less important or less valuable than those that have been scheduled for implementation, emanating from secondary conferences, in view of the fact that the first ones are an essential preliminary to the later ones.

On the basis of this observation we can enumerate the results as follows:

1. In the industrial sector: The conference of ministers of industry produced decisions to undertake a study of industrial legislation in the member states as a preliminary step toward making it uniform, and to prepare a report enumerating the industrial products of the various member states which could become subject to a single or common protective tariff policy. The conference also assigned a committee to investigate the possibility of instituting uniform measurements and specifications among the GCC nations, and uniform data on their various industrial projects. The committee recommended the establishment of a joint commission for industrial investment among the GCC nations. These decisions are clear as such; their implementation is essential for achieving sound industrial development among the GCC nations, and for determining the scope of cooperation and coordination in their industrial activity.

2. The conference of ministers of finance and economics decided first to establish a joint investment company with \$3 billion in capital. This company will be the principal vehicle for the GCC members' joint investment policies domestically, in the Arab and Islamic world and abroad. The conference has begun to study the possibilities for merging or increasing coordination among the development funds currently being operated by some of the members. It is natural for this investment organization, and for merging or coordinating the activities of the funds, for the GCC countries to formulate a common policy for investing their funds and for development assistance provided to other countries. While the founding of the joint investment organization is expected before the middle of the year, it goes without saying that the decisions that have been made with regard to this, and the studies of this subject and the development funds are only preliminary steps which may be followed by others with qualitative and quantitative differences when a plan for implementation is formulated. At this point it is sufficient that the establishment of this organization will indirectly fulfil the recommendations of the industry conference for the establishment of a joint organization for industrial investment for the Gulf nations. The organization that is established will be able to embrace the recommendations of the industry ministers' conference and any similar recommendations by other ministerial conferences. Clearly there is a need for establishing specialized investment companies in various fields. This preliminary organization may carry out certain goals, and there is nothing to prevent other organizations from following it, each working to improve the existing investment activity at home and abroad, and to augment it with new dimensions and new money.

Among the steps taken by the conference of ministers of finance and economics were decisions to set up committees to study and devise a plan for abolishing customs duties among the GCC member states, and to create a uniform customs tariff in the member states for foreign trade. In this connection I would like to make two observations:

First, by virtue of the fact that local products constitute only a small volume of trade among the member states it will be very easy to abolish custom duties on these products.

Second, by virtue of the fact that most of the member states do not depend on customs duties as a source of revenue for their national budget it will be easy for the council to implement uniform customs tariffs for foreign trade in a shorter time than the 5 years specified for this goal in the unified economic agreement.

With regard to the oil ministers' conference a sufficient indication of its success is the statement about it by the Saudi oil minister that it was the best meeting he had experienced throughout his public life. He said, "We were six ministers speaking with one voice and seeking a common goal." That is what the unified agreement had provided for in the area of oil and its allied industries. If the conference has decided to become a specialized oil ministers' committee which will meet twice a year to program implementation of the decisions that have been made and the policies that are desired, its clearest decision in the agreement on a strategy for oil security is for loaning any member state what it may need in the way of oil and oil products by supplying them, selling them and crediting the state's account in the event that it suffers any partial or total production stoppage. This decision shows the total commitment to the policy of coordination which is the purpose for which the GCC was established.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: At the beginning of the discussion, with reference to the text of the unified agreement, you mentioned that one of its goals and concerns is the achievement of food security for the member states. Do you think this is possible in view of the fact that the agricultural potential of GCC member nations is for the most part known to be poor?

Al-Quwayz: Achieving any goal is, of course, a relative thing. What concerns us as individual member nations, and the GCC as a whole, is making a coordinated effort to achieve the highest possible degree of food security or to reduce as much as possible the uncertainties connected with it.

The meager agricultural potential of the GCC nations does not necessarily mean that all of their potential is in investment and must be so. The expertise developed by Saudi Arabia's experiences in agriculture in recent years, particularly with wheat cultivation, shows that agricultural output can be improved and increased to a great degree, particularly if an aggressive agricultural policy is pursued in the process.

Similarly, there are possibilities for increased poultry and livestock production. We are also interested in a resource that is very important for our countries, namely fish, yields of which can be greatly increased.

But increased production is not the whole story. Food security also includes stockpiling. The nations of the GCC collectively must adopt a coherent policy in this area which also has ample potential.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Within the framework of all that has been said, is the council's work proceeding with appropriate speed, or is it going somewhat slowly?

Al-Quwayz: I can assure you that the GCC's work is proceeding with due speed. This does not stem only from our sense of responsibility, but also from the political will which is behind the council's work, and the desire of the kings and princes of the member nations to overcome any obstacles which may stand in the way of cooperation. Moreover, the citizens of the member states have complete confidence in the GCC. We sense this confidence in our day to day contact with all levels of society in these countries.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Does this mean that you are not encountering specific problems in the course of your activity?

Al-Quwayz: Every task has its difficulties. But our biggest--and perhaps only--difficulty is that even though the political will for the GCC's success and the citizens' confidence in it are heartening, they increase the pressures of responsibility due to the council's need for numerous qualified cadres, some of whom are still lacking, to make them fully prepared for construction, which is the most important kind of preparedness. Our problem in this connection is that a council like the GCC must, according to its bylaws, utilize only citizens of its member states for skilled positions. As is well known, the number of these people is not small, but most of them prefer the various allurements of the private sector.

9123

CSO: 4404/335

AREA PRESS REACTS TO IRAQ-IRAN WAR DEVELOPMENTS

GF041630 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0930 GMT 4 Apr 82

[Excerpts] Manama, 4 Apr (WAKH)--Today's Gulf papers commented on the developments of the Iraq-Iran war. The papers demanded that the war which Iraq is fighting should become a pan-Arab war and called for supporting Iraq in view of the dangers posed by the Iranian regime not only to Iraq but to all the Arabs.

The Saudi paper AL-JAXIRAH says that since the very beginning of the fighting, Iraq and other fraternal countries realized that various international powers in the East and the West rejected the idea of allowing Iraq to achieve a decisive military victory against Iran, which would force the Khomeyni regime to return to reason and recognize the Iraqi national rights. It is regrettable that among those international powers which opposed the Iraqi victories were Arab countries, which chose to side with Iran against Iraq. Al-Jazirah warns that the current developments in the Iraqi-Iranian war will have undesirable results after the foreign interference in the military operations has been unveiled to the world. This will arouse grave questions about the outcome of the next stage of this war.

The Kuwaiti paper AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM calls on the Arab countries not to remain silent on the Iraqi-Iranian war and not to stand idly by. The paper called for changing the dispute into an Arab-Iranian war after Tehran turned a deaf ear to the Iraqi positive position which was aimed at ending the war.

The paper warns that the Arab Gulf area has become a direct goal of this war in accordance with U.S. plot which is designed to change the balance of power in the area, to fragment the Gulf countries or force them to fall in the lap of the United States after exhausting Iraq and driving it away from the Arab-Israeli dispute. Afterwards, the United States will spread its military bases and fleets in the area and convert its countries into protectorates. "The paper continued that the Arabs must support Iraq on all levels, to ensure freedom and independence, since" the ruling party in Tehran has repeatedly indicated that it wants to cow down Iraq, gain control of the area and disperse Arab power, in addition to preventing the Arabs from concentrating on the confrontation with Israel." The paper added that having Iraq victorious and steadfast does not mean that the Arabs must stand idly by or provide support at a distance," because the situation entails acting on the side of Iraq so as to make Tehran realize that the Arab wall is too high to be accessible.

Commenting on the same subject, the Kuwaiti paper AL-QABAS notes that there is no way to stand idly by the Iraqi-Iranian war, as it has been taking place in the heart of the Gulf area for 18 months, during which Iraq has fought with the spirit of sacrifice. The paper adds that the Arabs, from now on, cannot be satisfied with just applauding the heroes of the Iraqi army, who are achieving consecutive successes on the front, without presenting their blood of martyrdom for victory. The paper adds: "The current regime in Iran has proven to be a destructive danger, not only to the Iranian people themselves, but also to the Gulf area as a whole. Iraq is fighting this war not only in defense of Iraq, but also in defense of its Gulf environment and the Arab homeland in general."

Al-Qabas notes that it is not surprised by the harmony of the statements issued by Tehran and Tel Aviv. Col 'Ali Jamali, Persian commander of the ground forces [name and title as received] on the front, expressed hope and "optimism" that Iraq will continue to be alone in the war and will not receive any aid from any side. On the other hand, the crowds of Israel expressed pleasure at the continuation of the war between Iran and Iraq. Israeli Chief of Staff Refa'el Eytan expressed his joy "at seeing them fight each other." Former chief of military intelligence, (Hayim Hertzouk) fears the ending of the war, because according to him, Iraq "is a great military power," while others say that Iraq will never forget the strafing of its nuclear reactor.

CSO: 4400/206

POSTAL COMMITTEE ENDS MEETINGS

GF031300 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0825 GMT 3 Apr 82

[Excerpts] Muscat, 3 Apr (WAKH)--The executive council of the Gulf Mail Committee, which has been holding meetings in Muscat, has recommended charging the committee's general secretariat with the preparation of a preliminary study on the possibility of allocating one or more transport planes for the transport of mail among the committee member countries. This study should deal with operation methods, maintenance costs and a cost comparison study of buying or hiring one or more planes.

Ending its meetings today, the council also recommended charging the general secretariat with continuing the study on the possibility of establishing a faculty or department for mail at the Arab Gulf University or establishing a mail center or institute to train intermediate cadres.

The council approved Qatar's proposal to invite representatives of aviation companies operating in the Gulf to establish coordination between mail directorates for the transport of air freight among the countries of the region.

The council also approved charging the general secretariat with examining and pursuing problems that the member directorates encounter regarding the transportation of air mail, first class mail, and surface mail and also regarding cooperation and coordination with the Arab Air Transport Federation.

The council recommended that the member directorates take steps at the telecommunications and communications ministries of the member countries to bolster the position of the Gulf Mail Committee at the Arab Wire and Wireless Communications Federation and to work for exempting the committee from telegraphic costs.

The council decided to hold the 3d session of the executive council of the Gulf Mail Committee at the committee's headquarters in Riyadh in April 1984 if no member directorate calls for holding the session in its own country.

The council began meeting last Saturday in the presence of representatives of seven Arab Gulf countries, the Arab Mail Federation, the International Mail Federation, and Arab Air Transport Federation.

CSO: 4400/206

PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

DIRECTORS END FIRST MEETING--Manama, 1 Apr (WAKH)--The first meeting of the directors general of the Gulf News Agencies concluded in Manama this afternoon. It was chaired by WAKH Director General Nabil Ya'qub al-Hamar. During the meeting, the conferees discussed ways to expand cooperation among the Gulf News Agencies and to enhance WAKH's Arab and international role and position. After the meeting, Kuna Director General Burjus Hamud Burjus lauded the positive spirit and the understanding which prevailed the meeting. He said the meeting was successful and that good ideas on enhancing and expanding WAKH's role were prosed. He also praised the efforts being made by Tariq 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mu'ayyad, Bahrain information minister and chairman of the WAKH Board of Directors, and Nabil Ya'qub al-Hamar, WAKH Director General, to enable the agency to occupy its proper position among the world's news agencies. He added: WAKH has played a major role in broadcasting Gulf news to the world. What has been concluded in the meeting is a continuation of resolutions which are being implemented. The director general of Kuna emphasized that the resolutions adopted today were positive and constructive and will improve the agency's activities in various news spheres to enable it to present a clear picture of the region to the world. [Text] [GF020503 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1930 GMT 1 Apr 82]

GULF POSTAL COMMITTEE CONVENES--The second session of the executive board of the Gulf Postal Committee will begin in Muscat tomorrow and will last until 5 April 1982. During this session, a number of issues will be discussed, including the development of mail service among the member countries, the introduction of first-class mail service, the possibility of establishing a department or faculty for postal studies in one of the universities of the region, a study of the situation and activities of competitive national postal companies, and the allocation of a special airplane for mail transport. The session will be attended by representatives from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Iraq, Oman, and also by representatives from the Arab postal federation, general secretariat of the Gulf Postal Committee, the International Postal Federation, and the Arab Air Transport Federation. [Text] [GF261839 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 26 Mar 82]

CSO: 4400/205

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

MESSAGE FROM AL-QADHDHAFI--His Highness the Amir, Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman al Khalifah, received at al-Rifa' palace at 0090 today Libyan Ambassador to Bahrain Mohammed Ramadan al-Rubi, who delivered a written message from the Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi on bilateral relations. [Text] [GF281121 Manama Domestic Service in Arabic 1030 GMT 28 Mar 82]

CSO: 4400/206

KHOMEYNI'S REMARKS ON GULF WAR CITED

NC070614 Free Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 6 Apr 82

[Text] LE MONDE writes that Khomeyni recently said: We do not want war, but since the enemy (?is still on our territories) we have no alternative but war. He added that since the Iran-Iraq war is no longer beneficial to the United States, U.S. President Ronald Reagan's statement that the crisis between the two countries should end was not surprising.

Political observers say that the noteworthy point in Khomeyni's remarks is that he says that the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war is no longer to the benefit of the United States, therefore the United States wants the war to end. What this means is that the continuation of the war during the past 18 months was to the benefit of the United States and this at a time when during the past 18 months the Islamic Republic has opposed any proposal and peaceful solution and has insisted on the continuation of the war.

Even though we have repeatedly announced on the Free Voice of Iran that the war between the two neighboring countries is neither to the benefit of Iran nor to the benefit of Iraq and that this destructive war should be ended as soon as possible, nevertheless after 18 months that have cost billions of dollars in material losses for Iran and during which tens of thousands of our country's youths and adolescents have been killed--in the recent battles at Dezful and Shush more than (?30,000) were killed--Khomeyni announces that the continuation of the war is no longer to the benefit of the United States. Thus it becomes clear that Khomeyni has been fanning the flames of the war as per the wishes of the United States and Britain and has rejected any peace proposal. Definitely the continuation of the war is still to the benefit of the superpowers because they sell the arms, ammunition and war materiel to both countries and exploit the destruction of the industrial and economic installations of the two Muslim and neighboring countries in their own interests. If Khomeyni claims that so far the war has been to the benefit of the United States then why has he refrained until now to accept political solutions for the termination of the war?

CSO: 4640/234

KHOMEYNI WARNS RADIO, TV DIRECTORS NOT TO 'ANNOY' PEOPLE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 64, 25 Mar 82 pp 6-7

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeini called on the directors of the regime's radio and television network last week to take good care not to annoy people in their propaganda efforts. He also told them to think clearly and to make preparations before making TV or radio speeches.

Khomeini's remarks, which were made to a delegation of radio and television personnel on March 18, were as much a surprise to Iranians as his speech on New Year's Day. For the media in Iran is under the direct control of Khomeini's own office. Moreover, the radio and television do very little except praise Khomeini and broadcast religious sermons spiced with pro-regime and anti-American propaganda.

His speech was made amid reports the same day that about 30 staff members at the radio and television were earlier, possibly on March 16, arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary activities. A revolutionary guards spokesman confirmed the arrests, but did not elaborate other than charging the arrested people with anti-regime activities.

Khomeini said: "Any undue remark, any wrong talk, can upset the whole community and it may take a long time for the harm it does to be made good." He then drew attention to the opposition groups saying: "You can see that on a single day a series of things happen simultaneously all over the country. What happens in Bandar Abbas is repeated the same day, in the same manner, as far away as in Azarbaijan. These are too well coordinated."

He continued angrily: "Radio and television are too important to be left just to anybody. It must not be open to everybody to go there to say what he desires to say. That is why the radio and television office are under the joint supervision of the three authorities." He also complained that the regime had failed to counter propaganda by opposition groups and imperialist broadcasts. This is a complaint he repeatedly makes, however.

Because the remarks by Khomeini and the arrests came just before the Iranian new year some informants speculated that a quarrel might have developed between the professional staff and the young left-wing mullahs who control day-to-day affairs at the network on how to cover the New Year. Iranians

traditionally celebrate Now Ruz in a big way but the mullahs of the Khomeini camp, who are strongly opposed to Persian nationalism, are intent on damping down the occasion. Khomeini last week called on Iranians not to celebrate the festival because of the war.

Few professional staff, other than technicians and manual personnel, survived two purges which were carried out among the radio and television personnel in 1979 and 1980 under Sadegh Qotbzadeh. In a third purge carried out by Bani-Sadr when he became president most of the administrative staff were thrown out to be replaced by Bani-Sadr's men. The 30 men now arrested could be Bani-Sadr appointees.

In any case Khomeini's remarks show that after three years in office during which indiscriminate purges were carried out the mullahs are not yet happy with the small number of professional people who have survived. This is not confined to the radio and TV staff but to the entire civil service and other professionals and experts.

Meanwhile, both Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani and President of Supreme Court Mussavi-Ardabili warned that some Friday prayer leaders in the provinces were in the habit of making irresponsible statements. They suggested that the Friday prayer leaders' speeches be checked and edited by a central office.

CSO: 4600/389

MUSSAVI FACES OPPOSITION FROM CIVIL SERVANTS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 64, 25 Mar 82 pp 7-9

[Text] Iran's theocratic rulers are locked in a battle with the civil servants and professional cadres who have survived the regime's repeated purges but are still wary of the lack of job security in the wake of yet a new wave of purges.

At present the mullahs are engaged in an operation which they call "the reconstruction of the civil administration." This operation began last summer when the later assassinated mullah, Javad Bahonar, was appointed prime minister. The aim of the operation was to dismiss or retire all civil servants above the age of 30 and replace them by theological students or trusted followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, referred to as faithful hezbollahis.

Bahonar was clever enough not to call this operation a purge because he knew that the country would no longer accept yet another round of dismissals. So he called it a programme for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of civil service. He even promised to reinstate some officials who were earlier purged.

However, Bahonar's assassination along with then president Rajai and the wave of executions which followed diverted public attention from the civil service reconstruction. Meanwhile, the new prime minister, Mir Hossein Mussavi, announced that some parts of the reconstruction programme would be open to public debate. In this way he invited those civil servants who had managed to cling to their jobs through the purges of 1979, 1980 and early 1981 to air their views.

But what he heard was not to his liking. The bill sanctioning the so-called reconstruction aimed at doing away with the usual qualifications which were required for employment of civil servants and their promotion. The main criteria were to be such qualifications as "faith in the Islamic revolution and in Khomeini's doctrine, a revolutionary record and personal virtue." Paper qualifications and actual job experience were to be of secondary importance.

Mussavi expected the debate to centre around such topics as the importance of Velayat-e-faghih (religious authority) and the necessity of giving top civil

service positions to those who had studied theology in Qom under Khomeini's chosen disciples. Instead, those who dared to participate in the debate talked of the rampant inefficiency in the civil service, blaming it on the indiscriminate purges since the revolution. There were also references to the lack of job security.

Some complained that the new bosses of the civil service, whose only claim to fame was their record of having spent some days in prison under the Shah or being a member of the Muslim Students Association, summarily dismissed old and experienced staff, demanded blind obedience, and monopolised all the remunerative jobs for their own relatives or those who were recommended by the mullahs of the Khomeini camp.

There were other revealing complaints. One young woman asked why such officials as deputy ministers and directors-general, who were young school leavers or university drop-outs, rode in expensive bullet proof cars surrounded by a dozen or so body-guards. "During the previous regime the prime ministers and cabinet members never travelled in bullet proof cars and they only had a single body-guard," she said.

Many civil servants had also complained against compulsory Islamic wear for female staff, against nepotism, abuse of power, corruption and hypocrisy. The general conclusion was that the efficiency of the civil service had fallen drastically in comparison with the pre-revolutionary era while corruption had increased. "We expected progress in the civil service but we see quite the opposite," was how one official summed up the debate.

Understandably, Mussavi announced that the corrupt elements and American agents in the civil service had misused his invitation to debate the reconstruction bill. He then ordered the dismissal of those who had dared to use the debate to criticise his government and the revolution.

Meanwhile, the media coverage of the debate was one-sided. The mullah-controlled press and radio gave good coverage to officials who praised the bill but made no reference to those who criticised. The critics, therefore, resorted to pamphleteering. They wrote their statements and distributed them or pinned them on walls in their offices, including the prime ministry. Some of these complaints were picked up by clandestine radio stations and were broadcast. This brought charges that the critics were agents of counter-revolution.

The whole thing has escalated so much that last week Mussavi was forced to invite all the employees of his office to a general meeting to assure them that once the work of reconstruction of civil administration's manpower was completed "all the employees would enjoy job security." He also said that the bill was not intended to render the civil servants jobless, rather it might even reinstate some of them who were dismissed during the previous purges. But he was adamant on the point that new people from among the former nezbollahi students and young mullahs must be brought into the service. And then he said the experienced staff must teach the newly employed ones "the tricks of the trade."

Thus, Mussavi put his finger on a touchy point. The old ones, fearing loss of their jobs, refuse to teach or train the new staff, arguing that the new recruits lack the qualification for learning administrative skills. This has created tensions and it does not seem the tension can be easily contained. The only alternative is for Mussavi to dissolve government departments and then to re-establish them anew, recruiting all the staff from scratch. This was done in the case of the former security agency SAVAK and the Ministry of Information.

CSO: 4600/389

SHAH'S REMARKS IN UK, OFFICERS' TRIAL REPORTED

Meeting With Antiregime Leaders

NC061703 Free Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 6 Apr 82

[Text] Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran, said in a meeting with leaders of antiregime groups and Iranian correspondents: I want the monarchy for Iran, not Iran for the monarchy. Reza Pahlavi, who had gone to London for a series of political contacts with opponents of the present regime, said before leaving the city for an unknown destination that he was invited to London in order to create unity between all the opposition forces (?in their) struggles. He said: According to the constitution, the shah is a symbol and all groups should be able to freely carry out political activities. Reza Pahlavi added: Iran's salvation is a priority matter and the Iranian nation is the one that determines the country's destiny. Reza Pahlavi expressed the hope that all differences between the opposition forces (?will be solved in an open atmosphere). The young shah of Iran reiterated the need to liberate Iran from Khomeyni's clutches.

Last night the clandestine Voice of Iran praised the intelligence and alertness of the shah of Iran and his respect for freedom and law and said that it is very likely that Reza Shah II will take important trips in the future and will expand his activities in this field.

This clandestine radio also reported that the trial of nine Iranian officers, who were arrested 2 weeks ago on charges of attempting to stage a coup and to bomb Khomeyni's residence, ended yesterday. A Free Voice of Iran correspondent has reported from Tehran that the possibility that these officers will be executed is very great, especially since military prosecutor Reyshahri presides over the court.

Comment on Shah's Remarks

NC080846 Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian 1805 GMT 7 Apr 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] I want the monarchy for Iran and not Iran for the monarchy. The shah is the symbol of national unity and in imperial Iran all sects and groups should enjoy complete and equal freedom. From the remarks by Reza Shah II, the shah of Iran, to exiled compatriots.

lar-piercing shouts can be heard and the flames of propaganda are being fanned in our country so public opinion will be misled that if the tattered regime falls, Iran will face a deep crisis and a so-called vacuum of power, or that it will have no other alternative but to accept another Islamic republic. Therefore all efforts pivot around one axis--to conceal the importance and power of national forces and the (?monarchical) system, which has for centuries been the factor for national unity and keeping alive of a nation and country called Iran in a veil of ambiguity, so that the people surrender to the formulas and theories of those politicians that led to the establishment of a destructive and abominable regime like the Islamic Republic of the imam of the Umma.

Compatriots: If you pay careful attention you will see that the propaganda in this field is so vast that it is as though the Islamic Republic in general has not come only for the salvation and prosperity of the calamity-stricken Iranian nation but has also topped its list of policies and ideologies with the liberation of the oppressed nations of Africa and other deprived nations of the world. They speak of freedoms in such a way as though these were the valuable gifts brought by the initiators of a republic such as this.

The Islamic Republic of the imam of the Umma has not yet freed itself from the clutches of a destructive war before it promises the liberation of Jerusalem and the annihilation of "Zionism" and that democratic Islamic Republic has not yet achieved what it wants before it promises deceitful freedoms to the nation like its predecessor. All these are an effort to turn the thoughts of the Iranian people from national and popular forces and ideas --forces which make no claims, but whose only aim is to liberate the nation and country from the clutches of the oppressors and the construction and reconstruction of Iran, forces which consider these as the holiest of their national duties.

That which the young shah of Iran has said and says in expressing his aims and wishes for his compatriots and country is a clear reflection of his thoughts that are based on two main bases--patriotism and respect for freedom. The young shah of Iran emphasizes the unity of the entire Iranian nation with any political ideology and repeats the simple sentence that the first problem of all Iranians is the problem of national salvation. We should first have a country, then discuss problems pertaining to it in an open and peaceful atmosphere and to try to solve them together. The meaning of this remark is extremely clear and there is no need for so-called scientific analyses. The shah of Iran does not consider any member of the great Iranian family to be higher than the other and from this outlook, for him even the millions of monarchists and supporters of the constitution are placed on the same level, as are other groups with different political ideas. The gist of this remark is thinking of Iran and the Iranians, both of which come before any political ideology and are priorities. This simple remark is the essence of pure support for freedom--freedom which spreads like an umbrella to cover everyone, which does not support any special political trends and which only takes into consideration the national unity of Iranians and the unity of a holy land called Iran.

The shah wants the monarchy for Iran and not Iran for the monarchy. He wants the monarchy for Iran because for centuries it has been the most important factor in the unity of various Iranian races and the only reliable support for national unity. The shah does not give out any type of freedom as a gift but considers freedom to be among the definite rights of the nation which, according to the constitution, is equal and undeniable for all Iranians. In short, the fact that the shah will reign and not rule as the manifestation of the nation's will is the most important point in the ideology supported by national forces.

Now, if we think a little carefully we will see more clearly the goal or goals of persons who, inspired by the known plots of colonialists, are trying to deviate the Iranians' public opinion and to replace the Islamic Republic of the imam of the Umma with a democratic Islamic republic. But there is no doubt that the Iranian nation has learned its lesson, and it will accept nothing less than a national rule based on laws given to us by the freedom-seekers of our constitutional revolution and it will not submit to another compulsory republic. With hopes for the victory of the Iranian nation!

CSO: 4640/234

PAST, PRESENT CONDITIONS ANALYZED BY MONARCHIST PAPER

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 1 Mar 82 pp 1-4

[Text] For the third time in a month, the Islamic Republic has lowered the sale price of crude oil, which now costs \$30.20 a barrel, or \$4 less than the prevailing OPEC price. Naturally, this third decrease has been denied by Tehran, which always tries to deny even the most glaring truths when they could harm the regime.

When it was campaigning against the Shah, the Mojahedin-Khomeynist subversion had drawn up a list of the monarch's "crimes." Criticism of the former regime's oil policy was the cornerstone of the revolutionary propaganda: the Shah was criticized for having sold more oil than was necessary, and thus having sacrificed the nation's future for the immediate needs of the superpowers. At that time, the Khomeynists were promising in the mosques that when they came to power they would share the oil revenues among the workers. Their listeners, calculating that each would get 30 million rials a year (2 million francs), hastened to go on strike to force the Shah's departure. Who could resist such a temptation? The head of a family of seven imagined himself already receiving 14 million Francs a year. However, today these unfortunate people are unemployed, deep in misery. The world market is saturated, and oil has lost its former value. The Islamic Republic is reduced to bartering oil for ordinary consumer products made in the USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

On the other hand, the Shah, while in power, constantly explained the basic reasons for his policy. There are archives, in all languages, which show this convincingly.

The oil surplus, the drop in prices on the international market, and the worldwide economic crisis--he had foreseen them all. From 1973 on, he had concentrated on speeding up implementation of his economic and industrial development policy. He was well aware that such a pace would cause difficulties and lead to bottlenecks. But he wanted to give Iran as rapidly as possible an industrial infrastructure which, when the time came, would assure it alternate sources of income. The Shah knew that oil would soon stop being an expensive and sought-after commodity. It was therefore necessary to sell as much as possible as quickly as possible to profit to the maximum from a favorable but precarious situation. He counted

...all the petrochemical industry, which would be able to get its raw materials from our own earth; there followed a whole group of small enterprises intended to achieve greater economic independence. The Shah was aware of a lesser evil the too rapid acquisition of wealth by the people, with its predictable consequences. The achievement of this plan would, he thought, gradually eliminate the difficulties and reestablish the general equilibrium of the country.

The agricultural sector also gave the revolutionaries a pretext for a show of indignation. Let us dwell on this point, which is still too often cited by the Western Orientalists, still eager to peddle the nonsense put out by Bani-Sadr and co., and presenting this sector of Iranian life as one of the main targets of "crimes."

It is difficult for a European, who has lived all his life in a country where intensive agriculture, to understand the nature of agriculture in Iran. The dry and saline soil does not produce those prodigious crops which are the only kind that can feed an expanding population, and traditional and ancestral methods do not meet the new demands. The three fertile provinces of North Kurdistan, Mazandaran, and Khorassan cannot by themselves provide for people's subsistence.

Agricultural reorganization began during the 1960's. A few large pilot projects in the driest areas were already yielding spectacular results, opening up for Iran new prospects for intensive agriculture and even agro-industry. But more time was needed to ensure the country's independence in food supply. Pending that time, it was necessary to import food. Was this a disaster?

Concomitant with agriculture, an important electricity network was under construction. Many dams, most of which were planned with French cooperation, were supplied with irrigation water for agriculture and electric power for industrial and domestic lighting. Today the two large towns of Mashad and Yazd are threatened with water shortages because the dams designed to supply them have not been completed; the dams in the south have been emptied and the water has been flooded because of the fear of Iraqi bombing, and a number of the dams are not being used because of lack of maintenance. The Iranian Government daily issues unbelievable communiqués trying to explain the various breakdowns that are paralyzing the country: a storm in the north has caused an avalanche, etc. The peasants no longer receive enough food, and the rural exodus has assumed alarming dimensions.

In 1968, the Shah was having fine success in France announcing the development of Iranian agriculture and the emergence of an urban subproletariat. He was not aware of this situation nor causing. He had not seen his country for many years. When he himself came to power, what did he do? Tehran, which had 1 million people before the revolution, in 1968 had 2 million. The urban subproletariat came right from this very subproletariat, which under the Shah was not only has not diminished but has continued to grow. It is in this milieu that the Hezbollah are recruited.

Our French friends used to hypocritically criticize the Shah's agricultural policy, which was a logical consequence of his oil policy and his overall approach. They would have been better informed after a visit to the Correze and other regions of France which year after year are losing their population and are today in the process of dying, with their villages deserted and their farms abandoned.

If your Islamic Revolution had not occurred, the Shah's industrial development policy would be starting to bear its first fruit. Our major investments abroad would be sustaining our economy, and Iran would be able to resist the world economic crisis.

Our French press journalists who "organized the episode," as even one of them said, of Beaupré-la-Château to the benefit of Khomeynism, do so only through their ignorance of the realities and through superficiality. Always looking for and sensationalism, they neglect to study the reality of events. They forget that each people has its own cultural structure; they do not see only a world like theirs. They settle for some rapid results and do not do real research. It is so much easier to listen to someone like Paul-Sadr, with the aura of his artificial crown of opposition, and to repeat his blarney. Blood may run because of their complicity, but it is not their fault. They are not responsible for the ruin of peoples, and the ruin of peoples does not disturb them. They nevertheless pursue their work of destruction and subversion abroad, attacking now one country and now another. The Cuba affair, among others, had already provided an example of this mode of operation: this was so handsome and photogenic that it would have been a shame not to imitate him.

Finally, some of our French colleagues believe they can exploit the Mujahedin revolution. These men, who send children to their death, are stirring up a revolution which is too strong for us to ignore. The Mujahedin lie without conviction or shame, as they always have, and pursue only one objective: to take power in Iran--the relentless and bloody power of a Marxist dictatorship. We appeal to the conscience of our colleagues that they not again, because of a lack of awareness or because of blindness, play the role of "moderates' accomplices in Iran.

Our article "LAJAVI" has just been published in PARIS-MATCH No 1709 of 26 February 1979 and describes how easy living is for him and how clearly he betrays his role to an informed audience:

"We are not the Poles. We want to get rid of this millenary of execution and torture. It was introduced in Islamism, along with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. We have opposed it ever since, even for judging the man's accomplices. We would not want to defend the Lajavi people, but neither would we want their elimination as the final goal."

Before believing this man and publishing his lies, read what he has written. There is: "Collection of Communiques and Political Positions of the Mujahedin of the People," Vol 1, covering the period 11 January 1979 to 9 July 1979, (1st edition published in Teheran 11 February 1980 by the Ministry of the People Organization). The following are selections from it:

11. Page 30: Message of congratulations from the Mujahedin of the People sent at midnight on 15 February 1979 to Khomeyni (IRAN LIBRE note: At the same time that the first four generals had been executed).

"...We congratulate you on this remarkable and revolutionary action which causes joy to all this country's disinherited....We hope for more such revolutionary actions against all criminals without delay, so that those who collaborated with the monarchy will disappear to the last man."

12. Page 30: Communique issued on the 5 April 1979 referendum:

"...In the context of the new policy of the imperialist states, the concept of 'human rights' is used to strengthen dictatorships by giving peoples the illusion that they are less oppressed...(IRAN LIBRE note: We particularly note the attention of Amnesty International to Mr Radjavi's opinion of it, despite what has been done for him.)

13. Pages 116-117: Warning to the Mujahedin of the People about the possibility of amnesty for two Savak torturers:

"...The failure not to execute them (Tehrani and Arache) would give the counter-revolution a chance to take root....We hope the rumors of a possible amnesty are false, and that the tribunal will hold to its revolutionary principles and total determination in eliminating criminals, as it did for Khomeini, Khatami, and Nassiri--even though the latter could have provided considerable information if they had been given opportunity to speak."

IRAN LIBRE note: Radjavi cannot deny his responsibility for publishing these rumors. At the time, he was still in Iran and leading his movement.)

We assume the responsibility of being the voice, in exile, of our oppressed people in Iran. As long as we are able to speak, we will denounce all forms of intimidation or respite the untruths, lies, and insults which any-where, in this or in France.

IRAN LIBRE offers its services to anyone in providing documentation needed by lawyers and journalists to carry out their tasks. That is why we reprinted this publication--so that everyone will benefit from it.

...omission is reprehensible, and inadequate information can have disastrous results for the fate of peoples. Too much Iranian blood has been shed as a result of the complicity of some French journalists; enough is enough.

CLANDESTINE RADIO SAYS REGIME INSISTS ON IRAQ WAR

NC081718 Free Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 8 Apr 82

[Text] A Free Voice of Iran correspondent reports that the nonaligned foreign ministers conference being held in Kuwait has advised Khomeyni's Islamic Republic to end the war with Iraq and to resolve its differences through peace talks and in an atmosphere of understanding.

So far, Khomeyni's regime has rejected any just and logical effort aimed at ending the war. Although Iraq has officially announced that it is ready to return occupied Iranian territory with the establishment of a ceasefire and with the commencement of talks between the two countries for the solution of border disputes [words indistinct], Khomeyni's regime, which is greatly beset by domestic difficulties, is not ready to end the war. It wants to blame all existing difficulties on the war, and at the same time to completely destroy the army and not allow the popular and national armed forces to form a strong structure.

Khomeyni's foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, delivered a strongly worded speech against Israel at the nonaligned foreign ministers conference and called for the establishment of Islamic rule in Israel. Velayati's remarks come at a time when the Israeli Government is continuing to place arms, ammunition and spare parts at the disposal of Khomeyni's regime so that it can continue the war with Iraq. Recently, an Israeli official said in Paris: Israel is happy that Iran and Iraq have become involved in a war which, ultimately, is to Israel's benefit. Israel will spare no assistance to Khomeyni's Islamic Republic to (?continue) the war.

Meanwhile, the Islamic Conference is to send delegations to Baghdad and Tehran in the next couple of weeks to continue mediation efforts aimed at ending the Iran-Iraq war, hoping that these delegations will be able to convince officials of Khomeyni's regime to accept a just peace on the basis of Islamic and international norms.

END: 4640/234

COMMENTARY ON REJECTION OF IRAQI PROPOSALS

NC071246 Free Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 6 Apr 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Compatriots: The Islamic Republic has rejected all logical proposals for the termination of the war. Now the conditions for establishing peace between Iran and Iraq are to Iran's benefit from all aspects and our independence and territorial integrity too have been ensured in international peace proposals, by the Islamic Conference, nonaligned countries. Iraq has announced that it does not covet Iran's territory in any way and is prepared to return the occupied areas after the establishment of a ceasefire. But Khomeyni's Islamic regime, seeing its interests in the continuation of the war--something which is only to the benefit of imperialism and Israel--refuses to accept peace proposals for solving the two countries' problems and insists on continuing the war.

Much has been written and said in recent days by the world press, radio and television networks on the Iran-Iraq war. All reports state that the Iraqi Government is interested in negotiations to terminate the fruitless war. Meanwhile, no one among the leaders of Khomeyni's warmongering regime has the courage to accept Iraq's logical conditions and to express serious readiness for peace talks.

Politically speaking, the sparking off or continuation of any war is easier than ending it or announcing readiness for talks. (?This has been proven many times in history). Definitely, the weaker a regime and the more involved in problems, the more difficult it is for it to think of negotiations and of establishing peace. This is why the Tehran regime--because of its opportunistic wishes--prefers to continue the fruitless war knowing that the situation in 2, 3 or 6 more months will be no different from today.

The Iraqi Government has announced that, with the commencement of peace talks and the establishment of a ceasefire, it is prepared to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories. It has also proposed that a committee be formed to determine which country was the aggressor and if it is proven that Iraq started the aggression, then it will pay war indemnities to Iran. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that Khomeyni's regime will be able to get more concessions in the next few months or even in the next few years,

and basically the proposals put forth on the establishment of peace is the best path toward a logical termination of the war. The (?only thing) that will be achieved by continuing the war will be further damage and further exploitations by U.S. imperialism, Britain, the Soviet Union and Israel.

During the 18 months prior to the war, Khomeyni's despotic (?mullahs) proved not only that they were unfit to rule and unable to understand Iran's problems, but also that their objective and plan was to destroy Iran's economy and society--an objective which colonialists and imperialists hoped for years to achieve and finally did achieve (?with the help) of a bunch of ignorant mullahs.

Khomeyni's regime has turned Iran back to the dark medieval ages. Destruction, and setting back a country and nation [words indistinct] meets the nation's resistance. This what we see happening today. Khomeyni's Islamic Republic, which has spared no efforts toward this end, has been unable so far to break the people's resistance to Iran retrogressing. This regime cannot fulfill its sinister objectives under the veil of a war, which it has turned into a pretext to promote its objectives. Whether the war ends or continues, the bases of Khomeyni's regime will crumble.

The regime ruling Iran rejects peace proposals and plans because it does not have the courage to accept peace. This is because once the war ends it will be unable to repair the damage and mend all ills that stem from the war. It will be unable to do either. Even though the [words indistinct] mullahs know that the continuation of the war [words indistinct] nevertheless they are using the war as an excuse to (?ensure its own interests), to give Israel as great a peace of mind as possible as far as Iraq is concerned and, finally, to be able to continue wretched life for a short while, enabling them to crush opponents and intensify the terror, censorship and oppression.

Khomeyni's Islamic Republic [words indistinct] (?should know) that what must be done will be done and that the downfall of the hellish regime of the mullahs is inevitable [words indistinct].

CSO: 4640/234

BATTLEFRONT REPORTS 'GODSEND' FOR MULLAHS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 64, 25 Mar 82 pp 1-2

[Text] The alacrity with which Tehran announced its offensive and sweeping gains against the Iraqi army last Monday inevitably led opponents inside Iran to see the announcement as a ploy to take the pressure off the mullahs.

Speeches by Khomeini and other officials over the Now Ruz holiday reflected their concern over the deteriorating internal security situation. Reports from Tehran said top officials were travelling from place to place by ambulance after the latest series of attacks on officials travelling in ordinary vehicles.

The arrest of 25 people, believed to be air force and other officers who were said to have been planning to bomb Khomeini's home and other strategic places, was quickly followed by a four-hour gun battle in Tehran's Yussefabad district between Mojahedin-e-Khalq activists and revolutionary guards. The government announced it had found the counter-revolutionaries' hide-out and captured many weapons.

It also claimed it had seized 25 centres of the marxist Fedayeen-e-Khalq movement and arrested 40 of its members. Both Khomeini and prime minister Hossain Mussavi referred to the discovery of an attempt to blow up the revolutionary guards' main ammunition dump. Another powerful bomb, which officials said would have destroyed a big area, was discovered and defused in Tehran's usually crowded Sepah Square, where a bomb killed 10 people recently.

Bombings and violence were reported from other parts of the capital and the provinces. In Mahabad yet another Friday prayer leader was gunned down.

In the face of all this it was no wonder Khomeini was on the defensive. He praised his administration as one more perfect than any the world had ever seen before. And he angrily condemned those who, he said, were claiming things were much better in the days of "Mohammad Reza," his name for the late Shah. He was bitter about his clerical opponents, whom he said should thank God they were able to live under the banner of the Islamic republic.

The reports from the war front were a godsend for the officials in the midst of all this. Their announcement of wide-scale victories, thousands of Iraqis

killed and wounded and others, including Jordanians and Egyptians, taken prisoner, set off new euphoria in Tehran, with people congratulating one another and passing round Now Ruz candies. The mullahs' lowering of their guard in their speeches was forgotten again, though few people really knew whether they should believe the victory stories or not.

Khomeini, who it was announced was going to take another 10 days' rest soon after an even longer break from official duties, said he embraced the brave soldiers and guards who had won the latest victory.

But the Iraqis were quick to announce their counter-offensive and their claims matched the Iranian ones. Baghdad had also announced it was to parade Iranian prisoners through the streets. Iran's premier said they hoped to see the captured oil minister Tondguyan in the parade. He has not been heard of for some time, and Mussavi said that if he wasn't on show they would know he had been tortured or was dead.

Some Tehran sources contended the big push by the Iranian forces was designed to take back some land and provide evidence of a victory that could suggest Iran had really gained the upper hand in the war and thus could negotiate with the Iraqis with an advantage in the eyes of the Iranian people. In spite of fierce declamations of determination to go on to complete victory, the sources said Khomeini's officials have given the go-ahead for the Islamic Conference Organisation to continue to press the Iraqis to meet their conditions up to a certain point.

Arab sources said this week that the Iraqis were willing to withdraw from Iran as soon as talks start without waiting for any favourable result. This might prove sufficient inducement to the Iranians to start negotiation once some definite victory can be shown to the Iranian people. There have been several signs of Iranian officials' attitudes on peace softening in speeches over the past two weeks, observers say.

CSO: 4600/389

'RADIO IRAN' COMMENTS ON SOVIET AGGRESSION

NC091658 Radio Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 9 Apr 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Reports published by foreign news agencies--not by the regime's Islamicized mass media--indicate that Soviet helicopters violated Iranian airspace and territory at dawn on Tuesday, 5 April, and attacked Hormak village in northern Zahedan near the Afghan border. During the attack, not the first by Soviet forces on Iranian border areas, rockets and bullets rained down on the defenseless people of Hormak village and on the conscientious gendarmes who were serving [words indistinct]. Dozens of people were seriously wounded, among them several gendarmerie NCO's and a number of young children. The excuse used by the Soviet Army to bomb Hormak apparently was the presence of a number of Afghan brothers and sisters who had fled to Iran from the oppression of the Soviet soldiers and their Afghan servants and had sought refuge in Hormak.

The oppression of the Afghan people and the massacring of the patriotic freedom fighters of Iran's brother and neighbor by the Soviet occupiers is not a new story. What is particularly noteworthy is the Islamic regime's silence over, coupled with its efforts to hide, this flagrant aggression of Iranian territory and the killing of defenseless people by the Soviet Army inside Iran. Foreign observers may ponder how a country that considers itself independent can stay silent in the face of such blatant aggression, but one glance at the cooperation between Iran's Islamic regime and the Red Army in crushing Afghan Mujahedin will answer their question.

Iran's Islamic regime, which from the start did not show any great desire to condemn the Soviet aggression of Afghanistan, was compelled to seemingly take the side of the Afghan Mujahedin only after pressure by domestic and foreign public opinion. But actually, not only has it not assisted the Mujahedin in any way but, on the contrary, it has cooperated with the Soviet occupiers in crushing patriotic Afghan combatants. This regime, which claims to defend Islam and Muslims, has not extended any effective assistance to the Afghan Mujahedin and does not allow Afghan refugees to settle in Iran. Its limited financial assistance is extended only to several parasitic Afghan mullahs, who like their Iranian counterparts think of everything except the nation, its independence and freedom. We can see an example of the limitations

imposed on the Afghans in Iran in how they were allowed to commemorate the anniversary of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Afghan brothers were not granted permission to demonstrate in front of the Soviet Embassy and their (?slogans were limited) to expressions of support for the Islamic Republic of Iran and to praising Imam Khomeyni. In addition to these limitations, Iran's Islamic regime has arrested Afghan refugees on several occasions on charges of buying and selling smuggled goods and has handed them over to the Soviet occupying forces at the border points of Tayyebad, (?Eslam Qal'eh) and [words indistinct]. It is better not to talk about the fate of the refugees who are (?thus) handed over to the Red Army [words indistinct].

The (?presence of) the Soviet Red Army and its allies on Iranian territory, be they in the form of (?sudden attacks) or in the form of patrols, is not (?something new). About a year ago, Soviet and Cuban officers, accompanied by Islamic Revolution Guards, started patrols on Iran's borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The objective of these missions is to find the crossing points of Afghan Mujahedin and Iranian combatants and to arrest them. So far, thousands of Afghan Mujahedin who intended to enter Iranian territory or were crossing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near the Iranian border have been arrested by joint Cuban and Islamic patrols and been handed over to the Red Army. All these Mujahedin have been labeled as smugglers. Baluchi combatants have also been arrested and are now in Islamic prisons.

In addition to allowing the patrol and attack missions, Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic regime has granted the Red Army a permanent presence in Iran. (?An example) of this presence is the electronic eavesdropping base that has been built by the Soviet Red Army on Malek Siahkuh Mountain. The Soviet officers and technicians who work at this station wear uniforms of the army of Islam and are guarded by 300 Islamic Revolution Guards. The nearly completed Iranian naval and air base at Chahbahar has also been placed at the Red Army's disposal, and Soviet experts are presently working with great speed to complete the base. With the stationing of Soviet naval and air units at Chahbahar, the Soviet Union will be able to control and dominate vital transit routes in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean.

As has also been confirmed by foreign news agencies, the Soviet aggression on Hormak village and the massacre of gendarmes and (?defenseless) people [words indistinct] is not the first of its kind. Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic regime [word indistinct] has veiled all such cases of crimes and aggressions. However, this time after reports on this were dispatched throughout the world and the Iranian people were informed by Persian-language radios, this report was (?inevitably confirmed).

There are several reasons why the ayatollahs ruling Iran have (?turned) to the Soviet Union. The first is the Islamic Republic's dependence on arms and ammunition from communist countries. Another very important reason is the presence of KGB experts in Iran who (?are assisting in organizing) the Islamic regime's security organization. In addition, the part played by the Tudeh party and the Feda'iyān-e Khalq organization in the cooperation between

the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union against the Afghan Mujahedin should not be ignored. The Tudeh and Feda'iyen are (?diligently) cooperating with the Islamic Republic in identifying opponents of the regime in Iran and abroad. In return, Mr Khomeyni pays by cooperating in crushing the Afghan Mujahedin.

CSO: 4640/234

'FREE VOICE OF IRAN' CHARGES REGIME KNEW ABOUT SOVIET ATTACK

NC081912 Free Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 8 Apr 82

[Excerpt] A number of Iranian border policemen were killed and wounded in an attack by Afghan armed forces, supported by the Soviet occupying forces, on the Iranian border. A Free Voice of Iran correspondent reports that Soviet military aircraft bombed a border area in Iran where Afghan combatants are camped, killing several innocent people including some Iranian policemen. No precise information is available on the number of people killed and wounded.

An Afghan combatants' spokesman in Pakistan has announced that during the attack by the aggressing Soviet forces on the base of the Afghan guerrillas, who are fighting to free their country from Soviet domination, casualties were inflicted on Afghan refugees. The Afghan combatants' representative announced that the attack by the Soviet Army and the forces under the Kabul government's command might have been carried out with the Islamic Republic's prior knowledge, because Khomeyni's regime has not reacted to the incident.

The Soviet ambassador's meeting yesterday with 'Ali Khamene'i, the regime's president, may have been connected with this attack. Soviet-Iranian relations in the commercial and military fields have expanded recently. The Soviet Union ambassador assured the mullahs' president, 'Ali Khamene'i, during his recent visit, which was said to have taken place because his term in office has ended, that the Soviet Union is prepared to continue its assistances to the Islamic Republic and that in return Khomeyni's regime should collect the necessary information so the Afghan Army can bomb the Afghan combatants' camps on the Iran-Pakistan borders.

The Islamic Republic's silence on this attack by the Red Army Air Force and the Afghan communist forces on Afghan Muslim fighters through Iran's airspace shows that the Islamic Republic knew of it beforehand and granted permission to the Soviet Air Force and the puppet Kabul regime to enter Iranian airspace and bomb an area on the Iran-Pakistan border. Soviet and Afghan aircraft have bombed Afghan guerrilla camps in Pakistan several times in the past, actions which were met with a warning from Pakistan. This time, the Soviet Union used Iranian airspace in this flagrant aggression, allowing it to bomb the Afghan fighters' camps on the Iran-Pakistan border with greater ease.

CSO: 4640/234

COMMENTARY ON REGIME FEAR OF 'NATIONALISTS'

NC101040 Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian 1805 GMT 9 Apr 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Dear Compatriots: For some time now the officials and loudspeakers of the regime have gone out of their way to call anyone opposing Khomeyni's abominable republic and anyone raising his voice for freedom a monafeq [hypocrite--term used by regime in reference to the Mojahedin] in their propaganda attacks. It is extremely clear that the regime's officials and propaganda machinery have always used this term when referring to the Mojahedin.

A few short questions rise at this point. Are the deceitful ruling mullahs pursuing a specific goal when using the term hypocrites? Are the hypocrites or, in other words, the Mojahedin the only opponents who are struggling? Have all the combatant national forces joined the Mojahedin or the so-called hypocrites, or have they lost their ability and power to struggle and handed the scene entirely over to the Mojahedin? There are several other questions of this sort. Which answer to these questions is closer to reality?

In this talk we do not intend to condemn any group's effort to fulfill its ideologies and achieve its desires. We also do not intend to discuss whether or not these different and seemingly progressive ideologies are the ensurers of the welfare and security of the Iranian society.

The truth is that the regime's propaganda tricks, like all its demagogueries, have been unveiled today, and, if there are a limited number of people who believe their lies, they are either extremely naive or are among those who share in the illicit gains of the Islamic Republic of deceivers and plunderers [break in transmission for 55 seconds].

The intention is to make the people think that the Mojahedin are the only strugglers present in the arena. The objective is to inculcate on the tired minds of the people of Iran that there is no such thing as a full-fledged national and Iranian force or forces and that those who are arrested, imprisoned, tortured and executed or who are killed in numerous street clashes are from the Mojahedin or monafeqin group and not from the national and popular forces.

The question that will definitely rise at this point is: Aren't the Mojahedin at loggerheads with the ruling mullahs and how can one explain the fact that, by aggrandizing the Mojahedin, the leader of the Islamic Republic and his big and small mullahs are building a considerable force of them in the eyes of the people? The answer is very clear. The leaders of the regime have very clearly realized that the leaders of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, who have influenced the zealous youths and adolescents of Iran and have recruited them and are after high-ranking positions at the price of the blood of hundreds of freedom-seeking youths, do not form a force that can overthrow the regime, take over power and enjoy the nation's support, because the ideology of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization is the same used by Khomeyni and his ilk 3 years ago to deceive the people and to plunge it into disaster. They are also speaking of an Islamic Republic which brought on all these calamities and disasters. The only difference between this Islamic Republic and the present abominable regime is that one word, democratic, has been added between the two words Islamic and republic. Otherwise, everything is the same, and the claim is the same that Khomeyni had and has.

Khomeyni and his mullahs also made golden promises before coming to power and spoke of a paradise and of a better and freer life. Therefore, the regime's leaders and propaganda loudspeakers that have realized the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization's leaders lack popularity and the strength to rule a country as big as Iran have labeled all opponents as hypocrites and are trying to propagate the view among the society that there is no such thing as a national force or national forces in Iran today. The mullahs' propaganda network has even spread this thought to people outside the borders of Iran and in the press conferences and interviews with the regime's officials [break in transmission for 5 seconds] in a bid to enjoy the continued support of the colonialists.

The intention is to make the people accept the sinister belief that if Khomeyni's Islamic Republic falls a worse regime of the hypocrites--or Mojahedin--will come to power which will be much more harsh and irresponsible and which will threaten the entire area with the danger of unforeseen incidents. Therefore, the ruling mullahs slyly label anyone they kill, any freedom seeker they chain and torture, any person devoted to Iran and Iran's honor they throw in dungeons and any freedom fighter they kill on the streets and alleys in cities and villages as a hypocrite so that they will make the people forget the holy word "national" and so that the nation will lose its hopes in national forces and will bow to this abominable republic and nothing more. This is because the regime knows that the Iranian nation will not accept and experience another Islamic Republic, in any form, whether or not it is called democratic.

The regime knows that the Iranian nation is now only after a system that will bring justice, freedom, welfare and security. It is after a system written with the blood of its constitutional movement strugglers some 75 years ago in a glorious document. The deceitful regime is well aware of this definite reality, and it is because of this that it never speaks of national combatant forces. However, it is unaware of the fact that the devoted national strugglers for the freedom and honor of Iran and the Iranian nation neither need

nor heed these propaganda commotions by small and big groups but rely on the genuine wish of their compatriots and continue to struggle for their nation's and country's liberation and freedom. They rise in a front as broad as Iran to struggle with all satanic forces and with all alien and anti-Iranian ideologies and, above all, with the rule of oppression. The national struggle will continue until the rotten roots of this Islamic Republic or of any other so-called Islamic Republic have been eradicated from Iran.

CSO: 4640/234

IRAQI CLERICS' REPRESENTATIVE FORESEES SADDAM'S DOWNFALL

LD091424 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 9 Apr 82

[Excerpts] Speaking before the Friday prayers sermon was given today, Hojjat Ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Hakim, the representative of Iraq's militant clergy, referred to the martyrdom anniversary of Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr, Iraq's religious authority. He said: On the martyrdom anniversary of this great man we should keep in sight Iraq's bright Islamic future and we should translate into action the hope for realizing an Islamic republic, an Iraqi government of divine justice and leadership by the Velayat-e Faqih, for which that great authority spilt his blood.

Expounding on the internal situation in Iraq and Saddam's innumerable crimes, he said: The ruling regime in Baghdad, despite its efforts to demonstrate that the system has the support of the people or the party--that is, the Ba'th Party set up by 'Aflaq--it is patently obvious that the system is a dictatorial, autocratic system manifested in Saddam. Therefore, one might conclude that should the head of that regime fall, all its foundations, cornerstones and institutions would disappear. All the world political experts admit that Saddam and his dictatorial regime will soon disappear.

Hojjat Ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Hakim, continuing his speech, said: Another problem is that Saddam's despotic regime is kept on its feet on the basis of a tribe in Iraq; today there are a great many dissensions and calls, and there is a great deal of proof that many divisions have emerged in the midst of that tribe, so much so that the sons of a great many of the heads of these tribes [as heard] have been killed.

Another issue is the resurgence and increase in the spirit of resistance among the Muslim people of Iraq to that regime, as the majority of the Iraqi people do not recognize the present regime. This is because the regime does not represent the people, but rather represents world imperialism. This spirit of resistance is clearly obvious, particularly following the aggressive war inflicted by the Iraqi regime on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He continued: Another manifestation of the resurgence of the spirit of resistance of the Iraqi Muslim people is the demonstrations which recently took place in the two cities of Al Mawsil and (Imarah). Iraq's despotic regime, with its military organization and with armed forces which have lost

their morale, will not be able to continue this aggressive war. It begs for a halt to the war so as to preserve the paraphernalia of its power, but all the world's political experts admit that the Saddam regime, both from the military and political standpoints, has been defeated in this imposed war.

Hojjat Ol-Eslam Hakim, referring to the fact that the world imperialist forces might bring to power another pawn such as Saddam when he falls, said: The Iraqi people would not accept any regime imposed on Iraq by imperialism and colonialism.

Hojjat Ol-Eslam Hakim said: We believe that the Islamic republic and future regime of Iraq should be sympathetic to and coordinate with Iran's Islamic revolution and its leadership--constituted by the Velayat-e Faqih--to the utmost. The leadership of the Velayat-e Faqih is the leadership of all the Islamic nations and is based on the foundations of Islam; the line of thought of the future regime of Iraq is the self-same line of Velayat-e Faqih, and the line of the ulema and the clergy and the line of thought of all Muslims should also be the same.

Another point is the coordination between the Islamic Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran in all political stances, particularly in the struggle against world imperialism.

In conclusion he said: We believe that it is the Muslim people who should take part in building Iraq's future Islamic republic, just as the Islamic Republic of Iran is fundamentally supported by the people. Iraq's Muslim people have given up everything they have for the sake of Islam--in their forefront is our martyred Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr--may God have mercy on him--and his oppressed sister, Bint Al-Hoda; and on their side are tens of thousands of martyrs, refugees and tortured prisoners in Iraq. The Iraqi nation will choose the world leader of Islam. The Iraqi nation will choose the leadership of Imam Khomeyni.

CSO: 4640/234

MORE TURMOIL REPORTED IN WEST AZARBAIJAN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 64, 25 Mar 82 p 4

[Text] Armed opponents of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime have inflicted heavy blows on revolutionary guards' units in the vicinity of Mahabad, Miandoab and Tekab, reports from the area indicated last week.

A group of local gunmen, mainly Kurdish, was said to have raided the barracks in Mahabad. The raiding party was said to be commanded by non-Kurdish ex-army officers in battle fatigues but wearing no insignia.

Tudeh party sources in Tehran have reportedly told guards officials that the armed resistance fighters in Mahabad are being trained and commanded by officers of the former Imperial Guard. The Tudeh sources have reportedly told the mullahs that they are in possession of documents showing that an organization called the Iran Liberation Army has a network of activists in the area.

The attacks on the revolutionary officials in Mahabad came in the wake of broadcasts by Tehran radio claiming that the region had been cleared of anti-revolutionary elements. The mullah-controlled press has now admitted that big areas have yet to be pacified. The killing of Mahabad's Friday prayer leader at the weekend also underlined that original government claims were premature.

Other reports from Khoy and Salmas (formerly Shahpour) in West Azarbaijan indicated that groups of young men marched through the streets on March 13, chanting anti-Khomeini slogans and tearing up his picture.

Later revolutionary guards were brought into Salmas from Maragheh to restore order. Some of the guards and young mullahs, meanwhile, forced their way into the houses and stores of the town's Christian community, ostensibly searching for alcoholic drinks. The region is still very tense.

CSO: 4600/389

OBSERVANCE OF PRE-ISLAMIC 'NOW RUZ' FESTIVAL REPORTED WIDESPREAD

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 64, 25 Mar 82 pp 5-6

[Text] While opposition groups were encouraging Iranians to celebrate the New Year and not to be afraid of the mullahs, who are against such celebrations, the Islamic Association of Tehran Bus Company advised its members that "the origins of Persian Now Ruz are rooted in paganism" and as such the occasion must be abandoned by true Muslims.

"Indulgence in merrymaking and celebration of joyous occasions divert attention from worshipping God," its communique said. "Such acts of indecency befit the wayward whose profession it is to play music and sing songs," it added, in apparent reference to leaflets signed by "lovers of Persian music" and similar hand-outs appearing in the streets.

The communique also said that nationalist groups were appealing to the people's patriotism by seizing on such occasions as Now Ruz. "As true Muslims we believe in the sovereignty of God so in our book there is no room for anything else," the statement said. "We believe nationalism is in direct contravention of belief in God."

Several other Islamic associations issued similar communiqués, declaring that their members would not hold Now Ruz ceremonies. Friday prayer leaders in provincial towns meanwhile told their audiences that they had received "numerous letters" from women and children in which the letter writers had allegedly said they would not observe Now Ruz and would donate the money usually spent on it to the war effort. Most people found this incredible.

Observance of Now Ruz was widespread in spite of the appeals and mayors of resort towns had to put out public statements asking would-be holiday makers to stay away from their areas because of overcrowding.

And despite official harassment of a people who have celebrated Now Ruz for over 2000 years, top Islamic leaders, including Khomeini, Khamenei, chief justice Mussavi-Ardebili, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani and premier Mussavi, put out messages on the occasion. But they refrained from offering greetings. They used the occasion to remind people that there was little cause for being happy as "enemies are still at large and the war with Iraq goes on."

CSO: 4600/389

'MUSIC LOVERS' ACCUSE KHOMEYNI

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 64, 25 Mar 82 p 6

[Text] In leaflets distributed in Tehran and Shiraz last week a group claiming to represent "lovers of Persian music" accused Khomeini of "acting on instructions from imperialists to destroy all aspects of Iran's culture and heritage."

The leaflet said: "Now that Now Ruz approaches we take this opportunity to ask our compatriots to observe our ancient traditions in the most conspicuous and colourful manner possible so that the Iran-hating communist mullahs know that they cannot steal our identity.

"Khomeini is a renegade and outlaw who has been hired by oil cartels and communists to destroy our nationhood. That is why he is against observance of Now Ruz. But he will take his aspirations to the grave with his filthy body. We Iranians have preserved our sacred traditions against the enmity of such invaders as the Greeks, Arabs, Mongols and Turks. We can do so against the enmity to our heritage by a small-time criminal like Khomeini. After all, Khomeini is the creation of imperialism, he is the illegitimate child of an unholy marriage between black and red imperialists.

"In order to choke Khomeini to death we will play music and celebrate our Now Ruz. We have already done our duty in keeping our music alive during the dark days of Khomeini rule. We have done so while hooligans and criminals have killed many musicians and silenced others by using brute force.

"Today we see that our resistance has convinced many of those simple-minded people who were originally misled by Khomeini of the righteousness of our cause. Today those misled Iranians no longer believe in the criminal Khomeini. This traitor's supporters are only those thieves and criminals who were released from prison to rule over Iran."

CSO: 4600/389

ACTIVITIES OF IRANIANS IN DIASPORA REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 64, 25 Mar 82 pp 9-10

[Text] Iranian exiles were beginning to feel just a little less abandoned by the world last week. Not only had the western countries put down and forced through a resolution criticising the Iranian government at the United Nations commission on human rights, but even a senior British official in foreign under-secretary Douglas Hurd had conceded on television that the resolution would probably do more good than harm.

Of course, he didn't make it quite clear whether he meant harm to Iranians left home and experiencing the thuggery of Khomeini's regime or to the commercial interests of the British. No matter: if it's the first he had in mind, then it's all reassuring, while if it's the second it could mean that the West has decided that morality comes before money after all--even if it's taken three years of desperate efforts to prove the falsity of that idea before they got around to it.

Thanks, too, to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, who have not only been providing a detailed chronicle of the excesses of the Khomeini regime against their colleagues inside Iran but have been zealously getting the support of western politicians and journalists in publicising them, and also to the Bahai organisations, the world is finally beginning to appreciate the barbarism that Iran's rulers have been perpetrating on their people.

Compare these efforts with those of a small group of nationalist protestors who picketed the Syrian embassy in London last weekend to protest against the Syrian regime's support for Khomeini and his government. On Sunday only one woman turned up, the rest presumably finding the Now Ruz celebrations more important. In fact, an estimated three thousand Iranians turned up at a celebratory dinner and concert that evening in Hammersmith--where the singers who were promised didn't turn up, like the protestors at the Syrian embassy.

In spite of finding herself alone the woman outside the Syrian embassy held her ground throughout much of the day. The embassy finally sent for an Iranian embassy official, who went inside and took photographs of the woman through the window, presumably to send back to Tehran. Then the police were sent for and a kindly inspector left two constables to protect her until she had completed her vigil at dusk.

The western resolution at the U.N. human rights commission, which the Soviets and their allies refused to support, must put the other Muslim nations in something of quandary. How long can they go on saying nothing about the horrifying actions taken in Iran in the name of Islam? Do they not realise how cynical they look to the non-Muslim world? It really seems as if these Muslim countries are more intent on using Islam as a political weapon against the non-Muslim world rather than obtaining their spiritual sustenance from it.

Hushang Mehr Ayin, a prominent banker and journalist during the late Shah's regime, touched on the point when he wrote a letter printed in the London Times last week.

He wrote: "Viewing with great concern the fact that the accused assassins of President Sadat were 'tried in complete secrecy and denied the opportunity to defend themselves fully and freely in accordance with the rules of the law and dictates of justice,' Mr Ahmed Ben Bella, the well known Algerian revolutionary leader, appeals to President Mubarak of Egypt to revoke the findings of the court and order fresh trials in an open civil court.

"I do not intend to confirm or otherwise challenge Mr Ben Bella's views on the conduct of the Cairo trials. However, since Mr Ben Bella makes his allegations in his capacity as the chairman of the International Islamic Commission for Human Rights, I cannot help wondering why his commission has not made any public statements on the conduct of the so-called Islamic courts in Iran in which the unfortunate accused are tried not only in complete secrecy but are denied access to defence lawyers and even the opportunity to challenge the views of the judges let alone the facts presented by them.

"In the Islamic revolutionary courts of Iran the judges will hear only those witnesses who come forward to speak against the accused and the evidence presented as fact is often the opinion of the judges or witnesses. And all this is done in the name of Islamic justice which, incidentally, does not accept jurisdiction of civil courts. As an exponent of Islamic values Mr Ben Bella might do well by making public his views on the Ayatollah's faith in the dictates of justice."

Women's organisations in the Islamic countries, like those in the West, have failed completely to show any concern over the executions and other violence against countless young women in Iran in recent months. Nor did they speak up for Mrs Farrokhru Parsa, the former education minister, who was executed on unproven charges in the earlier days of the revolutionary regime. Or when a woman was stoned to death in Kerman. Should anyone give any credence to these so-called devout Muslims when they behave as if brainwashed on Islam?

CSO: 4600/389

BRIEFS

TRADE DELEGATION TO KUWAIT--The Iranian trade delegation led by Mr Khamushi, under secretary at the Ministry of Trade, arrived in Kuwait yesterday and was welcomed by the managing director of Kuwait's Chamber of Commerce. The delegation told the IRNA correspondent in Kuwait: We are visiting Kuwait at the invitation of the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce for talks on the expansion of trade relations between the two countries. During our 3-day stay in this country we will discuss trade affairs and the existing problems and we will try to find a solution for them. The delegation will then leave Kuwait for [name indistinct] and other countries of the Persian Gulf region. [Text] [LDO51118 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 5 Apr 82]

KURDISH LEADER'S INTERVIEW PREVIEWED--The French newspaper LIBERATION TODAY carried an interview with 'Abdorrahman Qasemlu, secretary general of the Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP] of Iran. Qasemlu, who is in Paris to participate in the National Resistance Council meetings, spoke about why the KDP joined the National Resistance Council. Speaking about (?relations) among the Kurds of Iran, Qasemlu said: We have close relations with all Kurdish tribes in Iran. Even Rastgari, which supports the monarchy, has joined the KDP. Only the Komeleh party, which consists of revolutionary Marxists who do not know what they want, have not joined us. On the KDP's cooperation with Bani-Sadr, who was the person in charge of the Kordestan (?massacres), Quasemlu told the LIBERATION correspondent: It is not the first time that two old enemies have joined hands for a common goal. Qasemlu pointed out that Bani-Sadr has accepted the KDP's conditions. We will broadcast a full text of 'Abdorrahman Qasemlu's interview with LIBERATION in our program tomorrow. [Text] [NC082045 Free Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 8 Apr 82]

MAJLIS DELEGATION TO LAGOS--According to the central news unit, Dr Musa Zargar, Mohammad 'Ali Hadi-Najafabadi, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami and Sabah Zanganeh, deputies of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, met with President Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i tonight. At the end of this meeting, Mr Zargar said in an interview with the correspondent of the central news unit: An elected delegation from the Islamic Consultative Assembly, comprising Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Sabah Zanganeh, Mohammad 'Ali Hadi-Najafabadi, and myself, are going to Lagos--capital of Nigeria--tomorrow to take part in the spring session of the Interparliamentary Conference. We were received by the president to present a report to him on our mission. He added: The spring session of the

Interparliamentary Conference will review the agenda for the main session which will be held in Rome at the end of the summer; the agenda will also be determined on this session. [sentence as heard] [Text] [LD082148 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 8 Apr 82]

OPPOSITION LEADER ON KHOMEYNI--The French newspaper LE MATIN published an interview with Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, leader of Iran's National Democratic Front who has joined the National Resistance Council, in its issue today. In the interview Matin-Daftari stated that Khomeyni is supported by only 10 percent of Iran and that he has been able to prolong his regime's life by using oppression and suppression and by continuing the war. Presently, only the fact that Khomeyni is alive has maintained the regime, because he directly supervises all affairs. In his interview Matin-Daftari said that Beheshti was the only person who could have continued Khomeyni's policies after him. After Khomeyni's death, no one else will be able to maintain his regime. After his death, [words indistinct] will destroy each other. We will broadcast a full text of the interview granted by Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, leader of the National Democratic Front of Iran, to the French newspaper LE MATIN in our program tomorrow. [Text] [NC081920 Free Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 8 Apr 82]

SOVIET REFUGEE CAMP ATTACK CHARGED--Reports from Islamabad and Tehran indicate that the forces of Babrak Karmal's puppet regime in Afghanistan and the Soviet occupation forces aggressed Iranian territory. This attack was on a camp of Iranian soil housing Afghan refugees. The government of the Islamic Republic has kept silent on this flagrant aggression of Iran's territorial integrity by the Soviet Union. [Excerpts] [NC081544 Radio Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 8 Apr 82]

SILENCE ON SOVIET BORDER SKIRMISH--The Soviet Government in Moscow has denied reports on clashes with Iranian forces. A spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry said that reports on the clashes between Iranian and Soviet border forces on borders east of the Caspian Sea are not true. He was referring to a report by the U.S. ABC Television which had revealed that a number of Soviet and Iranian infantry and air units clashed on the borders east of the Caspian Sea. The Tehran regime has not yet reacted to these reports in any way, but a Voice of Iran correspondent says that it is very likely that the mullahs' spokesman will refute these reports in his weekly press conference. [Excerpts] [NC100726 Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian 1805 GMT 9 Apr 82]

QOTBZADEH ARREST DENIAL--Reports that Sadeq Qotbzadeh was arrested by the regime which he played an important part in establishing have been denied. Reports indicate that these reports were denied in a telephone call by an AFP correspondent in Beirut with Sadeq Qotbzadeh's residence in Tehran. Qotbzadeh, Yazdi and Bazargan are now in Tehran and are continuing their treacherous efforts to take over power, if necessary. [Excerpts] [NC100738 Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian 1805 GMT 9 Apr 82]

KHOMEYNI MEETS COMMANDER--Colonel Sayyad-Shirazi, the commander of the ground forces of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this morning met with Imam Khomeyni, leader of the Islamic revolution and

commander in chief of the armed forces. The commander of the ground forces submitted a report to the imam on the activities of this force. Imam Khomeyni also received in audience this morning Hojjat Ol-Islam Haj Seyyed Mahmud Mar'ashi--the son of the great Ayatollah Mar'ashi-Najafi--who submitted to the imam a report on his trip to several countries. After the meeting, Hojjat Ol-Islam Haj Seyyed Mar'ashi gave the following statement to a correspondent of the central news unit: Some time ago I traveled to several countries in order to obtain valuable religious books. I also photographed more than 1,000 valuable religious manuscripts. I submitted a report to the imam on my journey. [Text] [LD111258 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 11 Apr 82]

PDRY LOBBYING FOR CHEAP OIL--The foreign minister of the communist regime of South Yemen has arrived in Tehran at the head of a delegation. He has a message from 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, president of the communist regime of South Yemen, for 'Ali Musavi-Khamene'i. It is said that during his discussions the foreign minister of South Yemen will ask Iran for cheaper oil and suggest plans for greater cooperation between the two regimes in the area. [Text] [GF111247 Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran 0330 GMT 11 Apr 82]

NEW ENVOYS--According to the central news unit, on the recommendation of the foreign minister and the approval of President Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, Mr Ebrahim Behnam-Dehkordi has been appointed as the Islamic Republic of Iran's new ambassador to Greece and Mr Hasan Asadi-Lari as the new ambassador to India. Mr Seyyed Rashid Musavi has been appointed as the provisional Islamic Republic of Iran's charge d'affaires in the Ivory Coast. [Text] [LD110312 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 10 Apr 82]

ENVOY TO DPRK--Tehran, 10 Apr (IRNA)--The first Iranian ambassador, Mr Asghar Nahavandian, to Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), presented his credentials to the president of the DPRK, Kim Il-song. [Text] [LD110312 Tehran IRNA in English 1922 GMT 10 Apr 82]

CSO: 4640/234

HAMMADI ANALYZES ASPECTS OF WAR WITH IRAN

JN031205 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1040 GMT 3 Apr 82

[Text] Baghdad, 3 Apr (INA)--Foreign Minister Dr Sa'dun Hammad I has said that the Iraqi military forces today are large in number and well equipped. He said that the armed forces, comprising the regular army, the popular army and the volunteers, are now larger in number and more capable than they were before the war.

In a study published by Ath-thawrah under the headline "Observations on the Question of the War With Iran," Dr Hammadi asserted that Iraq's military capabilities were not drained by the war of attrition as some people imagine or as one may gather from unrealistic analyses of the war. He said that allowing people to volunteer has opened [a] wide scope for increasing the number of fighters. It also threw into the battle hordes of fighters who would have had the opportunity to train and fight were it not for the war.

Dr Hammadi emphasized that the Iraqi army's experience in all the military fields--combat, logistics, planning and command--is now undoubtedly better than before.

Dr Hammadi said that, by its continuation, the Iraqi-Iranian war has increased the Arab war effort and capability of confronting Zionism.

It has also improved the Arab nation's preparedness for future battles, not vice versa. He said that the proper approach toward resisting the Zionist entity requires that the issue with the enemy on the Eastern Iraqi border must be settled radically. Keeping the problem unresolved is not at all in the interest of the Palestine question, he said.

Dr Hammadi added: Peace cannot be achieved unless Iran becomes convinced that Iraq and the Arab countries in the Gulf cannot be easily taken over and that they are not zones of Iranian influence. If Iran continues to be a source of anxiety and threats and continues to pursue the same old policy toward this region, then we will be forced to take all that into consideration and adjust our plans and programs accordingly.

Dr Hammadi denied claims that the timing of the war with Iran was not in the interest of the Palestine question, saying such claims "are naive at best."

He said that the war could only have been avoided by Iraq acquiescing in the new Iranian regime's plans to overthrow Arab regimes in the region.

Dr Hammadi added: The Iranian regime did not give anything to the Palestinian revolution other than moral support through statements. Even if we admit its sincerity, the Iranian regime's support for the Palestine question is not greater than that of Iraq, which is well-known for its military, economic and political capabilities. The Iranian regime cannot give anything other than verbal support. Motivated by self-interest, the Iranian regime seized the first opportunity to cooperate with the Zionist entity in the field of armament. This has now become common knowledge, admitted by the Iranian officials themselves.

Dr Hammadi concluded his study by saying: On the subject of the Palestine question's relationship with the war with Iran, there is what we may call right and what we may call wrong. What is right is that the Palestine question is the central Arab issue and that Zionism is the main enemy of the Arab nation. This calls for the pooling of all resources for a prolonged battle. What is wrong is for us to do nothing on the pretext that the Palestine question requires all our attention, while other parts of the Arab homeland are falling under [Iranian] occupation.

CSO: 4400/199

'ATH-THAWRAH' RIDICULES IRAN'S PROPAGANDA ON WAR

JN020930 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0830 GMT 2 Apr 82

[Text] Baghdad, 2 Apr (INA)--The newspaper ATH-THAWRAH ridicules the Zionist enemy's methods in instigating the Iranian regime to follow its evil and aggressive designs against Iraq and the Arab nation.

In today's commentary, ATH-THAWRAH asserts that the Zionist propaganda and methods cannot change indisputable facts. The Iraqi victory over the Khomeyni clique cannot be screened or belittled by this evil clique.

ATH-THAWRAH, the organ of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, says that blowing in the punctured bagpipe of the Tehran rulers is not a new method to take us by surprise. We have been aware of this method ever since the waves of the Zionist propaganda and the international intelligence networks brought this suspect clique to power in Iran and instigated it against Iraq.

The paper asserts that the alliance between the gang of Tel Aviv and those of Tehran and Qom has become crystal clear and cannot be concealed by a sieve. Also, the alliance between the tyrants in Damascus and Zionist has become an indisputable fact. The paper adds that the Mossad agents in Damascus in cooperation with the other Mossad agents abroad participated in the blowing process.

Continuing, ATH-THAWRAH says that Iraq has triumphed, and with God's help, it will continue to do so. Arab awakening has started and nothing can halt its victorious march, be it the indigenous Zionists in Tel Aviv or the false Zionists in Tehran and Qom or the Zionists in Syria who carry the Arab nationality, irrespective of their colors and of their methods of deception.

ATH-THAWRAH says that the Arab nation, which aspires for progress and glory, has discovered the road of progress and pursued the road of glory. The Arab nation will no longer be deceived by Charlatans whether they wear turbans or the false robe of steadfastness and confrontation.

In conclusion, ATH-THAWRAH says that the muddle of the Tehran and Qom rulers is of no avail, because the true and strong facts which have been established by victorious Iraq for 17 months and the strong spirit of victory scored by our leader Saddam Husayn and his hero people and army are the ones which determine the results and settle the situation on the battlefields and in the other domains.

BRIEFS

ANNUAL SESSION 3 APRIL--Baghdad, 3 Apr (INA)--National Assembly Speaker Na'im Haddad has stated that the new annual assembly session will emphasize the assembly's relations with Arab and foreign parliaments. Addressing the opening session of the new annual session today, Haddad said that assembly delegations will visit a number of world countries this year to deepen Iraq's relations with world parliaments. He added that an assembly delegation will participate in the spring meetings of the International Parliamentary Union in Lagos and will present a number of studies concerning the various topics which will be discussed at the meeting. Haddad pointed out that the assembly will soon be receiving Arab and foreign delegations with the aim of expanding the assembly's activities and promoting the democratic experiment in Iraq. He reiterated Iraq's full support for the Palestinian people's struggle under the PLO. He lauded the uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, adding that the Palestinian people will confront the Zionist enemy's terrorist practices. Na'im Haddad warned of the Zionist-imperialist onslaught which is directed against the Arab nation, adding that the state of division, the absence of the strategic pan-Arab line and the submission of some regimes to foreign forces facilitate the movement of the Zionist-imperialist alliance toward implementing its designs and expansionist objectives. He asserted that this alliance is a link in the Zionist-imperialist plan aimed at putting pressure on the Arab nation and forcing it to accept capitulatory solutions. [Text] [JN031438 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1335 GMT 3 Apr 82]

AGENTS IN NORTH IRAN AIDED--Attention listeners: The agents of Saddam's regime are continuing their sabotage attempts in Iranian Kordestan with the cooperation of the Iraqi intelligence. We have learned that two of Saddam's agents in Iranian Kordestan, one of them named Salih Tawfiq, arrived in the City of Irbil, met with the Iraqi intelligence men and received a quantity of bombs and explosives in order to carry out sabotage activities against the Peshmerga of our party and the Kurdish refugees in Iranian Kordestan. The two men left Irbil (?20) days ago. Therefore, we call on our Peshmerga and the Kurdish refugees to be way and alert against sabotage activities because Saddam's regime will not hesitate to strike at the patriotic forces, particularly our party, since it is now running toward collapse. We call on the masses of Irbil, Rawanduz and Chuman and all the people of Kurdistan to watch for Saddam's agents, inform our Peshmerga and comrades about their movements and their meetings with the Iraqi intelligence men and take appropriate actions against them if possible. We assure our people that the Ba'thist regime will eventually fall despite its sabotage attempts. Shame and ignominy for the agents. [Text] [JN041523 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Surani Kurdish 1500 GMT 3 Apr 82]

'POST' ON BEGIN'S ACTIONS, ELECTIONS

TA261506 Jerusalem POST in English 26 Mar 82 p 18

[Commentary by Yosef Go'el: "Who's Afraid of Early Elections?"]

[Text] Prime Minister Menahem Begin's on-again, off-again resignation on Tuesday was worthy of a political comic opera. His antics had the Ruritanian ambience that has come to characterize Israeli politics.

But there has been a steady, if small accumulation of tell-tale signs indicating that the country will indeed be going to the polls again before the year is out.

Consider first Begin's erratic moodiness. His public commitment to resign if Tuesday's vote of no confidence ended in a tie, was ill-considered to say the least.

The inelegant way in which he was persuaded by his panic-stricken colleagues to climb down from that tree was not unusual in politics.

But the fact that a political leader of Begin's stature has been caught in a bad miscalculation like this, is the sort of stuff that serves to undermine the very essence of political leadership.

Leaders of Begin's stature cannot--and, in effect, will not--be permitted many such mistakes by political colleagues who are dependent on their "great man."

Begin's threat to resign calls to mind the similar threats he has issued if there is "the shedding of a drop of Jewish blood by Jews" in the course of the forcible final evacuation of the settlers from the Yamit region.

This threat has been written off by observers as mere Beginistic hyperbole. But in the light of this week's performance, it may well be that Begin's coalition partners should be much more concerned, given the high probability that Jewish blood will indeed be shed in Yamit as a result of the fanaticism of some of the anti-withdrawal diehards there.

The moodiness and the erratic behaviour goes much deeper, however. Consider again, in the light of this week's events, Begin's tirade aimed at U.S. Ambassador Samuel Lewis, last December after American retaliatory measures against the Begin initiative on the Golan law.

Many paranoid Israelis--those who are charter members of "the whole is against us club"--reaped a deep sense of satisfaction from the sight of an Israeli leader finally "telling those Goyim [Gentiles] where they can go."

For the rest of us, who believe totally in the need for Israel to retain the Golan, although not in the timing of the Golan law, Begin's performance was an acute embarrassment. Worse, his assessment that the Golan law could be sneaked in behind the Americans' backs while they were distracted by dramatic events in Poland, was another incidence of sheer miscalculation. Prime ministers, particularly of beleaguered states such as Israeli, should not be permitted many such mistakes in judgment.

The tone of the tirade against poor Ambassador Lewis is being repeated again in the mud-slinging which Begin initiated last week with the HA'ARETZ editor Gershom Schocken around the decades-old Arlosoroff affair, with heated exchanges in the columns of the JERUSALEM POST and in Hebrew-language dailies.

In truth, the prime minister has been the victim of a uniformly hostile press since he assumed office nearly 5 years ago. He wisely desisted from retorting to criticism in the media, although as one of those critics I can fully understand the desire to strike back at one's tormentors.

A prime minister in full possession of his faculties and of a sense of responsibility, however, should not permit himself to give in to such human foibles. There is more and more reason to believe that the horror of an Arlosoroff murder inquiry which Begin seems determined to force on an uninterested nation, was triggered off by the red flag of a book written by HA'ARETZ staffer Shabtai Tevet. The inquiry, it seems, is to be a form of personal vendetta for an alleged "60 years of incitement" by that paper and its present and previous editors against the person of Begin's mentor, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, and the Jabotinsky movement.

The cumulative impression is one of a man who is nearing the end of his road, and is determined to settle accounts with all and sundry, once and for all. Begin has said as much, speaking repeatedly in recent weeks in terms of doing this or that "before I leave the scene."

On the Arlosoroff murder issue there is something eerily reminiscent in Begin's emotional performance of David Ben-Gurion's single-minded determination in the 1960's to launch a judicial inquiry into the Lavon affair, a stubborn insistence that in effect led to his resignation and spelled the end of his political career.

Some of Begin's life-long intimates have written of his penchant for publicly expressed self-pity. The best evidence that there is much more in recent events than a mere expression of such pathetic self-pity was the behavior of the liberal ministers in this week's cabinet vote that overrode Begin's declared intention to resign.

At the midnight meeting, four of the five ministers backing Begin's stand were liberals, and liberals of very different stripes. Consider the unusual sight of Yitzhaq Berman and Yitzhaq Moda'i on one side of an issue, not to mention their solidarity with Simha Ehrlich and Moshe Nisim.

One would normally have expected Begin's loyal followers in Herut to have backed him up. But the opposite was true, with Yoram Aridor, who has been the major victim of the prime minister's barbs and poorly veiled antipathy in the cabinet, being the only Herut minister to follow his lead.

The explanation for the liberals' stand is their conviction that Begin is sure to leave the political scene well before the end of the present Knesset's 4-year term. And that prospect scares them to death.

The liberals know full well that the inordinately large proportion of the Likud's cabinet and Knesset seats they have garnered, despite the shrivelling up of their own electoral appeal, is wholly due to Begin's determination to honour his commitments to "Reb Simha" Ehrlich. Once Begin is gone, Herut will insist on cutting them down to size, and the thought of the alternative, of going it alone in the next elections, for the first time in 20-odd years is a paralyzing one.

Their major hope lies in early elections under Begin's leadership as a guarantee that they will again be the beneficiaries of his personal bounty to a degree that they will never be able to expect from his Herut successors.

The Herut ministers overrode Mr Begin's rash decision and persuaded him to accept their ostensible revolt in good spirit (for the prime minister has no constitutional need to consult his cabinet about his intention to resign), primarily because of the question of timing. The assumption is that the optimistic results the Likud has been getting in recent polls may well be reversed temporarily during the period of the traumatic final evacuation of Yamit. Time will be needed, they feel, for the potential Likud electorate to forget that trauma. The electorate can be expected to have recovered by November, when elections for the local authorities are scheduled.

There is an additional argument for having early Knesset elections in November -- money. The parties are broke from the monumental financial effort that went into the last elections, as evidenced by the cynical shenanigans in the Knesset to approve additional state budgets to cover the parties' debts. Now is no time for another election campaign. The coffers can, however, be sufficiently built up, if not fully replenished for a November vote.

The performance of the Herut ministers in Tuesday night's vote is persuasive evidence that the same ministers who fall in line slavishly to support every one of Begin's whims are capable of rising above themselves and disagreeing with Begin when they perceive a real threat to their own political survival.

The National Religious Party and Agudat Yisra'el were also prime moves in scotching Begin's resignation threat. The NRP has still not recovered from its Knesset power being slashed in half by the last elections, as a result

of voter defections to Tehiya, Tami and directly to Begin. Their calculation is that elections too near to the frenzied atmosphere of the final Yamit withdrawal will harm them more than any other party and are to be avoided at all costs.

The Aguda for their part are aware that given their limited electoral power, they have the best they can hope for in their present position, with a government headed by a sympathetic prime minister who is at the same time totally dependent on their four votes for his hair's breadth majority. Elections that will result in a gain for the Likud can only erode their bargaining power.

They realize that a future Likud government headed by anyone other than Begin will prove less sympathetic to their demands. Thus, they can be expected to support early, but not too early elections.

All these calculations together point to Knesset elections before the end of the year. As to the timing, there is reason to believe that Begin will wait for a particularly clumsy application of American pressure for Israeli concessions on the Palestinian front to tender his resignation. He would then plan to run a campaign based on the theme of a disloyal and treacherous Labour alignment prepared to give in to the Americans and to Yasir 'Arafat. Such a party of course must be prevented from returning to power at all costs.

When the time comes, Begin will not bother going through the motions of having his cabinet talk him out of his intention to resign. He knows the way to the president full well and will use it.

CSO: 4400/209

MARCUS COMMENTARY ON GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

TA241118 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Mar 82 p 11

[Commentary by Yo'el Marcus: "The Government That Put Itself On Strike"]

[Text] These days the government of Israel is like that man in the joke whose domineering wife tyrannizes him. She told him to iron; he ironed. She told him to wash the floors; he washed floors. She told him to crawl under the table; he crawled. And one fine day when she ordered him to come out from under the table, the husband raised the flag of revolt and replied: I will not come out! The time has come for me to show you who is the man in the house! Well, our government, like the man in the joke, has remembered ridiculously late to prove to Egypt, through Israel's threats over the question of the border dispute, who is the man in the area.

After having generously conceded strategic depth, the oil wells, the airfields, the settlements of Ofira and the Rafah approaches, it is suddenly standing like a beggar at the gate and begging for a few hundred meters. It is hard to understand how a government which gave up such extensive territory relatively easily has got into a situation in which it is threatening to break its commitments to retreat to the end because of a few hundred meters.

The answer to this riddle, on the surface, is technical: We are faced with the end of an act which began with lack of thought. The negotiations with Egypt were conducted on the basis of the mistaken assumption that if Israel withdrew to the last centimeter, it would get something that Egypt in fact could not give it even if it wanted to: the West Bank. As a result of this mistake, Israel gave up its right to enjoy "minor border amendments," and now it is going out of its mind in an attempt to amend its mistake, at least in Elat. This, as I said, is the technical explanation for the embarrassing situation we have got into. In fact, the problem is broader and involves the extraordinary skill shown by the Likud government in tying its own hands, getting into self-laid traps and so, with its own hands, restricting its freedom of maneuver and action. The government has become its own captive on almost every issue; in domestic, foreign and security affairs. The fight over the meters and centimeters in Subau or the complications over holding the autonomy talks in Jerusalem are like the periphery of the series of complications the government has brought on itself.

Take, for example, the two repeated declarations by the prime minister: One about the north and the other about the south. The former determines that if one Jew is killed by the terrorists, Israel will act in the north. In the second, which he also repeated to Kamal Hasan 'Ali, he said that if Jewish blood is spilled during the evacuation in the south, he will resign. And here you have a government of Israel suddenly captive in the hands of Syria and the PLO on the one hand and, in contrast, in the hands of a group of Jewish fanatics, on the other, into whose hands the prime minister has entrusted the decision about the continuation of his term in office and the integrity of his government. And so, the timing for the military clash will be determined by the terrorists. After they have managed to equip themselves well, complete their deployment and dig in the tunnels and holes they are now excavating, guarantee the coordination and backing of Syria, 'Arafat and company will decide when it is worthwhile and convenient (for them) to lead Israel into action. At the same time, and, again, with a difference, Mr Begin has given the Eretz Ysira'el fanatics a miraculous format for how to prevent the Sinai withdrawal: A little Jewish blood and there is no Begin, no government and no withdrawal.

In the political-security field, the government has put its freedom of action on strike and entrusted the keys in the hands of Philip Habib. This old fox jumped at the bargain and, with the aid of a series of U.S. sanctions, a U.S. administration that is not well-informed about the obscurities of the area and trips to the United States and back, the government of Israel has locked itself into a corner in such a way that it will be very difficult for it to carry out even a legitimate action without taking the risk of a great U.S. punishment blow and attracting to itself the accusing finger of the entire world. And all this because of a few pairs of missiles that we raised Cain about and about which we announced, in the course of time, that, in fact, are not at all harmful.

In the sphere of our control over the territories the government is also closing off for itself the open options for a possible arrangement and, with them, the chance of a bearable, a more or less calm coexistence during the interim period. Up to the official annexation of the Golan Heights, the Druze were able to excuse themselves to Syria for their calm relations with Israel by the fact that they were under military rule. Now, since Israeli citizenship has been imposed on them, they will have to prove their loyalty to Syria through actions of protest against every problem. Life in the Golan Heights will never go back to being what it was. At the same time, the government has entered into a direct confrontation with the unseen spirits of the PLO in the West Bank; a sort of war which, because of its character, has almost no chance of being won. Here, too, the government has got itself into a situation in which, from now on, the only possibilities are deterioration and bloodshed which will not only make our life bitter, undermine the moral immunity of the Jewish inhabitants of the country and, in the end, strengthen the hands of the Arab extremists, it will also show us to the world as a nation of oppressors.

In the field of domestic affairs the government has put itself on strike by putting itself into the hands of the black religious forces, far more than what was required of it, in order to remain in power. However, the prime

minister has always held in his hands one threat against Agudat Yisra'el: If you go too far, I will establish a national unity government without you. Now that the last threat the prime minister had against Agudat Yisra'el has been given its final burial by the decision to establish a committee to investigate the Arlozorov murder, if Agudat Yisra'el wants it the cabinet ministers will go around wearing kaftans and laying tefilin [abiding by religious practices] twice a day.

The same thing applies to the self-laid trap Begin got himself into with his declaration yesterday that if the motion of no confidence in the government ended in a tie, he would submit his resignation to the president.

We have never yet had such a government as this one for being clever enough to put itself on strike and get itself into every possible deadend. The only freedom of action left to it is in the field of the swansong and eating ones' own words. We are hearing plenty of swansongs and in the course of time will have the eating of words while Rome burns.

CSO: 4400/209

'HA'ARETZ' CRITICIZES SHARON'S WEST BANK APPROACH

TA261430 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Mar 82 pp 13, 18

[Commentary by Poles: "Why Is the West Bank Stormy?"]

[Text] We are witnessing a battle between Israel and the PLO, perhaps the most important battle since 1948--Prof Menahem Milson said on Wednesday night on the television program "Moqed." Earlier, the commander of the central command voiced his belief that the struggle had begun to answer the question: Who will control Judaea and Samaria--Israel or the PLO. Certain sources subscribe to the version that this week's events are nothing but the result of the PLO's decision to stir a "popular uprising" in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a decision coordinated with the Amman regime.

Perhaps, the PLO leadership has for some time been trying to stir stronger expressions of Arab opposition to the Israeli military government than those revealed to date. Some PLO leaders probably argue that an outside observer may receive the impression that the complaints of a population that does not rebel against an occupation regime should not be taken into consideration and does not deserve political support. The arguments of skeptics must be countered by an activist line. The establishment of a civilian administration, designed as a preliminary stage to the autonomous regime envisaged by the Begin government, along with the disbandment of the al-Birah Municipal Council, merely supplied a convenient excuse for issuing the order to stage violent demonstrations. Even if the Municipal Council had not been disbanded, the events in the West Bank--apparently in reaction to the disbandment order and the appointment of an ad hoc committee headed by an IDF officer--would have taken place anyway.

Those who remember the arguments made in the years before the independence war will be willing to believe that just as in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv at that time, Beirut is today plagued by conflicting opinions of those who have reservations about exposing the civilian population to the severity of a foreign rule and who pin their hopes on the intervention of foreign outside elements for the sake of the struggle for national independence, and others who think it is necessary to demonstrate and stir riots even if this involves casualties. On the contrary, only these casualties may convince international elements that the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip really want to get rid of Israeli rule.

I remember the words of the late Moshe Sharet at the national convention of German immigrants in Jerusalem in either 1939 or 1940 when he defended the Jewish Agency's policy in its struggle against the white paper. When the document was published in May 1939 he had been staying in London and, according to him, he "waited for an explosion."

There are grounds to the assumption that the Arab mayors keep constantly in touch with the PLO leadership and try to coordinate their positions and that the variety of opinions in Beirut is also reflected among the heads of the Arab population in the territories. However, is it really possible to believe that the latter only exercise outside orders and that if it were possible to sever their ties with the PLO, or if we succeeded in annihilating the PLO through the appropriate operation in Lebanon, calm would be restored to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dozens of Arab functionaries would present their candidacy to the administrative council of the autonomy and thousands of people would run to the polling stations to vote for their representatives?

Why should we believe that Bassam al-Shak'ah and Karim Khalaf--who were dismissed yesterday from their municipal posts--are less intelligent than Yisra'el Roqah and Yosef Sapir? We would be well-advised to remember how the heads of our local self-rule measured their steps between the British ruler, the Jewish Agency and the National Committee; between the institutions of organized settlement and the "secessionist" organizations, namely the Irgun that split from the Hagana and the Lehi which split from the Irgun. The Arab mayors do not lack thought and initiative and even if their activities appear to follow the PLO's trends it does not mean that under the current circumstances they would not have willingly assumed an activist line.

The defense minister claims that the events in the West Bank are the consequence of the PLO's decision. Sharon and his subordinates are trying to convince us that the firm hand policy is not directed against the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el--as Menahem Begin calls them (although in the Camp David accords he recognized the existence of a "Palestinian people" and its legitimate rights and justified needs)--but against the PLO. On every possible occasion Sharon tries to put into our minds his own version, on the assumption that the Israeli public would be ready to digest any political and military action in the territories if it is portrayed as a link in the chain of our struggle against the PLO.

The statement about absolute identity among the Arab mayors or, better, about the total dependence of the Arab mayors on the PLO leadership cannot be corroborated with straightforward evidence. Moreover, the question arises whether it would not be wise to distinguish between the two components of the Palestinian front. Occasionally, somebody in Israel recalls what happened in Algeria: After the French evacuation, control was seized by those Algerians who remained in their country and suffered the yoke of occupation rather than by the FLN commanders who conducted the armed war from the outside. Is it wise to malign the Arab mayors who were elected by the inhabitants in free elections and portray them as the obsequious slaves of the organization beyond the borders? Would it not be wiser to try and deepen awareness about the differences with the exiles, an awareness which probably exists deep down in their hearts?

In reply, some would say that those believing in such a possibility are deluding themselves--and they may be right. However, if it is an illusion, it is no greater an illusion than that fostered at present by circles in the civilian administration that the dignitaries who lost the confidence of their electorate in 1976 will now be willing to agree to be appointed as mayors by the Israeli defense minister. Even if we agree that there is a united Palestinian front, would it not be proper to make an effort to split it?

One should not assume that the leaders of the Arab population are itching to vacate their seats to the PLO commanders who spent the years of Israeli occupation safely and comfortably in Beirut. It would be a mistake to make moves which cannot but force them to express solidarity with the PLO.

However, that is how Ari'el Sharon has always acted--and increasingly so for the last week. Apparently, he succeeded in convincing Begin and other ministers that just as he managed to uproot terror in the Gaza Strip [when he was the commander of the southern command] he will also get the upper hand in shattering opposition to occupation in the West Bank and even in gathering a new local leadership which will be willing to give a hand to the implementation of the autonomy plan. Because he made a promise, Sharon is now compelled to plead for one more day or a few more days until the army succeeds in imposing order in the territories and "overcomes."

Sharon's prophecy may shortly come true. However, it is doubtful whether the events of last week should be regarded as new phenomena--albeit not very extraordinary ones--in light of the cycle of rising and subsiding riots we have experienced in the past. It is true that the throngs of adult Arabs are not running any risk, they leave the danger to the young. However, this time they are more daring than in the past and they presumably see the youths who hurl stones, erect barricades and set tires on fire no different from the way adult Jews looked at the youths of our rebellion movement in the 1940's.

Does all this lead to the conclusion that we must agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state? Not necessarily. However, if we want to prevent its establishment we must offer the Arab population in the held territories--which is probably not interested in continuing to be part of the Israeli economy and which is not eager to be ruled by men with kalashnikovs and bombs--a political future of full rather than a so-called autonomy. What Begin has proposed to date under this headline cannot satisfy the Arabs of the territories and we have not yet even heard Mustafa Dudin say that he is willing to make do with it.

Thus, the circle closes and we are back at square one. We signed the Camp David accords and we agreed to postpone the date on which Israel would be entitled to raise its demand for sovereignty over Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district until the end of the 5-year autonomy period. Egypt is awaiting the realization of the promise to give full autonomy to the Palestinians and it will be difficult for the United States to go on being indifferent on this issue. However much we get upset that the world generally does not show any

interest in what is happening in Afghanistan and/or El Salvador but insists on the issue of autonomy to the Arabs of the held territories, the Christian world which is used to paying attention to the holy land (however feeble its religious faith nowadays), is not only taking an interest in us, Jews, but also in its Arab inhabitants. This interest does not stem only from its concern about oil supplies from Arab sources.

In the ninth decade of the 20th century it is very difficult to negate the right to self-determination from a national entity comprising over 1 million people. We may oppose their right to a sovereign state--and that is not an easy chore either. However, whatever we propose instead must be as close as possible to a right to self-determination, with reservations only as regards to our explicit security interest. Anything beyond it has no chance of getting the approval of the local Arabs and the blessing of Egypt and the Western world. Without them, we will be forced to increase the use "of all the means at our disposal" and, consequently, Israel's spirit will be damaged.

CSO: 4400/209

'HA'ARETZ' ON POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT DOWNFALL

TA300950 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Mar 82 p 11

[Commentary by Yo'el Marcus: "Upon Whom Will the Heavens Fall?"]

[Text] It is reasonable to assume that until the completion of the Sinai withdrawal the government will not be in danger of falling as a result of a vote of nonconfidence. The Alignment has learned its lesson from the last vote, that the government is too dependent on one vote to amuse itself with motions of nonconfidence. The motions might succeed, but at the same time, many people in the Labor Party are rubbing their hands with glee in view of what appears to them to be shortly realized. After 26 April, they say, the heavens will fall on this government. America, Egypt, the West Bank and all the other plagues that will descend upon it all at once and make it impossible for it to last. These people predict a scenario in three acts: 1) Begin will have to submit his resignation in the very near future. 2) In such a case, there is a very good chance for Mr Peres to found a government without elections. 3) In the event that this possibility does not work out well, Begin would be happy to establish a national unity government. By his resignation he would, in fact, provide the answer to the two obstacles because of which the Labor Party has recently refused to join such a government: There would be new guidelines (at least formally) and a new government composition. This section of the predictors' scenarios--or, to be more precise, those of the dreamers--in the Labor Party is built on the assumption that after the completion of the Sinai withdrawal Begin himself will want to get rid of Ari'el Sharon and placing the defense portfolio in the hands of the new partner will be a good excuse for this move. So much for the prediction by those close to Peres.

It is true that knowledgeable people in the Likud do agree with the basic assumption of the Alignment dream--that is, that this government will not last until 1985--but not for the same reasons, and Begin going to the president to resign will certainly not lead to the same scenarios. Mr Yoram Aridor, one of the Likud government's foundation pillars and obviously a main figure in the era to follow Begin, evaluated this week in an open talk with a friend that the assumption that the heavens will fall on the government after the withdrawal is nothing but an unfounded opinion.

First, in contrast to all the dire predictions, he does not believe that the United States will impose a drastic, large-scale punishment against Israel.

The United States has not now raised the amount of the loan to Israel by \$300 million in order to cancel it in another 2 months. Haig's latest statement about what is occurring in the West Bank proves, in the opinion of people in the Likud, that there is more understanding for Israel's fight against the PLO in the West Bank than what is being shown by whom they call "beautiful people in Israel." The United States will also not take any extreme step (as long as Israel acts in this way, of course) in order not to push Israel into violating the Camp David agreement and annexing the West Bank.

Secondly, Egypt is doing the minimum required by the Camp David agreement and, in any case, it already did the worst thing possible for normalization even before the completion of the withdrawal: Mubarak's not visiting Jerusalem and the attacks by Egypt's representative in the UN Security Council against Israel this week have established certain facts and set a clear framework for the formal relations that have prevailed between the two nations. The relations will take the form of the maintenance of permanent representations on both sides and scrupulously keeping to the disengagement lines determined between the two countries. In any event, Egypt will violate the Camp David agreement, it will not want to give Israel an excuse to annex the West Bank.

Thirdly, people in the Likud believe that the lack of calm in the West Bank will die down after the expulsion of several outstanding figures representing the PLO. Begin will not, under any circumstances, want to appear as the person violating the Camp David agreement, and for this reason he recently explained to the U.S. president that he does not intend to extend Israeli law to the West Bank. This, of course, holds true for as long as the attempts at a dialogue over autonomy continue and nobody from the third side of the agreement triangle tries to upset matters.

From this we can conclude that if Begin goes to the president at any stage, according to his confidants, it will not be because of external pressure, but because he cannot for any length of time put up with the one vote majority turning him into an easy target for blackmail and threats. Experience also proves that when there is an ebb in public opinion the danger of desertions increases and any small weakness leads to another weakening of the parliamentary status of the government. However, what Mr Begin did in his conditional resignation--Mr Aridor said this week--was a brilliant exercise whose significance was not grasped: He tied the hands and legs of the NRP and Agudat Yisra'el. It is true that he did commit himself not to call elections without their agreement, but by the fact that he responded to their request, he prevented the danger that they would abandon him all of a sudden in order to found an alternative government with the Alignment. From this it follows that all the evaluations according to which Peres has the option of establishing a government headed by himself and that Begin will go to the president are, in his opinion, nonsense.

In the scenarios predicted by the Likud, when Begin goes to the president, the most reasonable possibility is early elections. In order for this to happen, the NRP and Agudat Yisra'el must be convinced that no alternative has been left but to help the Alignment after a gentleman's agreement has been achieved with Begin that even if the Likud becomes stronger, the partnership between the three will continue in the 11th Knesset. [As published]

Begin wants to guarantee the rule to the Likud even after he goes, and for this purpose he will not pass up any opportunity to harm the Alignment and erode it in the long run. Therefore, the possibility is not being dismissed that Begin may be interested at a certain stage--with the agreement of his religious partners, of course--in founding a national unity government as an interim stage before early elections. Thus he would, first of all, achieve a split in the Alignment and the abandonment of the Labor Party by the definite doves. The new partner would not, then, enter with equal forces, but with 10-12 seats less. The most important portfolio it could be given would be a deputy premiership and the foreign affairs portfolio; Begin will not, under any circumstances, give up Sharon as defense minister. And so, within a short time, Mr Begin would split up his new partner into doves and hawks and his backing in the government for extremist moves will enjoy an important addition from the Labor Party. In the end such a government would serve the interests of the Likud.

This being so, everything is still open. But if the Alignment builds on the fact that the heavens fall upon the government, the latter is actually making preparations to bring the heavens down on the Alignment and on its untamed members who are always in a state of alert.

CSO: 4400/209

'HATZOFÉ' ON ARENS' TASK IN WASHINGTON

TA281715 Tel Aviv HATZOFÉ in Hebrew 28 Mar 82 p 2

[Commentary by Ya'akov Edelstein: "What Does Ambassador Arens Bring With Him?"]

[Text] Ambassador Moshe Arens is returning to Israel for the first time after presenting his credentials to President Reagan, and after introducing himself and his views in the U.S. media.

It is no secret that Arens had been a candidate for the post of defense minister in this government, and that he refused to accept the office because he did not want to deal with the evacuation of Sinai and Yamit in accordance with the peace treaty with Egypt--a treaty with which he did not agree. The post had been offered to him twice by Prime Minister Menahem Begin and he declined to accept it because he did not agree with the government's security policy.

Arens is one of the few independent people in the Herut movement with the guts to pursue his opinions. In his recent appearance in the United States, he said that should there be no progress in the autonomy talks, the extension of Israeli law to Judaea and Samaria might be considered. This statement generated queries in the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, and Minister Yitzhaq Shamir defended Arens, saying that an ambassador may express his opinions freely without asking permission from above for every statement.

The real purpose for his return is the reorganization of the embassy in Washington: He has to compose the embassy team to fit his manner of work. The present team consists of attorney Nehushtan, a Herut functionary, who was appointed envoy during the term of former Ambassador Efrayim 'Evron, an Alignment member. The information officer is Mr Harry Hurwitz, also a Herut functionary, from South Africa. This is not an experienced professional team and, hence, Mr Nehushtan was offered to serve as ambassador to Holland, his post in Washington to be assumed by a senior Foreign Ministry official. No name has yet been mentioned, and meanwhile the possible candidacy is considered of the brother of the late Yonatan Netanyahu who fell at Entebbe, who is not an official member of the Herut.

The ebb in the relations between Washington and Jerusalem, generated by the tongue-lashing Begin gave U.S. Ambassador Lewis, has petered out somewhat. In talks with Secretary of State Haig, he was requested to act to prevent "punishment" for every step taken by Israel, and Haig promised to act in that direction.

Arens' task is to return the situation to its former state. This is no easy task, particularly when he cannot be sure that the prime minister will conduct the policy in accordance with his advice. Begin is not wont to consult before adopting drastic steps, certainly not with the ambassador in Washington.

The memorandum of understanding on security matters signed between the two countries has been put into deep freeze. The prime minister announced after the American punitive steps taken following the passage of the Golan law, that he sees the "memorandum" as cancelled, since the United States abrogated it, in his view. Weinberger received this with joy, since he had opposed the memorandum itself. He signed it following instructions from President Reagan, but did so without publicity, without correspondents and photographers. The "memorandum" could have been pointed out as a political achievement, a goal many prime ministers would aspire to; but it transpired that this "memorandum" is useless. Even more, it constitutes a nuisance.

On the other hand, Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Yehuda Ben-Me'r told the Knesset, in an answer to a query, that the "memorandum" has not been cancelled. Hence, the situation in this matter is quite vague and it is up to Arens to restore the ruins of the "memorandum," which were the consequence of the tension following the passage of the Golan law.

The United States continues to criticize our policy in the territories. It is reacting to each and every step by expressions of regret and by diplomatic censure. It will play a role in the UN Security Council, in the formulation of resolutions and in the discussion over the Arab complaints against Israel on the recent situation in the territories. There are contacts between the United States and Israel regarding the position the United States will adopt. Should a condemnation be proposed, the United States may vote in favor. But should it come to sanctions, it will vote against and use the veto. This is the customary U.S. policy. Condemnations are acceptable. Words--yes. Sanctions, actions--no.

These six basic problems are now to be dealt with by Ambassador Moshe Arens, who is in charge of the diplomatic arena that is most important to Israel.

CSO: 4400/209

'POST' ON ALIGNMENT-LED COALITION

TA300910 Jerusalem POST in English 30 Mar 82 p 3

[Commentary by Sarah Honig: "Slim Prospect for Alignment Coalition"]

[Text] Tel Aviv--Even if it managed to woo the religious parties away from the Likud, the Alignment's chances of setting up an alternative coalition are negligible, Labor Party sources told the JERUSALEM POST yesterday.

The Alignment's weakness stems chiefly from within, they said. MK Shulamit Aloni of the Citizens Right Movement, some Mapam MKs and the Shinuy Party have already served notice that should Labor Party enter a political partnership with the religious parties, they will not join it.

This would immediately rob Labor of its ability to muster a slim Knesset majority. Without Aloni, for example, the Alignment would become a smaller Knesset faction than the Likud. In the event of the government's fall, the president would not be able to judge Labor Chairman Shim'on Peres as having equal chances of forming a government with Premier Menahem Begin. Thus Begin would again, it is likely, be entrusted with the task.

While at least three Mapam MKs warned off the record that they would have nothing to do with a coalition that included Agudat Yisra'el, Aloni was open in her opposition. She told the POST she would not agree "under any circumstances to be part of a coalition that gave Agudat Yisra'el what the Likud does. I think that the situation as it now exists is wrong and it would not be righted if Aguda became a partner in the Alignment. If Aguda is in, I am out."

Aloni said that it would be better for the Alignment to go to the polls. It would certainly not be in Peres' interests to head a wobbly coalition of strange bedfellows, which would fail miserably. "He would not be premier for long and would bury his political future forever and always," Aloni maintained.

Shinuy MK Mordekhay Virshubsky said yesterday that any Labor calculations about an alternative coalition "were made without us. We certainly cannot be coalition partners with the Aguda because of civil liberty issues. If Labor wants to team up with those parties, it would be without us."

According to some Labor pundits, it is such opposition from within to an alternative Alignment-led coalition which prompted official denials that any contacts about a new coalition with either the National Religious Party or Aguda have been taking place. Alignment Knesset faction chief Moshe Shahal said his party will only begin negotiations in the event Begin resigns.

However, there are persistent rumours from both Labor and the religious parties that Labor leaders have attempted to sound them out on the possibilities of teaming up. The religious parties have reportedly been promised that they would get exactly what the Likud had given them so far.

However, at this point, both Aguda and the NRP agree that Labor's ability to form a coalition is "less than minimal," according to a high-ranking NRP source. The problem is how to prevent Begin from maneuvering the situation in such a way as to precipitate early elections, this source said.

Likud sources told the POST that Begin is resolved to hold early elections. He will try to keep his coalition together until shortly after the Sinai withdrawal and then try to convince the religious parties to join a legislative move that would schedule new elections in November, to coincide with the municipal elections, these sources said.

The Likud is the only party now, looking forward to new elections, believing that it can profit from them. It is hampered, however, by the need to muster a majority of 61 in the Knesset for such a move and its coalition partners are wary of new elections. This is especially true of the NRP and Tami, which are afraid of losing much of their support for the Likud.

According to recent polls and to evaluations in Labor, early elections are also not in the Alignment's best interest. Thus the main opposition party might paradoxically find itself opposing a new vote.

Labor MK Shevah Weiss, for example, warned that "elections now would most likely mean a strengthened Likud." He also warned that his party might be in for some internal upheavals in the event of elections. "Peres' candidacy for premier is not a foregone conclusion. Peres would automatically be a candidate only if he seeks to form an alternative coalition," said Weiss, who personally supports former Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin.

Perhaps it is this internal party rivalry which spurs Peres to opt for an alternative coalition rather than going to the polls again, it is said in Labor.

CSO: 4400/209

POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER WAR VIEWED

TA261338 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Mar 82 p 13

[Commentary by Yo'el Marcus: "The Inevitable War"]

[Text] Since with or without elections the end of the Likud era is not in sight, it is logical to presume that war, whatever its scope, between Israel and one Arab element or more is but a question of time. Its scope, timing and duration are unknown to me. Nor do I know which forces will confront us--whether it will be only the PLO with the Syrians in Lebanon or more than that. War may erupt overnight or within a year, but in my evaluation it is inevitable.

Whoever thinks that I am overconfident should recall that only a few weeks ago war was avoided at the last moment. This was the case not only because of the weather but because the government had not yet reached a full consensus on its timing or possible consequences. The armistice with the PLO, achieved through the active mediation of Philip Habib--whom Israel caused to appear in this region--has at this stage tied not only Israel's hands but also those of the opposite side. As paradoxical as it may seem, however, this tying of hands has augmented, rather than reduced, the danger of full-scale war, because these bonds do not permit either side to "let off steam." The terrorists cannot risk undertaking sporadic guerrilla actions or firing their katyushas here or there and Israel cannot carry on its policy of "hitting the terrorists at any time and any place" or be free to launch local retaliatory operations, as it used to do in the past. The impression is that Mr Habib has put an end to the era of small blows and has left room only for large-scale conflagrations. The government never forgets to declare twice daily that from now on it will react to the smallest incident.

Since so much praise has been lavished on the weather which, so to speak, has prevented war, very little--if anything--is heard in public about the philosophy motivating those elements advocating and pushing for an all-out war in Lebanon. Concealed behind the official pretext that "we shall not tolerate shelling or terrorist actions" is the strategic concept that it is necessary to strive for the virtually complete physical liquidation of the PLO. In other words, not only should its hands and fingers in the West Bank be cut off (which it is now being attempted with an iron fist) but its head and heart, located in Beirut, should also be severed. Since Israel does not want the PLO as an interlocutor or partner to a solution for the West Bank,

those who advocate a confrontation with the PLO think that it is logical to carry the fight against the PLO in the territories to Lebanon as well. In their view, with the loss of its physical strength, it will not only lose its hold on the territories but will also relinquish its growing international standing. That is to say, war may break out not only for military purposes (namely to push the PLO out of artillery range of the northern settlements), but for the achievement of political objectives as well. Professor Milson, after all, already openly admitted that this is the biggest political war Israel has had since 1948.

If the assumption that the Likud will in one way or another continue to remain in power is correct, no one will argue that this will be the end of the autonomy idea and that a new deadlock will be created in the region. In order to break this deadlock and compel the unenthusiastic U.S. administration to impose a settlement involving Israel's extensive withdrawal, influential government elements assess that in any event the PLO will sooner or later resume its hostile actions under Syrian auspices. The PLO is vigorously preparing for this possibility, and Syria is simultaneously preparing for an eventual military confrontation with Israel. If their resumption of military activity is so highly likely, why wait until the time is right for them? Ambassador Arens' statements in Washington on a possible preemptive operation by Israel were therefore not an expression of his personal opinion but a reflection of the mood prevailing among decision-makers.

If this has not yet occurred, this was for two inhibitive factors:

--The first is that there is a controversy about Syria's possible reaction. Obviously, large-scale actions in Lebanon will lead to clashes with the Syrian forces stationed there. The question is over whether Israeli-initiated actions might not give Syria a pretext for attempting to strike at the Golan Heights and to open a second front for a prolonged war.

--The second is fear of a far-reaching U.S. reaction. The administration has made it unequivocally clear that it will not tolerate any step of the kind which was in question several weeks ago not only for fear of damage to U.S. interests in the Arab world, but because it is not prepared for military intervention in the region if the Soviets make a physical appearance on Syrian territory--which one can safely take for granted. Israeli information attempts in Washington about the future dangers posed by the terrorists and Syria have left the Americans indifferent and unconvinced.

However, since the strategic philosophy (of liquidating the PLO) has struck roots in the decision-making circles, the above inhibitive factors can be considered as merely being temporary--until a plausible reason for action has been found. This could be a terrorist act in which Israelis are hurt or an American act which would push Israel into a corner. The trouble is that such matters are deliberated upon in private chambers and "blitz" decisions are made by the prime minister and knowledgeable sources, and a public debate is most always nonexistent. Consequently, questions like whether it is really possible today to 'liquidate' the PLO; or how such a war could help us curb the establishment of a binational state under the Likud government; or how such a war could develop and whether apart from loss of lives, it

might not bring upon us an imposed settlement. All these questions will remain unprobed and might severely erode the national motivation in the times of trial.

The impression is that the government has squandered the Palestinian part of the Camp David accords and the chance to widen the crack that opened in the wall of Arab hostility by means of political negotiations. All we can do is to mediate gloomily on the question of how it came to be that with the completion of the implementation of our first peace treaty with an Arab state, war is once more threatening to knock on our door.

CSO: 4400/209

'MA'ARIV' ON HUSAYN'S REVIVAL OF 'ISRAELI OPTION'

TA071636 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Apr 82 p 15

[Commentary by Moshe Zaq: "King Husayn's Feelers"]

[Excerpt] Mustafa Dudin, a former minister in Husayn's government and the man who conducted the negotiations with the PLO in Jiddah in 1972 on the king's behalf, has declared his loyalty to King Husayn and wants people to realize the latter's dire situation. Jordan is financially dependent on the funds it receives from the Arab oil states in its capacity as a confrontation state with Israel. This is the background against which one may understand why Husayn is so eager to send volunteers to Iraq. Perhaps, it is easier for him to express solidarity with an Arab rejectionist state far away in the Iraqi front than being compelled to send "volunteers" to the PLO which is seeking permission to cross through his territory to carry out acts of sabotage in Israel. Indeed, Syria is trying to incite the Palestinians against Husayn arguing that all he wants is to shoo them away from a confrontation with Israel by sending them to the Iranian front. If the Syrian argument is correct, Mustafa Dudin's mission to Tel Aviv may perhaps also be regarded as the opening of an "Israeli option" by Husayn.

Al-Sadat took us by surprise when he came to Jerusalem to receive "everything." The former Jordanian minister--who quarreled with his colleagues in the Jordanian Government--took us by surprise when he came to Tel Aviv wishing to achieve "everything" by means of negotiations.

Husayn is certainly not placing all his weight on the "Israeli option" but he is trying to resume the game on two fronts--both the rejectionist front and the negotiations front. He plays openly in the rejectionist front but in the negotiations front he plays through Mustafa Dudin, in spite of the fact that his prime minister issued a decree threatening to impose death sentence on anyone holding negotiations with Israel.

Only a man as sly as Husayn can take such a gamble and enjoy the best of two worlds--both the millions it receives from the oil countries in its capacity as a confrontation state and by leaving an open door assuring his position in any possible negotiations on the future of Judaea and Samaria. Indeed, even in those years when Husayn held face-to-face talks with Israel prime ministers and cabinet members, he saw to fulfilling all the requirements of

Arab political warfare against Israel and he did not even shirk his contribution to Arab solidarity in the Yom Kippur War when he sent armored corps units to the Golan Heights and was dealt a harsh "blow" by the IDF.

The Jordanian prime minister's sentence against Mustafa Dudin does not rule out the possibility that this man is trying to safeguard Husayn's rearguard in case the Iraqi-Saudi-PLO cards failed.

The U.S. veto of the Jordanian draft resolution denouncing Israel at the UN Security Council--precisely at a time when the United States is courting Jordan and seducing it with large quantities of weapons--may strengthen Husayn's view that he must not give up on the "Israeli option" because this option strengthens his position in the Arab world and increases his freedom of maneuvering. Some people thought that Israel's statements that Jordan is the Palestinian state were pushing Husayn into the arms of PLO-Saudi-Iraqi cooperation--but that was not the case. When it seems to Husayn that Israel is blocking his options for maneuvering in the Arab world he sends his feelers to us to raise his prestige lest he be left to the favors of the Arab potentates. After all, if his Pan-Arab game were to be discovered he would be exposing himself to heavy pressure by the PLO to allow terrorist operations from his border, thus risking a strong Israeli reaction.

Husayn's talks with the Israeli Government have raised his stock in the Arab market. Husayn was not adversely affected by the talks with Israel. On the contrary, his position weakened the moment the talks stopped and he will undoubtedly try to reconquer the freedom of action which he has wisely exploited through the years.

Husayn has so far tried to gain the recognition of the PLO which divested him from responsibility over Judaea and Samaria through membership in the joint PLO-Jordanian committee.

Now that the PLO's neck in the "territories" is breaking, Husayn will probably seek a way to reopen the "Israeli option," an option closed to him by al-Sadat when the latter refused to heed the Jordanian king's telephone call asking him to come to Camp David. [Sentence as published]

CSO: 4400/209

QALQILYAH OFFICIAL DENOUNCES JORDAN

JN292012 Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 1610 GMT 29 Mar 82

[Excerpts] In the Tulkarm region, the administrative director, Col (Shalom Motsavi), appointed three mukhtars for the villages of Khirbat al-Mudawwar, Ra's 'Atiyyah and Kufr al-Dik. Our correspondent for West Bank affairs Rif'at Qaddur reports:

A celebration was held today at the headquarters of the Qalqilyah villages' society in (Habala) Village on the appointment of three mukhtars for Khirbat al-Mudawwar, Ra's 'Atiyah and Kufr al-Dik.

'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad Salamah, head of the Bidiyya Rural Council and deputy head of the Qalqilyah villages' society, spoke on the occasion, commenting on the Jordanian prime minister's decision to execute the heads and members of the village leagues in the West Bank and to confiscate their properties.

[Begin recording] Sir, you have issued a military order to execute the heads and members of the village leagues in the West Bank. You have given them 1 month. Permit me, Sir, to reply and to say that this is an arbitrary order. Your Excellency, first of all do you know what the village leagues are?

Your radio and television are preoccupied with sending our sons to prisons and killing them. [Sentence as heard] We did not leave the West Bank in 1967. All those who listen to your news think that you have liberated the West Bank or are close to doing so. I wish that Your Excellency would answer this question: How was King 'Abdallah killed? Where was he killed? Was he killed in the headquarters of a village league or while he was praying to God Almighty in the al-Aqsa mosque?

Sir, how many Arab countries are there now? Please, come and liberate, if you so wish. Our hands will be placed in your hands and we shall welcome you. Otherwise, let peace prevail. We have had enough tragedies, dispersion and killing of innocents.

You are listening from far to the news about the West Bank and its steadfast inhabitants. You have become the head of the Hashemite Jordanian state and the one who issues martial law orders. I would like to draw your attention, Sir, to the fact that the people here, in the holy places, have become wise in time and know the road that will lead them to a dignified life. [End recording]

CSO: 4400/209

TZIPORI COMMENTS ON POLICY TOWARD ARABS

TA011201 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Apr 82 p 3

[ITIM report]

[Text] Minister of Communications Mordekhay Tzipori said yesterday he differs with various elements in the government regarding the way to handle Arab militancy in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district. "If the PLO were to launch a military struggle in Judaea and Samaria we would be legitimately entitled to take very firm action. However, since the nature of the struggle is different Israel must take special care of the subtlety of its ways and methods because it usually does not enjoy a great deal of sympathy in the world and it must keep and try to nurture the very little it has. This method is rather regressive, as far as we are concerned," the minister stated in the "News Conference" program on the Voice of Israel.

The minister explained that he was definitely concerned about developments in the territories but stated that nevertheless Israel should remain in Judaea and Samaria. Arab militancy will persist but Israel must learn to cope with it. In this present struggle the Arabs are using women and children to exert political international pressure, although 17- or 18-year-olds should for all intents and purposes be regarded as dangerous fighters.

He said the entire government unanimously believes in the operation of the civil administration in the territories. In his opinion, all the aspects of civilian rule should be granted to the Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria and the heads of the Jewish local councils were wrong when they asked that the military government authorities rather than the civilian police handle the affair of the settlers who opened fire at rioters.

The minister added that after Israeli law was applied to the Golan Heights that area became part of Israel. Therefore, the army should not be put to work in the druze villages--just as the army is not active in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem--but rather the same elements used in any other sector in Israel should apply.

Tzipori emphasized that political considerations should be taken into account in any Israeli operation against the terrorists in southern Lebanon. According to him, if Israel were to enter into southern Lebanon it would be forced to withdraw within a few days or several weeks because of political considerations "and then the situation in southern Lebanon may worsen as far as our presence there is concerned."

IDF COMMANDER ON GOLAN DRUZE SITUATION

TA262100 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 26 Mar 82

[Interview with Commander of the Northern Command Maj Gen Amir Drori by military correspondent Ron Ben-Yishay about the IDF's policy toward the Golan Druze; date and place not given--videotaped]

[Text] [Drori] Before the area was declared a closed military area, there had been disturbances of order here [on the Golan Heights], and there had been no normal life here for a certain period of time. This peaked in the 2 weeks before the region was declared a military area, in which the residents, or a part of them deliberately caused disruptions in normal life in the four Druze villages, including suspension of essential services and preventing people from living according to their wishes. For example, they prevented people from going to work; they prevented people from getting Israeli identity cards; they prevented people from buying bread, because the shops were closed; they prevented people from buying milk for children; they prevented people from opening shops, they harmed medical services; they prevented the opening of schools and so forth. In other words, there was no law and order here, the strike had been imposed by a part of the people on the entire community, and people were unable to act freely and in accordance with the law.

[Question] What brought about this situation? What is the background to this situation, in which there are people calling for the disruption of order, and imposing strikes on the Druze villages?

[Answer] A part of the public apparently does not accept the extension of Israeli law to the Golan Heights. This is causing an escalation, disturbances of order and non-implementation of the law. The army entered the area in order to maintain the law. Since we took over the area has been closed to both entry and exit, and to traffic between villages. But the residents are definitely free to do what they wish inside the villages.

[Question] The Druze say that the administration is harrassing them simply for the sake of harrassment--things such as telephone line cuts, electricity black outs during the night, curfews imposed on herds thus preventing them from going out to graze. Is that really so?

[Answer] I do not know who is complaining that there are limitations today. In any event--and I have already said this--we are responsible for all the essential services as we define them, and we are supplying them; there has never been a single problem. I did not hear of a single hitch in the medical services--there were rumors--but there was no real problem; or about the water supply, or food and their like. All the things that you enumerated, and all the steps that we took, were taken for security reasons. Some of the telephones are not working, some are. We have our reasons for this. All that has been done here was done according to law, after a scrupulous examination by all the necessary legal advisers, and they are without blemish.

[Question] Who, other than the Golan Druze themselves, are the political factors acting in the area?

[Answer] A delegation of Hadash Knesset members and some from other parties visited this region and talked with people. Naturally there are differences of opinion, and there may be doubts about the usefulness of such visits, although the statements made here are also being stated at the Knesset in Jerusalem. But if, in the present circumstances, this is being said to the local residents--statements, for example, that the Golan Heights is a Syrian area that was conquered by Israel and that it will eventually become Syrian again; that the residents should not accept identity cards; that they should act against the extension of the law and that the law may perhaps perish; or statements against the state of Israel itself, which exists thanks to American arms and thanks to American money, and such. It is, of course, natural to have doubts about the usefulness of such statements.

[Question] Does Rakah or Hadash have great influence in the Golan?

[Answer] I would not want to touch on political subjects; I try to avoid them. I can only say that the clerics here have imposed a religious boycott on the communists. I have also been approached by Druze clerics and others with a request to prevent their entry. Since there was a resolution saying that Knesset members are entitled to visit the Golan Heights, the fulfillment of the request was impossible, and this has also been explained to all those who approached me on the matter.

[Question] For a long time a meeting between Israeli Druze and the Golan Druze was prevented. Why?

[Answer] This should be asked of the Israeli Druze or of others. In any case, it must be clear that in order for such a meeting to materialize the Druze here must desire it, the Israeli Druze must desire it and we must also agree to it. I can only say that there was no limitation on our part in that matter.

[Question] This contact between the Israeli Druze and the Golan Druze, was it fruitful?

[Answer] I said it is natural that the situation of the Golan Druze concerns members of that community in other places. And it concerns them not only in Israel, but also in Syria and Lebanon. Those are the places where Druze

live. And the repercussions go in all directions. For example, a message has reached the Druze here--and this is something that has been said by the Druze clerics here and in Israel--that the entire issue is not a religious issue. I was told by the priests with whom I met here, that one of the chief Druze tennets is that the law of the country in which they live should and must be respected.

[Question] So why do they not accept the law of the region in which they live?

[Answer] This is a question for the Druze. In any event, there is no subject here that is connected with religion. And there are Druze in Israel and there are Druze in Lebanon as well as in Syria. What may have changed here is that whereas in Israel to date there were some 50,000 or a little more Druze, today 12,000 more have joined that group. There is a population here to which the Israeli law applies and an army to which the Israeli law applies, and the law is binding for all of us. With this view we are acting here. And I believe that in the future--as you said, perhaps quite shortly--it will be possible to return to normal life in this area, and we shall live in quiet and in peace, as people had lived here most of the 15 years in which the state of Israel is present here in this region. [End videotape]

CSO: 4400/209

BRIEFS

'UVDA INTERNATIONAL AIRFIELD--On Friday, Transportation Minister Hayim Corfu confirmed that the 'Uvda airfield near Elat is an international airfield for the operation of civilian aircraft. As of this week, large jet aircraft will be able to land and take off on international flights from the 'Uvda airfield. The passengers will be transferred aboard airconditioned buses to and from Elat where they will proceed with all the border checking and customs arrangements. This will be in effect until a new arrangement is made regarding use of the airfield in 'Ezyon. In contrast with the agreement between Israel and Egypt, Israel will for the time being not use the airfield in 'Ezyon due to economic difficulties involving the payment of taxes at the 'Ezyon airfield. [Text] [TA041046 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Apr 82 p 6]

HEBRON HILLS REGIONAL COUNCIL--The Ministry of the Interior within the next few days is going to declare the establishment of the Hebron Hills Regional Council, which will include the settlements of Karmel, Ma'on, Luzifer, 'Amasa, Yatir and the Zohar Nahal foothold. Some of those settlements still have the status of Nahal footholds and it will take some time before they become civilian settlements. The council of settlements of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip last night expressed satisfaction with the decision. It is still not known who will head the new council or where its office will be located. [Text] [TA291231 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 29 Mar 82 p 8]

NEW GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES--The Government Names Committee recently decided on the following names: In the Golan: Qidmat Tzvi (a village); Nimrod (Nahal foothold); in the Galilee: Abirim (observation post); in the Umm al-Fahm area: Ginat (Nahal foothold); in Samaria: Berakha (Nahal foothold); Yo'ezer (communal settlement), 'Asa'el (communal settlement); in Judaea: Nili (communal settlement), Netef (communal settlement), Adura, Otni'el (communal settlement), Kefira (communal settlement), Eshpolot (Nahal foothold), Yaqin (Nahal foothold); in the Jordan valley: Elisha' (Nahal foothold); in the Gaza district: Neue Deqalim (regional center); in the Besor district: Yesod Hadarom (Moshav). The committee also decided, inter alia, to give the name Shalom District to the area bordering in the north with the Gaza district, in the west with the Yamit district, in the south with the Haluza dunes and in the east with Nahal Besor (provisional name--Pithat Shalom). [Text] [TA281203 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Mar 82 p 3]

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AT TOURISM CONFERENCE--A seminar of the European Tourism Committee and the World Tourism Organization will be held in March 1983 in Israel with the participation of representatives from communist countries. This was decided upon at the session of the committee that was held last week in Budapest. The director general of the Ministry of Tourism, Rafi (Parvar), who attended the session as Israel's representative, reported yesterday that all members of the committee, including representatives from communist countries, voted in favor of holding the seminar in Israel. The seminar will deal with the development of tourism infrastructure and tourist attractions. The conference approved an Israeli proposal to discuss the question of whether "peace is contributing to tourism and tourism is contributing to peace in accord with the Israeli-Egyptian model" at the organization's plenary session this August in Acapulco. An Israeli proposal to hold a summit conference of tourism ministers from throughout the world at the same time as the plenary session was also approved. Mr (Parvar) related that in his talks with the Hungarian tourism officials in Budapest he was told that the Hungarian Government is prepared this year to increase the ceiling for tourists visiting Israel. [Text] [TA291645 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 29 Mar 82 p 16]

'ROMANIA' OWES ISRAEL \$47 MILLION--London, 24 Mar (exclusive)--The HA'ARETZ correspondent has learned from authoritative economic sources that Romania has for 18 months owed \$47 million to Israel but due to the economic difficulties it is undergoing it cannot pay the debt. The Israeli Government regards the debt as being in a moratorium stage and it does not expect Romania to pay it even in coming years. The Romanian debt stems from the supply of goods and services by Israeli companies that insured themselves with a foreign trade insurance risks company. Thus the companies have not been affected by the debt. It has been learned that due to the political reasons Israel wants to maintain its economic ties with Romania. [Text] [TA251229 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Mar 82 p 2]

EGYPTIAN UNFULFILLED TRADE COMMITMENT--About a month before completing the Sinai withdrawal Egypt has not yet fulfilled all its commitments in the commercial sphere. Our correspondent Gadi Sukenik reports that Israeli businessmen have not yet received Egyptian multientry permits, good for five trips, and that arrangements to facilitate trade with Egyptian governmental companies have not yet been made. [Text] [TA251432 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 25 Mar 82]

ISRAELI OFFICER REFUSES TO SERVE--The following is a statement from an Israeli officer who refuses to serve in the West Bank and Gaza sector: I, Officer Hayim Bar'am refuse military service in the occupied Palestinian areas and completely oppose the occupation of the West Bank, particularly the inhuman repression of the Palestinian people. In recent days, fire was opened at Palestinian youths not only by soldiers but also by the settlers as well. I recognize the Palestinians' right to resist occupation by force because Israel occupies the West Bank to deprive the Palestinian people of sovereignty and the attainment of their national rights and to eventually expel them by any form of action against the Palestinian people. We now present to you information about this Israeli officer: The aforementioned officer had distributed the said statement to the information media in the Hebrew language. He is the brother of Knesset member 'Uzi Bar'am of the Zionist Labor Party. His father Moshe Bar'am was a former minister in one of the [one word indistinct] governments. [Text] [NC281100 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1028 GMT 28 Mar 82]

BA'TH PARTY ISSUES ANNIVERSARY STATEMENT

JN061609 Damascus SANA in Arabic 1515 GMT 6 Apr 82

[Text] Damascus, 6 Apr (SANA)--The regional command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Jordan has stated that, since the early 50's, the Ba'thists in Jordan have been struggling to achieve the Arab masses' interests and to liberate Jordan from the control of the United States and Zionism which have allied themselves to the reactionaries.

In a statement issued on the 35th anniversary of the Ba'th Party, the regional command said that the celebration of this blessed occasion makes us face our glorious militant and progressive responsibilities, calls on us to redouble our efforts and sacrifices and makes us remember the huge sacrifices that our brother Ba'thists in Syria have offered while being the target of the ugliest imperialist-Zionist conspiracy carried out by the agent hirelings, the Muslim brothers, a conspiracy direction not only against revolutionary Syria but also against the entire Arab liberation movement.

The regional command praised the steadfastness and confrontation of the comrade Ba'thists in Syria and their struggle against the conspiracies of domestic and foreign enemies. The regional command also praised their great achievements in every city and village in Syria under the leadership of struggler Hafiz al-Asad, secretary general of the Ba'th Party and president of the Republic.

The regional command said that this occasion take place after the comrade Ba'thists in Jordan have carried out various forms of struggle, passed through militant and glorious experiences, offered sacrifices and been besieged by the royal regime which is deeply involved in agency and subservience to U.S. imperialism and fascist Zionism.

The regional command stressed that the Ba'thists struggle had never been a struggle to achieve their personal interests but one for the sake of the Arab masses in the Arab homeland.

The regional command concluded by hailing all the comrade Ba'thist martyrs who continue to fall in defense of their glorious party's principles of unity, liberty and socialism.

CSO: 4400/208

JORDAN

BRIEFS

FREEMASONRY TO SABOTAGE LINKED--Amman--His Eminence Shaykh Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Khayyat, dean of the Shari'a College, has delivered a lecture at the Jerusalem College entitled "Islam and Freemasonry." In the lecture, Dr al-Khayyat dealt with the inception of freemasonry and the sabotage effects it caused to the Islamic world in particular and to the world at large in general. The dean of the Jerusalem College, the teaching staff and the students listened to Dr al-Khayyat's lecture. [Text] [JN051027 Amman AD-DUSTUR in Arabic 5 Apr 82 p 3]

CSO: 4400/208

KUWAITI PAPER ON ARAB MINISTERS' RESOLUTIONS

GF021825 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 1 Apr 82 pp.1, 19

[Editorial: "Arab Ministers' Statement: A Press Article!"]

[Excerpts] To sum up, the Arab foreign ministers, or their representatives, have asked themselves to implement all clauses which the Arab countries "complain" are not being implemented. We were surprised when they asked Israel to stop its repressive measures. It seems that they depended on the intensification of Arab efforts at various forums and international organizations "to force it to comply." This means that they cleverly managed to put the ball in the court of "all international forums and circles" to force Israel into recognizing Arab rights and into stopping its aggressive measures. Thus, we will find Israel complying tomorrow to these circles, as if it were an obedient pupil of international legitimacy.

Naturally, we [journalists] write such words in the daily newspapers because we do not have any other weapon. Why, then, are the Arab ministers--who represent their states and who have more at their disposal than words--emulating us in our profession?

The fact is that the Arab situation does not require statements or articles appealing to "international circles and forums" to force Israel to comply; nor does it require any verbal condemnation of the aggressive U.S. stand. Israel does not comply unless it is confronted with a real power to force it to comply; international circles are not this power but we [Arabs] are the power if we determine to be.

Expressing condemnation of the United States does not mean anything unless this condemnation is translated into practical and real stands which will force the United States at least to feel that the Arab lands and seas are not open bases for its armies and its prompt imperialist action in the Arab region and that Arab oil and resources are for the Arabs, not the sited states.

It [the United States] must also be punished when it tries to besiege an Arab country or tries to impose sanctions on it. For example, we are now talking about a possible confrontation with the companies which are trying to tighten their grip on some oil countries. Instead of exposing our might against the serpent's tail, let us expose this strength against its head, because that is the place for real confrontation. We may, through this, be able to win over the

United States for those who love it. Verbal condemnation--a permissible thing--does not have any effect unless it has grave consequences, because we have been announcing such condemnations over a period of scores of years while we grant the United States the status of most favored nation at a time when it is becoming more arrogant and fierce against our national existence and against those who are considered friends of the United States.

Now, if we try to sift the resolutions of the emergency ministers conference, what will be left? To be more specific, what will be left for those who are in the land, in Palestine and the Golan, those who are patiently struggling and sacrificing their blood and exposing themselves to Zionist-U.S. bullets?

We regret to say that just the opposite thing will remain for them, they will have to "comply" with the Zionist monster. It is not Israel which will comply with "international circles."

Nevertheless, as we have said, we pin our hopes on them. We depend on those commandos who are close to their land and who love its soil.

CSO: 4400/208

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON FRENCH, SWISS STANDS

GF061015 (Clandestine) Voice of Lebanese Armenians in Armenian 1330 GMT 27 Mar 82

[Article published in April-May issue of HAYASTAN, organ of the Armenian secret army for the Liberation of Armenia]

[Excerpts] After continuous [words indistinct] for months, the aggressive operations launched by the Armenian Revolutionary Movement against Switzerland and France have begun to ebb. The decrease in the number of operations followed the publication of communiques in January by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia [ASALA] and the Armenian revolutionary only organization demanding the termination of attacks on Swiss and French interests.

The Armenian revolutionary organizations had tangible reasons when they began to strike at French and Swiss interests. Moreover, when these organizations, at ASALA's demand, terminated their attacks against the said countries, they had tangible reasons for doing so.

In its 21 January call to Armenian revolutionary organizations, ASALA stated the following: Due to new alterations concerning the trial of our imprisoned combatant Mardiros Djamgochian, who has waged a struggle for the liberation of the occupied land and the freedom of the Armenian people. We demand the temporary suspension of operations against Switzerland and all Swiss interests and targets throughout the world until the final verdict of the trial of our combatant in the Swiss prison--a verdict which has to be in favor of the Armenian people and the [word indistinct] of the revolutionary struggle.

In its communique issued on 29 January, the Armenian revolutionary only organization stated that ASALA has assured it that the political demands of the comrades in the van operation in Paris had been met in full. The communique also stated the following: Because of our full confidence in our ASALA friends and the [words indistinct] of our attacks against Turkish fascism, we demand the termination of all the operations that were recommended to be carried out for our people's cause against French establishments and interests throughout the world.

Moreover, the communique stated that a change has been noticed in the French and Swiss attitudes. After sentencing the Fedayee Mardiros Djamgochian to 15 years' imprisonment, Switzerland agreed to review the verdict and hold a

second trial for him in which the verdict is expected to be far more lenient. Moreover, the Swiss Government terminated its (?informative) and (?suggestive) policy toward the Armenians and the Armenian cause and has started to adopt a more favorable attitude toward our cause.

On the other hand, the French authorities have agreed to special conditions that are granted only to political prisoners for the four Fedayeen of the van operation. Although this decision is neither final nor official, the trial of the Fedayeen of the Yeghia Keshishian suicidal commando group will be held in October, that is to say, a year after the van operation. The decision on this approximate date constitutes a positive step because in similar cases trials are held later than a year. All these developments caused us to terminate our strikes against Swiss and French interests.

The positive steps achieved are not the final [words indistinct]. What remains to be done, therefore, is to wait for the final verdict of Mardiros Djamgochian's new trial. This trial must be political and the verdict issued against Mardiros Djamgochian must be worthy of a warrior struggling for a just cause. Likewise, the trial of the four Fedayeen in the van operation must also be political and they must be granted the promised rights which are recognized to political refugees.

The said achievements, only a few steps taken along the path of final victory, have not been granted by France and Switzerland without reciprocity. They have been the result of the work initiated on three levels:

1. The struggle of our combatants in prison who have achieved their just rights by their hunger strike, decisive and honorable attitude, and demand to [word indistinct] the verdict passed against them.
2. The political and national activities of Armenians abroad--particularly the French Armenians' activities--that included organized demonstrations and meetings for the [words indistinct] of the four heroes of the van operation and for Mardiros Djamgochian.
3. Parallel to the struggle of the Fedayeen in prison and our people outside, Armenian revolutionary organizations initiated an anti-French and anti-Swiss campaign that manifested itself in times explosives and bombs.

CSO: 4400/199

BRIEFS

ADF CLOSES AL-BIQA' AIRSPACE--The Syrian deterrent forces yesterday prevented the opening of the air force school in the Riyaq Military Base. Furthermore, the Syrians notified the Beirut Airport authorities that they are firmly determined to prevent any civilian or military aircraft from landing in the Riyaq Airport or flying over al-Biqa' for reasons known to the Lebanese but unexplained by the Syrians. Moreover, the Lebanese army command obeyed the orders, closed the air force school and ordered all the school's instruments and equipment moved to the al-Qulay'at Airport, as has been stated by Lebanese security reports. [Text] [NC041100 Marj 'Uyun Lebanon Voice of Hope in Arabic 1000 GMT 4 Apr 82]

CSO: 4400/199

FES SUMMIT MAY RESUME IN JUNE

GF060542 Doha QNA in Arabic 1450 6 Apr 82

[Text] Dubayy, 6 Apr (QNA--M'hamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of state in charge of foreign affairs, thinks the FES Arab summit will probably resume in late June 1982. He says contacts are in progress between the general secretariat of the Arab League and the conference chairman on one hand and between the conference chairman and Arab countries on the other on holding a foreign ministers meeting at the end of May as a prelude to the summit.

In a press statement to today's UAE newspaper AL-BAYAN, Saudi newspaper AL-MADINAH, and Kuwaiti newspaper AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM, Boucetta explained that there must be at least one month between the foreign ministers meeting and the summit so that the Arab kings and leaders can become familiar with the agenda of the conference set by the ministers.

Boucetta stated that the letter he delivered yesterday to Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait, from King Hasan II, the Moroccan Monarch, in addition to reviewing bilateral relations. Also reviewed the results of contacts made by Morocco on resuming on the Arab summit, sounded out the Amir of Kuwait on arrangements for resuming the FES summit, and discussed ways to motivate Islamic action, especially regarding the implementation of decisions made by the Islamic conference that was recently held in al-Ta'if and which called for giving the Islamic conference a new horizon of action in order to achieve solidarity. The letter also pertained to urgent and necessary steps that should be taken regarding the Arab City of Jerusalem.

Boucetta added that the letter dealt with the current situation in the region, especially with respect to the escalation of hostile action by the Zionist enemy against the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied Arab territories, in addition to the Iraqi-Iranian, war which is a matter that should be resolved.

On his opinion on the reasons for the adjournment of the FES summit and whether these reasons have been eliminated in a fashion that preludes to the resumption of the summit, Boucetta said the contacts which are currently in progress among the Arab countries are aimed at unifying the vision on major issues in order to avoid differing views which would abate Arab action or make the Arabs appear to be fragmented before the people of the world. Therefore, it will require a great effort to surmount secondary Arab differences. If they cannot be eliminated they should at least be frozen.

The Moroccan minister added that the elimination of Arab differences will unite the Arab view of the goal and the way to reach this goal.

Moreover, he reaffirmed his country's support for the Saudi peace plan, since it is an Arab plan verified by the first FES summit.

He said the contracts which are underway to resume the summit are meant to unify the Arab vision regarding the main point on the summit agenda, which is the Saudi peace plan.

In his statement, Boucetta called on the Arab countries to eliminate their differences and consider the essential problem, which is the Palestinian cause and Jerusalem in particular following the recent escalation of the Zionist enemy's torture, banishment, and expulsion of the sons of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Boucetta said the Moroccan delegation will underline the uprising of the Arabs of the occupied territories during the meeting of the nonaligned movement's coordination bureau which begins in Kuwait today.

Boucetta noted that the Iraqi-Iranian war has aggravated Arab disagreements at a time when all efforts should be dedicated to stopping the war, which is useless to both the Iraqi and the Iranian peoples--this war that serves Zionism, first of all, and the countries that want to weaken the Arab-Islamic force so that this force cannot deal with its vital problems.

CSO: 4500/140

PROBLEM OF OVERPOPULATION STUDIED

Demographic Fluctuations Examined

Casablanca LAMALIF in French No 133, Feb-Mar 82 pp 14-18, 20

[Article by Zakya Daoud]

[Text] Nearly 22 million Moroccans, over 46 percent of whom are under the age of 15 and only 4.2 million of whom work or are assumed to be working: This is the country's population situation created by a boom after 1945 due to the drop in mortality and hopes for independence. There are some signs that this population curve is on a downward swing, but the velocity acquired is such and the structure of the population so young that the effects will not be measurable before the year 2000.

Measuring the impact of demography, the causes and consequences of the successive fluctuations is the purpose of the study we are publishing.

The Moroccan population has experienced a prodigious boom since 1947, following the typhus epidemics in 1937-1939, the plague and typhus in 1942 the 1944-1947 famine, during which the mortality rate went as high as 53 percent. According to most sources, this population explosion is due to a constant fertility rate of 50 out of 1,000, one of the highest in the world, which in the 1950's suddenly found itself confronted with a higher life expectancy and above all, a decline in mortality, from 20 to 13 and then to 10-11 per 1,000, or a drop of 45 percent between 1910 and 1973, which drop it is hoped will continue to dip as low as 7-8 per 1,000. Already, between 1945 and 1962 -- that is, with a generation -- the mortality rate was cut in half. At the same time that medical discoveries brought in from other countries modified its balance, the Moroccan population continued to follow its old practices, giving birth to many children in the hope that a few might survive. Ways of thinking changed more slowly than did health and disease prevention. This is what is called "demographic transition."¹ Previously, the mortality rate was far lower than the birth rate, which posed a constant threat to a subsistence economy facing famines and epidemics that shattered the fragile balance achieved. In the face of this situation, society established rules

of conduct aimed at promoting more births: early marriages, divorces on grounds of sterility,² polygamy, and so on. A powerful, encouraged natural fertility resulted, adapted to an economy in which human energy alone was the basis of productive activity and the accumulation of wealth.³ Legislation also favors the phenomenon: Numbers were needed in order to guarantee one's right to water, land and a high place in the social pyramid. The established order was the patriarchy. Despite all these practices, the growth rate of the Moroccan population was very low: .5 to 1 percent a year maximum. This balance was modified by the introduction of medicine, but behavior did not therefore vary. Already engaged in the 1950's, the population growth process was to continue and be accentuated, and here it would seem that another phenomenon joined the drop in mortality and explains it: increased income, both in figures and trends. Although per capita Moroccan income is very low, it nevertheless went from \$300 per person in 1970 to \$430 in 1976. Since independence, there has been a steady increase of at least 1.2 percent a year, independently of all contingencies and the very great inequalities of distribution. Actually, it was mainly the hope of a better standard of living with independence that played a role, raising the population growth rate from 1 to 2 percent a year, then to 3 and over 3 percent.

Hopes of Independence

Naturally, it has been shown in many countries and it is a commonly admitted fact that the higher the standard of living, the lower the birth rate. But in Morocco, certain studies would seem to indicate that at the beginning of the 1960's, while in the category of intermediate- and upper-level personnel there was a deliberately low birth rate,⁴ and while in the poorest population groups the low birth rate is the result of high infant mortality -- on the order of 115 per 1,000, but actually 150 per 1,000 in certain groups (since 3 out of 20 children die before the age of 5 and since out of an average family of 6 to 7 children, one is certain in advance -- these are only percentages, naturally -- that 1 will not reach the age of 10), on the other hand, in the new middle classes created by the country's accession to independence and among office workers and skilled workers who have occupied the posts left vacant by foreigners, an excessively high fertility rate has been demonstrated.⁵ The same is true of rural people leaving the land, people who, while enjoying better medical care, nevertheless continue their practice of encouraging a high birth rate.

In 1960, it was shown that the percentage of children increased with income. Regarding their motivations, the middle class insists on this high fertility: The persons in Morocco with the ideal of the greatest number of children are women in families assured of a small, but steady, income.⁶

The result? Between 1960 and 1971, the gross birth rate increased compared with preceding periods, while the mortality rate continued to drop. However, by 1960, the population had already increased 75 percent over the previous periods. The country therefore moved very rapidly from 7 million inhabitants in 1935 to 9.3 million in 1952, then to 11.6 million in 1960 and 15.4 million in 1971 (or 32.3 percent more). At the present time (1980), we have some 19,938,000 or 20.05 million (the figures are not very precise⁷), and henceforth, whether we like it or not, inasmuch as the population doubles every

25 years and has quadrupled in 40 years, it is possible that in 3 years -- the 1982 census should confirm the predictions or render them invalid -- there will be 28 million Moroccans.

Furthermore, population growth has taken on such speed that even if fertility should decrease, the growth in population will be 3.6 to 3.78 percent annually (even 4.5 percent by the year 2000) because of the youthful nature of the population and because life expectancy will certainly go from 55 to 60 years in the years ahead. As the Future group in Washington calculated,⁸ even if the fertility rate of women, now estimated at 6.5 children per family (6 in urban areas and 7 in rural), should fall, the growth already induced would be great until the year 2000 and doubling would remain inevitable for the next 20 years, no matter what family planning policies should be adopted, if indeed they are. Only after that could the process be reversed. We would therefore have between 40 and 50 million inhabitants by the year 2000.

Changes in Motivations

And yet, certain trends would seem to indicate that a stabilization around the 1980's is underway. In fact, given the current situation of statistics in Morocco, we do not have definite figures. Rather, one has indications that could be confirmed or rendered invalid by the future census, which is therefore anxiously awaited. Regarding school attendance, the increase in the number of elementary school age children -- that is, between 7 and 14 -- was 5 percent between 1960 and 1971, in other words, 1.8 percent greater than the overall population increase. If this figure were maintained, one would have arrived at 4.5 million children of that age by 1971, 5 million by 1975 and 6.2 million by 1980. However, according to the Ministry of Planning,⁷ it does not appear that there were over 4.5 million children of that age by 1980. It is therefore possible, under such conditions, that the projection of 7.6 million children between the ages of 7 and 14 years anticipated by 1985 would not apply until the year 2000 or perhaps never, inasmuch as the motivations of the population, with respect to hopes, standard of living and income, are precisely the opposite of what they were in the 1960's.

Furthermore, the available figures indicate or would seem to indicate that pressure was the strongest on education with the arrival of the younger generations in the 1970's and that now, as these groups grow older, the strongest demographic pressure is on the labor market, especially since 1975-1977, with a 5.4-percent increase annually in the number of job seekers who, by 1990, should make up 54 percent of the population, compared with 49 to 50 percent at present, or 15 million persons. One can measure the importance of these factors, if confirmed, especially since the psychological, and therefore political, repercussions of all the population curves are only felt 6 to 10 years later.

Another indication of the very slow drop in the birth rate: the size of the average family, which has evidently evolved as follows: 3.57 persons in 1960, 4.4 in 1962, 6 in 1966-1967, 4.8 in 1971 for urban dwellers; 4.98 in 1960, 5.2 in 1962, 6.5 in 1966-1967 and 5.7 in 1971 for rural people.⁹ One can also

see a very clear increase in the number of single persons: 60 percent of all men in 1960, 64 percent in 1971, 40 percent of all women in 1960, 53 percent in 1971, 56.5 percent since that time. There has also been a change upward in the marrying age: 17-18 for rural girls and 17 to 21 for urban women, and an increase in the number of divorces (27.5 percent of all urban women have divorced once and 1.7 percent more than three times). This evolution could modify a situation in which women between the ages of 15 and 50 could bring 6 to 7 children, three-fourths of them women, into the world.

Inactive Population

However, while these figures are decisive for the future, especially in that they can double the size of the Moroccan population: 40 million inhabitants by the year 2000 with the current birth rate, and 98 million by the year 2025 (or over 130 percent) instead of 32 million by the year 2000 and 47 million by 2025, with an average of 3 children per family and 36 by 2025 with an average of 2; while they are more reassuring than the dramatic tables generally drawn up, they change nothing in the immediate future: The children already born and those that are going to be born must be fed, educated, housed and employed. These things have not yet been done and we are far behind. We have to absorb that acquired speed about which we can do nothing and we have to take on an existing situation that is a heavy burden: In 1980, 16.8 percent of all Moroccans are between the ages of 0 and 4 years; 15.8 percent between the ages of 11 and 14. We therefore have 45.6 percent children and 2.7 percent over the age of 65, meaning unproductive persons or classified as such, for a potentially active population making up only 51.7 percent. This is all the more critical because all these active persons that must support from 3 to 4 persons each are not all occupied -- far from it -- because the total potentially active population is on the order of 8 million and only 4.2 million are classified as employed. Furthermore, among these active persons, 10.7 are only between the ages of 15 and 19. The burden of the inactive population is one of the main plagues hindering Morocco's economic growth, both with respect to the government, which has enormous potential social benefits to pay, and families, which can save nothing and which think only about surviving. Any improvement in the standard of living is much more difficult. A 4-percent annual increase in the population would require investments of 16 percent of the gross national production, without any improvement in incomes, and these figures were surpassed by Morocco only during the period of the boom from 1973 to 1977. Nationally speaking, the growth in education, health and food needs and social costs resulting from the population growth is very heavy for the community and thereby reduces investments in the productive sectors of the economy, sectors that could have provided an increase in income. If one cannot even invest 16 percent of the GNP a year, then one does not have stagnation, but rather, regression and the vicious circle of poverty, which only engenders more poverty. The greater the population increase, the slower the economic progress. Furthermore, investments take a long time to be profitable and economic adjustments are needed, if only to absorb the population growth.

False Quarrels

There are naturally different ways of viewing the population boom and some have encouraged it, if only by letting it happen, intellectually convinced that the more Moroccans we had, the more powerful Morocco would be. Or perhaps they thought that the more Moroccans there were, the more change there would be for some and less for others, as long as people were only concerned about their survival. While such an opinion can be verified in the immediate present, it is less certain for the future. But there are those who would say, "After me, the deluge!"

And yet, this quarrel, which raged early after accession to independence and which still burns periodically and with vehemence,¹⁰ is a false quarrel, for the problem is not so much the total number of the population as it is its rate of growth and the country's ability to absorb it.

At the present time, that ability is very limited. The impact of population growth on agriculture, which is advancing at a rate far slower than that of the population, on urbanization, which cannot assimilate -- either physically or psychologically -- all the newcomers, on employment (generations of unemployed and underemployed are being born), on education (we cannot even enroll all children between the ages of 7 and 14 in elementary schools), on the environment (insoluble problems of financing, development and equipment), on the economy (verifiable drop in the standard of living, indebtedness and increased recourse to foreign capital),¹¹ and on health (we are no longer protected against the return of epidemics and mortality), is absolutely dizzying: A 3-percent increase per year is a major burden for the economic takeoff, even if some can say that a growing population results in surpluses that can be invested in order to improve the standard of living (provided that that population is employed), and is, in any case, ready to accept any innovation and any change. Nevertheless, it has been proved that one cannot continue in this way without a possible increase in the mortality rate, if only because of the disturbances that such population growth cannot fail to engender. Population growth has never before reached current levels in the Third World. During their growth period, the developed countries experienced rates three or four times lower and over a longer period.

These figures, which are taken from various sources, support one another (while neither confirming nor contradicting the Malthusian hypothesis in the sense that population growth has not hindered economic development, but has not aided it either), are not given in order to promote a future birth control program, whose effects would not, at any rate, be felt for 15 years, but in order to give a warning concerning the country's present and future situation and call for the drafting of adequate measures and a coming to awareness regarding development and population growth.¹²

For the time being, there is no hope at all in a family planning policy whose effects to date are not even mediocre. Not only has it not reached all women between the ages of 15 and 50 (4,484,000 in 1980) of child-bearing age, but it has not even reached women who said they were interested in it at

the time of various polls, some 550,000 in 1976, compared with 471,000 in 1971. Only 75,000 women were taking the pills distributed by the government at the time and it was estimated, given the inability to have figures on those going to private doctors, that 140,000 women were practicing birth control in 1973, without counting the 5 percent of all rural women and 13 percent of all urban women who a poll showed were using traditional methods of contraception. These figures are therefore far below needs and desires.

Policy for Women

But while the drop in mortality has been rapid thanks to the dissemination of techniques from foreign countries and without any control of the environment or noteworthy changes in the economic and social areas, then can the same be true for fertility?

For Rachidi, who asks the question, the profound process of technical progress is begun on the individual as well as collective level and creates the conditions for changes in the ways of thinking of Moroccans, who will finally become aware of the fact that there is a new balance set up between death and the birth rate. It is the technical and social evolution that caused the birth rate to drop in Europe even before any development of modern family planning methods. In Morocco, between 1960 and 1971, the urban population rose 58.6 percent, the active urban population 43.5 percent and the population employed in the secondary sector 54.2 percent, even though the growth in population does not help technical progress, the illiteracy rate is still around 76 percent and the labor force remains unskilled. Urbanization has already had undeniable consequences: Once several children have been born, half of the urban dwellers do not want more. Up to the age of 30, fertility figures are the same for urban and rural people. It is not until after that age that the difference is important. Rural women continue to have children, going from an average of 3.49 from 25 to 29 to 6.07 children from 45 to 49, while urban women go from 3.33 for 25 to 29 to 5.19 for 45 to 49.

The level of education of women is the element which Rachidi seems as much more influential with respect to fertility.¹³ In his opinion, the education and employment of women, along with the improvement in their income, constitute the most effective processes in Moroccan society for a reduction in the birth rate. The status of women is therefore the main reform to promote if one wants Moroccan society to change its growth rate.

Education Policy

However, without any encouragement -- quite the contrary -- the situation of women is changing. The proportion of active women went from 8.9 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1977, especially for those under the age of 30. However, this has not yet had any effect on motivations regarding the ideal number of children desired. One can nevertheless point out that this ideal number is higher than the national average of children and has therefore not been attained: It is 4.6 in the rural world, while the current average would be 3.5, and 3.3 in the urban world, when the current average per family would be 3.1. The problem of competition between employment, career and children

is still rare and the current situation of the job market explains this perfectly well. Progress in education should also constitute a powerful factor causing a drop in the birth rate, because this parental investment can only enter into competition with the number of children, whose economic usefulness it reduces and whose cost of raising it increases. That is why Rachidi recommends: "We are in the presence of a vicious circle because population growth prevents general education, but we must push education in the extreme if we want it to help reduce the population growth rate. The education policy must be aimed at girls as much as boys, if not more so, because there is 1 girl for every 2 boys in elementary and high school and 1 for every 4 at the university level." This education policy must also reach rural areas, which tend to reject it. Pressure must involve both number and quality at the primary level and progress at the secondary and university level. But the improvement in school attendance rate should be a consequence in the drop in fertility and a reduction in child labor. The income policy is the third important element.

Cries of Alarm

Higher income reduces infant mortality, first of all, and the Future group in Washington has just figured that if every Moroccan family had only three children, then the current infant mortality would be cut in half. This could therefore constitute a favorable factor for the drop in the birth rate, with parents being more assured of the survival of their offspring and consequently, of their investment, their health and old-age insurance. But beyond that, increasing the national income and distributing it well geographically and socially are effective factors in promoting a reduction in the birth rate. We know, and all figures show, that inequalities have sharpened since 1960 and that something other than tax pressure, which has risen faster than the GNP,¹⁴ is needed to reverse the phenomenon. For example, as recommended by Rachidi, one could have an agricultural price policy, especially for wheat,¹⁵ or a policy to develop public services, a modification in land structures, and so on.

But all of this remains in the domain of a general evolution and will have only very slow effects, affecting ways of living and thinking. In the meantime, the Future group in Washington is stepping up its warnings: In agriculture, it states that if there were only 3 children per family, we would have .60 hectare per person of cultivated land and .23 hectare of arable land. We would have to import only 2.9 million tons a year instead of 5.7 million, we would have to create only 260,000 jobs a year instead of 300,000 and by the year 2000, we would have only 9.8 million job seekers instead of 10.1 million. Furthermore, we would have only 11 million inactive persons instead of 19 million, investments would become tolerable and we could, having only 4.6 million children to educate (instead of 7.6 million), have adequate school facilities to accept all school-age children for a cost similar to what would be needed to take in about 53 percent of all children of the same age if we were to maintain the current birth rate. In fact, this would cost only 2.1 billion dirhams (468 dirhams per year per child), compared with 3.3 billion dirhams for all children, which seems impossible to bear, and 1.8 billion for 53 percent of them, or 3.8 million of the rate does not go down. One could

then improve the rate of school attendance and the quality of education, while developing secondary, professional and higher education.

Which Morocco?

If families had only 2 children, the ratios would be even better: We would arrive at .80 hectare of land cultivated and .25 hectare of arable land per farmer. We would have to import only 2.1 million tons of grain a year, we would have only 9.7 million job seekers a year, we would have to create only 200,000 jobs a year and we would have only 9 million dependent children. Above all, the situation after the year 2000 would be improved in all sectors because before that time, it is certain that a drop in the birth rate would not be felt.

However, this reduced birth rate must be promoted starting now because, the Future group emphasizes, the increase is so rapid that the effects could be immediate. If an emergency program is launched in 1980, there will be 3 million less children born in 1985 (this is already too late) and there would be 29 million Moroccans by the year 2000 and 37 million by the year 2035. On the other hand, if the program is not launched until 1985, we shall have 34 million Moroccans by the year 2000 and 44 million by the year 2040. If the program is not launched until 1990, there will be 37 million Moroccans by the year 2000 and 52 million by 2045.

It is therefore up to Morocco to decide today what Morocco will be like tomorrow and we have already seen since independence how many repercussions conscious and unconscious decisions have in the years to come.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Croissance Demographique et Developpement Economique du Maroc," by Mohamed Rachidi, Editions El Miqtat el Maghreb, 1981.
2. There are 8 percent sterile women in Morocco today.
3. The use of energy still remains very low (the equivalent of .26 tons of oil per year per person), despite the enormous currency expenditures this occasions. The problem can only be solved by scientific and technological research.
4. It is true that women from the wealthier classes are the most hesitant to increase the size of their families and it is among them that one finds the most candidates for family planning, since their needs have been modified and their desire for social advancement now decisive, which is not always the case of men in that social category, who may not, it is true, have the same motivations.
5. The middle class born of independence would therefore be partly responsible for the population increase until 1971, but only partly, because the drop in mortality has been decisive.

6. The men in this social category are apparently more reticent in responding to inquiries.
7. "Morocco in Figures in 1980," Ministry of Planning, 20th edition (Editeur BMC [text illegible]).
8. In 1979, under the aegis of the Ministry of Public Health and the IDA in Rabat (American International Development Association), an analysis was made of the impact of demographic factors on various Moroccan economic and social objectives. The Future group in Washington was entrusted with the task and drafted a report entitled "Rapid" (relations between demographic factors and development), published in French in 1981.
9. Some 40.5 percent of rural families have 6 persons or more, 6.3 percent have 10, and in the cities, the proportion of families with a single person is 7.4 percent of all urban families.
10. The opinion we have published is one example.
11. Which is also a burden for future generations.
12. According to the Future group, which quotes a study made in 94 developing countries, birth rates have dropped 19 percent between 1965 and 1975 with a family planning program. Tunisia has reduced its birth rate by 20 percent and Turkey by 18 percent. For countries without any program, there has been no drop in the birth rate.
13. While according to investigations, the level of education of the man does not play a part.
14. Tax pressure went from 17.2 percent in 1965 to 20.3 percent in 1973 and 23.8 percent in 1976 (the level in France is 23.5 percent) and has since increased.
15. Import prices for wheat rose 100 percent between 1974 and 1977 and at the same time, minimum prices guaranteed to the farmer rose only 35 percent.

Population and Employment

Casablanca LAMALIF in French No 133, Feb-Mar 82 pp 22-23

[Text] The enormous burden of the inactive population (nearly 60 percent of the total) and unemployment: These are the main characteristics of the employment situation in Morocco. In 1980, the potentially active population -- that is, between the ages of 15 and 64 and therefore of working age -- is some 4.2 million, but the population it must support totals 13.3 million, an average of 3 persons for every potentially active worker, triple the ratio in developed countries, where 1 or 2 adults work for every dependent person. This is an enormous burden for the national economy and will grow even worse between 1980 and 1985, with the rise of the new generations. Moreover, between 1960 and 1971, there was a worsening of the ratio between potentially active and

inactive persons with the population growth and increase in the number of old people. The burden on the active population went from 3.6 to 1 in 1960 to 4 in 1971. Under such conditions, there is no possibility of increasing national production and in order to relieve such pressure, productivity would have to go up 12 percent per person, only to maintain the standard of living.

However, the situation is even more serious because potentially active does not mean actually employed. Outside of agriculture, which "employs" some 50 percent of all Moroccans, 15 percent of the population is in the civil service (266,000 government employees in 1971; nearly 350,000 at present, increasing at a rate of 6 percent annually), 22 percent in industry (whose growth was 4.5 percent annually between 1960 and 1971 and which now employs some 597,000 persons, compared with 248,000 in 1960 and 387,000 in 1971, but especially in a sector which has developed such as public works and building and at the cost of an enormous drop in productivity), and 50 percent of the urban population in the tertiary sector, which represents some 895,000 persons in 1971, with 2-percent annual growth. However, this increase has come about at the price of a drop in productivity. Based on sex, in 1971 there were 2.8 million women indiscriminately classified as inactive -- that is, 73 percent of all women between the ages of 15 and 64. Some 605,000 women are classified as active, or 8 percent of the total female population or 16 percent of all women between the ages of 15 and 64, or 11 percent of the potentially active women. But in 1982, a very arbitrary calculation was made of a heavy increase in the number of women working, who would now make up 21.6 percent of the potentially active population, double the 1971 figure, with some 60 percent occupied in the tertiary sector. For men, 50 percent in 1971 were considered to be active, but the figure dropped to 43 to 45 percent in 1976. There has consequently been a decline, mainly in rural areas, because of the very high birth rate, a decline in mortality and the results of emigration and the rural exodus.

But here again, despite growth registered in secondary and tertiary employment, the figures should not give rise to any illusions: Out of 5,861,000 potentially active persons in 1982, 4.2 million are reportedly employed, meaning 1.4 million unemployed, which is backed by other sources. Some 20 percent of these are potentially active workers in urban areas. Moreover, underemployment is also rampant: It was an estimated 18 percent of the active force in 1971, with 45 to 50 percent in agriculture, 28 percent in public works and 24 to 18 percent in certain industrial sectors. While in 1971, only 350,000 persons were considered to be unemployed and only 730,000 were underemployed, the consequences of the economic crisis and population growth (with an annual increase of 5.4 percent in the number of job seekers) helped multiply these figures. Moreover, between 1960 and 1971, the number of truly active persons increased only 1.8 percent a year, when population growth was 3.2 percent a year. It is true that the increase in active workers later rose to 2.8 percent annually, but there are no elements to verify these figures. What we know for sure is that 57 percent of the unemployed are under 25 and that among them, 63 percent are young women. There are reportedly many more unemployed and underemployed today than in 1971. But here again, one must refine data because between 1960 and 1977, there was an increase in the crafts of 6.5 percent a

year. Furthermore, child labor distorts statistics. According to the 1971 census, 2 percent of all children between the ages of 5 and 14 are active, 50 percent are in school and the rest are classified as family aids. In a subsistence economy, a child is a producer from a very early age.

What are we waiting for to correct this situation characterized by unemployment and underemployment? Between 1968 and 1972, when there were nearly 710,000 job seekers, it was expected that 485,000 jobs would be created. Only 400,000 were actually created and there were consequently an additional 310,000 persons looking for work. Of these, 89,000 went into national service and 75,000 emigrated. Between 1973 and 1977, job seekers increased 4 percent annually, or by some 800,000 (compared with 1.9 percent between 1960 and 1971 and 2.3 percent between 1968 and 1972). Actually, growth should have been 5 percent a year. Some 422,000 jobs needed to be created. Some 293,000 were, including 54,800 in agriculture, 116,900 in the secondary sector, 87,600 in the tertiary sector and 34,600 in the administration, but there were an additional 550,000 unemployed, as emigration no longer played a role and the national service was less important.

According to Rachidi, workers without jobs totaled 855,000 by 1977, compared with 739,000 in 1972. For Rachidi, the surplus labor supply was more than 60 percent higher than predictions and the objectives set for development of secondary employment were not attained. The latter, which was to have employed 1.05 million persons, did not succeed in doing so. The creation of one jobs costs 947,000 dirhams in industry, 977,000 in fishing and 184,000 in tourism.

This situation could grow even worse. In 1985 -- that is, in 3 years -- there would reportedly be 6.6 million potentially active workers, meaning, based on highly contingent figures, 2.2 million jobs to create and 4.2 million to create by the year 2000. These predictions were already known and we realized that we had to create at least 300,000 jobs a year in order to absorb the unemployed and newcomers on the labor market, but we have not succeeded. At the current rate of population growth, there will be between 10 and 13 million potentially active workers, meaning job seekers, whether or not they are successful, by the year 2000. But by that time, the pressure on every active person will be even greater: There will be 100 children for every 100 workers, or 19 million inactive persons, and the high percentage of low-level workers with low wages will be an obstacle to the development of domestic demand and consequently, another limitation on growth.

Population and Agriculture

Casablanca LAMALIF in French No 133, Feb-Mar 82 pp 24-26

[Text] The effects of population growth on the situation in agriculture are catastrophic. Between 1960 and 1971, the area cultivated per person dropped 11 percent and is now around .54 hectare per person and .42 for arable land. At the current rate, it will be .18 by the year 2000 and .07 by the year 2025. Actually, in the best of cases, the coefficient of land cultivated will drop by 30 percent by the year 2000. All statistics, whether those of the

Future group in Washington or of Rachidi, agree on that point. They also agree on the evaluation of the deterioration of soils, expansion of the desert, overgrazing (24 million head of livestock by 1930), the saturation of cultivated land -- and generally poorly cultivated -- without counting the past 2 years of drought, during which agricultural production and livestock dropped by half, the lack of water, its poor distribution, and so on. With 7.4 million hectares cultivated -- 16 percent of the total area -- Moroccan agriculture is small-scale agriculture: The soil is being worn out and the excessive division of land (11.6 million parcels in 1973-1974, according to the agricultural study) worsens farming conditions, which are generally pitiful, with the exception of a few large farms. Some 80 percent of the farms are traditional family operations (every 4.9 hectares of workable farm land is divided up into six parcels on the average) which do not use labor and which are moving more and more toward subsistence agriculture, in the sense that they are concerned only with meeting their own needs. Agriculture buys 13 percent of its production from other sectors and sells them only one-third of it, essentially for export. Over a third of the farms market nothing. That is why, even if production were to increase, it would still be necessary to import food for the cities, especially wheat, and it would be fantastic if the rural areas even fed themselves. And yet, as A. M. Jouve notes in the latest REVUE DE GEOGRAPHIE, grain growing dominates Moroccan agriculture: Some 80 percent of all land in 1979 was planted in grain and we now have 4.5 [million?] hectares planted in wheat compared with 3 [million] in 1940 and 2 [million] in 1920. As Rachidi also confirms, agricultural production has risen by at least 50 percent in 25 years and according to Jouve, grain production has risen by 20 million quintals between 1930 and 1979, while the average yield has varied little (2 quintals per hectare increase for grains in 50 years). This increase in the case of grains is therefore due to the expansion of areas planted and for cereals, it has come about very slowly and by 20-year cycles. Forage products have increased 10 percent, market garden crops 27 percent, meat between 18 percent for cattle and 15 percent for sheep, and oil-yielding and leguminous plants, the bases of farm diets, have tripled their production. But even if production has increased 50 percent and even if it is generally underestimated by 10 or 40 percent, Rachidi notes, at the same time, the population has grown by 50 percent. As a result, per capita farm production has dropped: 130 kilograms per person in 1971, 97 in 1980 and agriculture's share of the development process steadily slipped. In 12 years, the agricultural GNP has risen only 8 percent, while the general GNP rose 20 percent and agriculture now occupies only 50 percent of the population. According to Rachidi, there is a surplus on the large farms, representing some 18 to 20 percent of production. But where does it go? Rachidi is very harsh on the subject of agricultural development: "The stagnation of per capita production has always limited and continues to limit the possibilities of launching an industrialization which is incapable of absorbing such rapid growth in urbanization," he writes.

What is more, the country has just embarked upon an outrageous irrigation policy that has not yet obtained the anticipated results. The population growth, which reduces the area per person planted in grain, also creates other needs and further reduces that area in crops or even in new needs. And yet, enormous investments have been made in agriculture, toward which the government has

drained off surpluses from other sectors, taking scarcely 1 percent of agriculture's production with a rural tax representing (in 1976) .02 percent of all national revenue and 1.5 percent of all direct taxes. But these investments have resulted -- especially speaking about water projects, a privileged area of investment -- in an increase in arable land of only .5 percent per year over the past 10 years and a 1-percent increase per year in arable land seems impossible to the Future group. Consequently, unable to increase the area of arable land, one could increase the amount of land cultivated, fight erosion, which takes away from 50,000 to 70,000 hectares a year, reforest, use 100 percent of all potential water resources -- only 40 percent are now used -- equip suitable land with irrigation facilities (we have not even completed 500,000 hectares), use fertilizer and select seed, mechanize, engage in research and bring about agrarian reform: in a word, do everything to improve productivity. But is such action possible when rural areas are overpopulated, when there are 70 persons per square meter in the Gharb, when more and more unsuitable land is cultivated and when in so doing, one ruins grazing land? It is true that on the national level, there are 2 persons for every hectare cultivated, but in certain zones, there are 7 or 8. These are areas with good land and also owner farms which, on 38.3 percent of the area, have half of all rural families.

And yet, the farm population is not increasing nearly as rapidly as the rest of the population. Its growth is only 1.5 percent a year, compared with an annual average of 3.3 percent, because of a rural exodus estimated at 100,000 persons a year but which has long exceeded this generally accepted figure and concerns 1.3 percent of the natural population increase in rural areas and in particular, all newly active persons with under 2 hectares. As Rachidi notes, the rural areas are losing its most dynamic elements, those most apt to seize development and therefore, create new economic and social conditions. And just as on the national level, emigration results in a drop in employment (although farm workers doubled between 1960 and 1971, 531,000), mechanization, the splitting up of land. And while, between 1960 and 1971, the number of farm owners dropped by 13 percent, going from 1,368,000 to 1,187,700, and the potentially active farm population increased by only 14 percent, the total active population grew by 43 percent. It now totals some 2.6 million persons (who, while they would have had to feed 6.3 persons each in 1960, had to feed 7.7 in 1971), with 2.8 million women being considered as inactive, which is false.¹ The amount of agricultural underemployment is enormous, even if one can scarcely speak of unemployment. It went from 25 percent in 1971 to 45 percent in 1976. Employment in agriculture rose only .7 percent between 1968 and 1972. Some 150,000 jobs were created instead of the 275,000 planned and since that time, results have not been better and figures for the growth in production of 5.6 percent have not been achieved. Scarcely did we exceed 1 percent. In the face of these obstacles, livestock raising is becoming more and more important, or at least, was becoming more important before the drought. Everything would therefore depend on increased productivity, which, according to all sources, is real -- between 2.1 and 2.9 percent a year -- but very slow.

Population and Food

All of this explains why Morocco can no longer feed its people and must resort to greater and greater imports. However, in order to buy, one must sell or borrow and we are familiar with the cycle."

As A. M. Jouve notes, "the amount of grain available per inhabitant has dropped by half in 50 years, going from 460 kilograms per year in 1930 to 230 in 1979," even 216, according to other sources, due to the 3.5-fold increase in the population during that time. Furthermore, the years 1960-1965 mark the end of grain exports and the beginning of increasingly massive imports: 1 million tons a year on the average between 1973 and 1978 and 3 million tons last year because of the drought. At the current rate, this means 5.7 million tons by the year 2000. At the present time, we have to produce at least 41 million quintals of grain a year to feed people who devote 54 percent of their income to food. Of that 54 percent, a large share is for grain, even though habits change slowly. Nor is the demand for other products always met. The average consumption of tomatoes is 18.1 kilograms per person per year and of sugar, 14.7 kilograms a year. In order to produce that amount (we provide only 60 percent), we would need 15 or 16 sugar mills and 100,000 hectares planted in sugar beets. Meat consumption is on the order of 17.8 kilograms per year per person; it has risen 30 percent. Butter and sugar consumption has risen 78 percent; oil consumption by 72 percent, egg consumption 90 percent. One-fifth of all the country's imports are food and the currency outlay is great. Meeting our sugar needs takes almost all the foreign exchange obtained from exports of vegetables, tomatoes, potatoes and citrus fruits.

The deficit is already on the order of 20 million quintals of grain, 1.2 million liters of milk, 270,000 tons of oil, and it is increasing. By the year 2000, we will need at least 77.45 million quintals of grain, 1.391 b [sic] liters of milk, 297,000 tons of oil, 498,000 tons of meat and 600,000 tons of sugar.

Needs have already changed and become diversified, but it is certain that we shall have to modify our food habits and that given our fish resources and especially the potential (only half of which are worked), people should eat more fish.

Population and Housing

The urban population has increased four times over in recent years. It has grown to 10 million and it is likely that in the very near future, it will reach 14 or 15 million. Growth is actually 5.5 percent, compared with 3.2 percent for the population as a whole, with the rural exodus joining the urban population increase. However, 68 percent of all the newcomers are crowded together in the shantytowns and the housing shortage is alarming. Some 20 percent of all urban dwellers live in shantytowns, 20 percent of all urban housing made of masonry is in poor condition, 50 percent is without water, 20 percent without sanitary facilities and 30 percent without electricity. All housing is overcrowded, with 3 to 4 persons to a room. Between 700,000

and 300,000 housing units are now needed to meet the shortage inherited from the 1970's. And yet, enormous investments were devoted to housing between 1973 and 1977, benefiting from 21.6 percent of all government investments and 1.6 percent of the GNP. Some 57 dirhams per inhabitant per year were devoted to housing and 11 percent of the government's operating expenditures (7.16 billion dirhams). And yet, while 152,587 housing units were built between 1960 and 1971 and three times more later, the shortage was still not corrected. Between 1971 and 1977, the number of housing units increased by 3.4 percent, but the population increased even faster: 5.5 percent a year. We now need 1 million housing units to make up the shortage and absorb the rate of population growth and, given the current rate of population increase, we shall need 4 million by the year 2000, with an increase of at least 100,000 new units a year. The cost of such investments is astronomical and becomes impossible to calculate with inflation. Furthermore, the rapid growth of urban centers poses problems with transportation, communications, energy systems and other areas, problems that will become insurmountable and that require planning.

FOOTNOTES

1. Some of the figures given are old, but it is nevertheless important to provide them in order to show trends and see whether they are confirmed or rendered invalid by the results of the next census.
2. See Morocco's food balance in the preceding issue.

Population and Health

Casablanca LAMALIF in French No 133, Feb-Mar 82 pp 27

[Text] No one is unaware that the country's health care situation is very mediocre. In 1980, there were 1,075 doctors for all of Morocco, 1 for every 19,000 inhabitants, compared with 1 for 10,000 in 1958. But since 47 percent of all the doctors are in Casablanca and Rabat, the average is 1 for every 24,000 persons in rural areas and 1 for 98,000 in certain regions. Only a few years ago, two provinces had no doctor at all.

There is one out patient clinic for every 23,400 inhabitants on the average (1 for 40,000 in certain regions) and 1 health center for every 45,000 inhabitants. Admissions to hospitals are growing at a rate of 3.4 percent a year, but while there were 44 million consultations a year in 1976 (an average of 2 per inhabitant), that figure is steadily dropping: 40 million consultations in 1979; 37 million in 1980. In 1975, the number of sick persons was 40-percent higher than the number of beds. Every year, the government allocates between 16 and 18 dirhams for the health of every Moroccan, or 1.8 percent of all government investments between 1973 and 1977 and 1.6 percent of the national income.

The proportion of family expenditures for health does not exceed 3.2 percent of the national income. The average family spends 59 dirhams in urban areas and 14 dirhams in rural areas a year, relatively less than in 1960. The result is that the morbidity rate is very high and, according to all sources, is one of the causes of the drop in national production. While infant mortality has dropped to 105 per 1,000, it nevertheless remains very high and is unquestionably linked to income and demography. It is higher in large families in which children have a lower-than-normal weight. Over 41 percent of all children between the ages of 0 and 4 years are deficient in protein and calories; 45 percent of these are in rural areas. There are twice as many rural children with rickets as there are urban children with the disease. Malnutrition remains one of the main elements of the health situation, both with respect to children as well as women. 170 out of 1,000 of whom die during pregnancy. It is estimated that 14 percent of all deaths among women are linked to childbirth and that women are worn out by so many pregnancies coming close together, which has an adverse effect on prenatal and infant care.

While the early epidemics have been eliminated, dysentery, pneumonia, measles and malnutrition are the main causes of death, especially among children, in Morocco.

Given the current rate of population growth, it would not appear that the situation can be improved without very large investments. In addition, 4,300 doctors are immediately needed. In other words, 2,000 would have to be trained a year, compared with an average of 300. Every year, another 850 hospital beds would have to be added, and 30 clinics and 7 health centers would have to be built every year, if only to maintain the current health situation, without improvement, and absorb the population growth, which has a direct effect on the situation of small children, malnutrition and morbidity among women.

Population and Education

Translation LEPAGE in French No 103, Feb-Mar 82 pp 28-29

[Text] Illiteracy rates have been reduced somewhat by an effort made in the area of education since accession to independence, going from 83 percent in 1960 to 36.5 percent in 1971 and even lower now, although the next census must confirm that fact. And yet, because of the increase in the population, the number of illiterates has grown and there are now some 12 million out of a total population of over 20 million. Furthermore, the progress made masks profound inequalities. In urban areas, the illiteracy rate is only 56 percent (compared with 73 percent), but it is still 88 percent in rural areas (formerly 91 percent). In addition, the illiteracy rate among women is still 87 percent: 65 percent in urban areas (compared with 78 percent previously) and some 96 percent in rural areas (compared with 97.8 percent before). While the total number of illiterates rose by 71 percent due to the increase in the population, the number of illiterate women rose 105 percent annually. Illiteracy is still a fact of life for four-fifths of all women. There were only 150,000 literate

women in all Morocco in 1960 and 679,555 in 1971. But on that date, only 192,341 had attended school and only 27 percent followed a normal primary cycle. A slight improvement was noted in 1977 because 76.6 percent of the women educated had been taught in elementary school out of a total of 740,361. At that time, 32 percent of all urban women were in high school, as were 10 percent of all rural women, and 2 percent of the urban women had access to higher education, compared with 0 percent for rural women. For men, the illiterates in 1971 were in rural cities. By 1960, there were only 800,000 persons over 10 years old classified as literate and 1.9 million in 1971, 450,000 in rural areas, but with respect to literate urban men, some 99.5 percent were still without training.

And yet, an enormous effort has been made in the field of education, which annually represents 4 percent of the national product, 24 percent of the GNP and 30 percent of the government budget. In order to maintain, but especially to generalize and advance education, enormous investments are still needed and while in 1975, there were 70,000 teachers, there was still a shortage of 70,000 classrooms. According to Rachidi, the needed expenditures are more than 20 percent greater than government financial possibilities and would require a minimum economic growth rate on the order of 3.5 percent a year. In his opinion, general education is impossible without major economic growth. As for household expenditures, they are already high, representing 50 dirhams per family per year for education.

But the enormous investments made in the field of education to date have not, even if they have pushed figures up, led to any generalization of elementary education. There were 961,000 children in school in 1960 out of 2,061,000 children of school age, and 1.7 million in 1971 out of a total 3.4 million. In 1980, 2.1 million children were in elementary schools out of 4.4 million of school age.

The rate does not exceed 51 percent because the number of children of school age children has so far increased 5 percent a year and the number of children in school has increased 3.1 percent, without the initial delay ever being made up. Between 1960 and 1971, the proportion of young children actually increased by 30 percent and while it has since slowed down, the effect has not yet been felt. In 1980, school-age children represented 28.8 percent of the population, compared with 25.4 percent in 1960 and 27.6 percent in 1970.

According to the Ministry of Planning, there were 5,738,000 children between the ages of 5 and 14 in 1980 (4,623,000 between the ages of 7 and 14), when 6,191,000 were predicted. Despite this enormous increase for government purposes, the predictions of 1971 (4.53 million) and 1975 (5,077,000 children) unfortunately did not come true. But the pressure nevertheless remains very strong. Although everywhere, there is a decline of schooling in rural areas. For parents, in fact, school attendance is an investment that competes with the number of children and education diminishes the economic usefulness of children, while increasing the cost of raising them. However, the enrollment rates are not the only figures to look at. Attendance rates are more important and are so catastrophic that they alone constitute a negation of all the financial efforts poured into education, to such a point that for Rachidi, the

effort made in elementary education is a waste of the national capital, since less than 40 percent of the children reaching the end of grade school can go on to high school. School attendance rates for elementary grades do not exceed 35 percent, with 60 percent for urban children and 22 for rural pupils. In other words, it is not half of all school-age children that are in school, but one-third.

The pressure is perhaps less on the figures than on these abnormal percentages.

While in 1980, the number of young people between the ages of 15 and 19 was 2,136,000, only 734,199 of them were in high school, compared with 298,900 in 1970-1971. There has therefore been progress, but it has been very slow, and one has to admit that the predictions of the 1973-1977 plan were not realized at this level. For higher education, the gap is even greater because while the students have progressed considerably, they still numbered only 90,000 in 1982, compared with 52,000 in 1976-1977, or 3.4 percent of the number of elementary school students, and when there are only 3.1 students for every 1,000 inhabitants in Morocco. If one takes into consideration the fact that in 1980, there were 1,768,000 Moroccans between the ages of 20 and 24, one sees that only 2 percent are in higher education.

These figures, which are a secret to no one, are dramatic, but the situation may grow even worse because, as Rachidi emphasizes, if the economy does not develop, it seems impossible to obtain a noteworthy improvement in the rate of school enrollment. However, the economy cannot develop without skilled, trained workers, the first vicious circle, while the government must now devote a large part of its resources to the social sectors, neglecting the productive sectors, thereby delaying the needed economic growth.

If progress continues at the current rate, there will be 600,000 [sic] children by the year 2000, only 3.8 million of whom can be schooled, with the 20 to 30 percent dropout rate per class with which we are familiar and costs 120 percent higher than those today. If the fertility rate should remain unchanged, there will be even fewer children in school, with the rate dropping from 51 to 34.5 percent.

Population and Income

Masablanca LAMALIF in French No 133, Feb-Mar 82 pp 30-32

[Text] In order to increase both national and individual income, we must invest, save and produce. All of these things require considerable capital in a country such as Morocco, which is quite lacking in it. Investment has never been able to compete with the needs of the people except during the brief period of 1973-1977, when it experienced an unprecedented boom, going from 11.5 percent of the GNP between 1960 and 1971 to 12 percent in 1972 (an investment of 12 percent of the national income each year represents a minimum in Morocco for maintaining the situation as is, without any improvement in the standard of living), 16 percent in 1973 (necessary rate to increase the standard of living by 1 percent a year in the absence of any demographic increase),

29 percent in 1975 and 36 percent in 1977. Since that time, the investment effort has been halted. In this effort, the government occupies a predominant place: its share was 49 percent between 1960 and 1965, 53 percent in 1973, 58 percent in 1975 and 75 percent in 1976 (including 16 percent for agriculture, 9 percent for the infrastructure, 37 percent for energy and 29 percent for the social sectors).

What is more, while the government investment has dropped considerably, public savings have been reduced by a doubling of spending: a constant increase in the number of civil servants and burdens. National savings were 12 percent of the GNP in 1958, 17.5 percent in 1975 and 11 percent in 1977 but have steadily declined since that time and foreign capital has been massively resorted to.

Can the savings of enterprises make up for government savings? In the beginning, a policy of incentives was pursued but its results were not up to hopes and in addition, it was proved that such a policy helped heighten inequalities. The government then began to drain off the savings of enterprises through steadily increasing fiscal pressure which, in 1965, was only 17 percent of the GNP but which rose to 20 percent between 1973 and 1977 and more since, exceeding the rate of countries such as France. The savings of enterprises has therefore been wiped out and the taxes accumulated have increased government revenue, but its expenditures as well, so that the profits therefrom have not corresponded to hopes.

As for household savings, the figure has never exceeded 8.7 percent of income and the money has mainly been used for consumer products and housing. The evolution of consumption shows that it has dropped, going from 67 percent of resources to 55 percent.

Production has felt the effects of this economic policy. It doubled between 1960 and 1971 and experienced a certain boom between 1973 and 1977, dropping thereafter. The result is that despite the profound inequalities characterizing the per capita income structure in Morocco, income has nevertheless risen somewhat, going from 692 dirhams per person in 1960 to 1628 dirhams in 1975¹ and 2038 dirhams in 1977.

On the average, per capita income rose 1.2 percent between 1960 and 1976, or 22 percent in 16 years. Between 1973 and 1977, growth reached 6 percent a year and per capita income rose from 3. to 3.5 percent a year, but this did not last.

At any rate, demographic growth has absorbed three-fourths of Moroccan economic growth. Government investment efforts have had to be aimed at holding steady, then at the social sectors, neglecting productive sectors, and the efforts of the private sector have been handicapped by the absence of skilled labor, the corollary of mechanization and the absence of any real investment traditions. Family savings have been absorbed by the increase in population, inasmuch as the size of families rose 14 percent in rural areas between 1960 and 1971 and 12 percent in urban areas, with an average of about 6.5 children per family.

This situation is dramatic because the per capita GNP can be improved, either through an increase in the rate of production or through a slowdown in population growth. As Rachidi figures, if the population growth had been 1 percent a year instead of over 3 percent, the standard of living could have risen an average of 3.2 percent and per capita income could have grown by 250 percent. At a time when production was doubling, the population was increasing 1.66 percent, which leaves a very small margin for any increase in income, which other figures estimate at .6 percent per person due to the increase in the population.²

Now then, for a population increase of 1 percent a year, one already has to devote 3 percent of the national revenue to investment. With a 3-percent growth in population, a minimum of 12 percent must be devoted to investments and 16 percent if one wants an increase in income of 1 percent, 20 percent if one wants a 2-percent increase, and so on.

According to the Future group in Washington, with an increase in population of 3 to 3.6 percent every year, by the year 2000 it would be necessary to have 7.5-percent economic growth annually (therefore, 22 percent in investments), then 8.3 percent (25 percent in investments) in order to maintain the current level, without increasing income, or income will drop. Such a rate seems impossible to reach. Naturally, if there were 3 children per family, the necessary investments would be much smaller and the economic growth required to maintain the situation would not be so enormous. One could even increase per capita income by 2.7 or even 3 percent with an average of 2 children per family.

FOOTNOTES

1. This average per capita income of 1628 dirhams is lower than the cost of higher education for one student for a year. The cost of a graduate is 20-percent higher than that of an enrolled student.
2. Between 1960 and 1971, consumption rose 56 percent a year (21.4 percent for rural people) and the average rate of growth was 3.4 percent of the national income, which represents .6 percent per person, given the population growth we have stated.

Estimated Moroccan Population by Mid 1980, Based on Sex and Age (Source: Directorate of Statistics)

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0-4 years	1,696,000	1,648,000	3,344,000	16.8
5-9	1,580,000	1,578,000	3,158,000	15.8
10-14	1,291,000	1,289,000	2,580,000	13.0
15-19	1,069,000	1,067,000	2,136,000	10.7
20-24	886,000	882,000	1,768,000	8.9
25-29	723,000	728,000	1,451,000	7.3
30-34	580,000	578,000	1,158,000	5.8
35-39	486,000	483,000	969,000	4.8
40-44	412,000	405,000	817,000	4.1
45-49	345,000	341,000	686,000	3.4
50-54	277,000	277,000	554,000	2.8
55-59	220,000	225,000	445,000	2.2
60-64	166,000	173,000	339,000	1.7
65-69	115,000	132,000	247,000	1.2
70-74	72,000	82,000	154,000	0.8
75 and over	60,000	72,000	132,000	0.7
All ages	9,978,000	9,960,000	19,938,000	100.0

The Moroccan population is even younger than it thinks: 45.6 percent under the age of 15. There are 10.7 percent adolescents and even the 20-24-year-olds make up only 8.9 percent. As for those in their prime -- that is, between the ages of 25 and 39 -- they make up only 17.9 percent. It is useless to talk about those over 40, who are totally marginal, making up only 16.9 percent. These demographic percentages are astonishing. They have to be viewed as a corollary with the current political, economic and social situation in order to see it properly.

11,464
CSO: 4519/152

BRIEFS

SULTAN CABLES SENEGALESE PRESIDENT--His Majesty Sultan Qabus has sent a congratulatory cable to Senegalese President Abdou Diouf on the occasion of the Senegalese National Day. The cable says in part: "As the Senegalese people celebrate their national day, I am pleased to convey to you my best greetings and wishes of good health and happiness. I also wish progress and prosperity for the friendly Senegalese people." [Text] [GF031410 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 3 Apr 82]

LETTER FROM INDIAN COUNTERPART--Yusuf al-'Alawi 'Abdallah, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, today received a letter from P. V. Narasimha Rao, Indian Minister of External Affairs, pertaining to bilateral friendly relations and ways of bolstering them in addition to a number of current international issues. The letter was delivered by India's ambassador to Oman during his meeting with the Omani minister this morning. [Text] [GF041024 Salalah Domestic Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 4 Apr 82]

CSO: 4400/205

BRIEFS

SWISS ECONOMIC DELEGATION--Doha, 3 Apr (QNA)--Qatari Commerce and Economy Minister Shaykh Nasir Ibn Khalid al Thani today received a Swiss economic delegation which is currently visiting Doha. A Qatari official source stated that during the meeting the two sides reviewed means of bolstering bilateral relations in the field of industry and commerce, and discussed the possibility of increasing the activities of Swiss companies so that they may participate in the process of development and establishing projects in Qatar. The Swiss delegation arrived in Doha yesterday from Abu Dhabi on a 2-day visit in the framework of its current tour of the countries of the area. [Excerpts] [GF031716 Doha QNA in Arabic 1200 GMT 3 Apr 82]

NETHERLANDS TECHNOLOGICAL DELEGATION--Doha, 27 Mar (WAKH)--Ahmad Muhammad al-Suwaydi, chairman of Qatar's chamber of commerce, met today with the Netherlands advanced technology delegation headed by Mr Wolf, adviser to the Netherlands Government for aerospace affairs, to discuss bilateral relations and Israeli boycott regulations. [GF280432 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1830 GMT 27 Mar 82]

CSO: 4400/206

INFORMATION MINISTER ON PALESTINIAN SITUATION

LD302006 Riyadh SPA in English 1909 GMT 30 Mar 82

[Text] Riyadh, 30 Mar (SPA)--Information minister, Dr Muhammed Abduh Yamani today lauded the valiant struggle of Arab Palestinians, resisting the Zionist repeated repression and conspiracies in the occupied Arab territories.

In a statement given to SPA, on the occasion of anniversary of the Land Day, Dr Abduh Yamani hailed Palestinian Arabs brave resistance against the imposition of so-called civil administration in the occupied territories.

"It is a coincidence that the popular uprising in the area started during the period of observance of Land Day, making it more clear to the world that Palestinians will bravely reject all secret and open plots of Israel," Dr Abduh Yamani said. Dr Abduh Yamani noted popular uprising in West Bank also provided evidence to solid backing given by the inhabitants of the area to Palestine Liberation Organisation as "their sole legal representative inside and outside the occupied Arab lands."

"The courageous struggle of Palestinians in the area point to their strong determination to achieve their legitimate rights including the right of self-determination and independent statehood," the minister said. He observed the Israeli scheme of [word indistinct] of occupied Arab lands is totally unacceptable to the Arabs.

Referring to remarks of Premier Begin and other Israeli leaders, which expressed disappointment over the popular angry revolt not seen since 1948, Dr Yamani said this makes clear to the Zionist leaders that justice will ultimately prevail in the long run and that it is impossible for them to usurp the rights of Palestinians in their own lands.

He said there will be serious consequences if the world ignored the popular uprising of Palestinian Arabs.

"Palestinian revolt in the occupied lands provides a serious warning on the consequences of wasting time without finding a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian cause," Dr Muhammed Abduh Yamani said.

"Moreover, deteriorating situation in the occupied lands carry elements of danger and seeds of explosions which can lead to an unbearable dangerous threat to the peace and security of the whole world," he added.

Dr Yamani felt the observance of Land Day demonstrated Palestinian determination to reject Israeli occupation of their lands and holy sites. He urged Arab leaders to bear their historic responsibilities at this critical stage "which toughest trial for realizing the goal of their fateful issue."

He called on them to heal their marginal differences" benefitting none, except the enemies of Arab and Islamic nation."

The information minister advised Arab leaders to place all their weight and support behind the just struggles of Palestinians and defeat Israeli plans of imposing unacceptable solution to their just cause of Arab common destiny. He advised Arab media to bear its responsibilities in an honourable and sincere way to back the uprising of "our brethren in occupied lands." He expressed his hope Palestinians will sooner realise victory as they are struggling for a just cause and legitimate rights.

OSD: 4400/207

KUWAITI DAILY INTERVIEWS SAUDI MINISTER

GF291034 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 27 Mar 82 p 19

[Interview granted by Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, Saudi minister of finance and national economy, to al-Siyasah correspondent in Riyadh Ahmad al-Jarallah--no date given]

[Text] Question: Current oil revenues are said to have affected the country's budget, including its 5-year plan. Does this mean we are facing a temporary austerity plan or what?

Answer: Although we estimate the oil surplus crisis will end this summer--because the industrial countries will have more or less overcome their economic crisis, boosted their economy, increased oil consumption and stopped consuming their oil reserves--the kingdom's plan to confront the changing oil market situation and ensure revenue for development is somehow different.

In years past that were characterized by increasing revenues, Saudi Arabia invested great amounts of money in increasing production and export capacity of oilfields up to 10 million barrels a day in order to provide suitable prices for the market and, subsequently, to increase revenue sufficient for huge development plans and the formation of a good financial reserve. Therefore, the current circumstances on the oil market (which are considered to be temporary) were taken into consideration. Our financial reserves back up current oil resources in order to respond to the needs of development and will continue unaffected on the same level of past years.

On the other hand, the plan was laid down to create national production resources which will gradually replace the exportation of crude oil as a major revenue and will reflect on national production in all other sectors. In parallel, oil will remain an important reserve whose production can be increased once the market is back to normal with respect to consumption and prices, and hence oil revenues will once again respond to the needs and form the reserve.

Question: Then the kingdom will not turn to the international lending market?

Answer: Of course not. This will not happen. We have enough reserves. The reserves were designed for that purpose. Therefore, the current cut in oil

production has no effect on general expenditure policy or on development policy for the time being.

Question: Through the development plan, when will oil be part of income and not all of it?

Answer: If we look at the constituents of the general national income, we see that the contribution of sectors other than petroleum are developing gradually. They now constitute 56 percent of the national production constituents. By increasing this, oil exportation will become a smaller part. As for the government's financial revenues, the state does not exact taxes. Therefore, oil constitutes 95 percent of the state's revenue. However, as I said, crude oil is a huge reserve whether its production decreases or increases, not to mention the fact that the private sector is developing and its personal competence is increasing and will be employed better in oil and oil derivative operations.

Question: Some people believe that general expenditure has decreased compared to past years.

Answer: I have certain figures on current budget disbursements. These figures say that during the 11 months of the current fiscal year about 226 billion riyals were spent. This figure is less than the figure for the same period last year, which was 162 billion riyals. Therefore, expenditure increased, not decreased. Anyhow, the financial situation in the region is leaning toward stability after undergoing years of continuous development of financial revenues which were rapidly and increasingly put into the local markets. Henceforth, however, development will be stable and the importance of national spending will be further stressed.

Question: When those abroad talk of Saudi expenditure or Saudi oil revenues, they imagine that these are monies and shares that go into the pockets of certain powerful persons. What is your response?

Answer: What happened in the region was that the increase of the country's revenues created a strong tendency to accelerate development. This has never been experienced by any other country. And although God alone knows the future, I expect a similar rapid development to take place. This development will have results astounding to those who are used to limited and stable development rates. Therefore, some falsehood and analysis will come into play. However, despite all the negative signs of this period, we should not forget its tremendous positive features.

The Saudi budget, as revenues and spending, is published and promulgated in full detail, unlike other countries where the budget is presented in unclear outlines and items. It is fully detailed in this country. Therefore, there is no room for accusation or upsetting things. Isn't it admirable that the state allocates 50 billion riyals for house construction loans without interest which are backed up by the state? Isn't it admirable that the state allocates 20 billion riyals to support electricity companies in addition to other funds and allotments aimed at bolstering food prices and establishing productive

enterprises? All of this is sometimes conveyed inaccurately. After it became feasible, the state opened various channels for distributing wealth to the private sector in order to develop and make it progress. What happened in the region is unusual for those who did not experience such trends in regard to financial policy and who are used to classical trends of general financial rules.

Question: It has been said that during the previous upswing the general expenditure was subject to the avarice of agents and contractors. The state previously announced specific limits for commission. Do you think the things that the state complained about are under control?

Answer: In my capacity as finance minister, yes, this phenomenon is now under control. It was part of that period's shortcomings. At that time speed was the main factor in the implementation. Now the situation is different and commission rates are no longer the same as they were. This is attributed to the increase in the competency of the state's departments with regard to observation and followup actions. We have reached a phase where competition among official organs to expedite their requirements and decrease the cost of these requirements has become the cornerstone of competency. Government competency has increased with regard to formulating plans and determining specifications and the cost of these specifications. Therefore, we feel now that the situation has changed. There are no longer projects of low income and high costs.

Question: The Saudi development budget was exploited by some foreign companies which started on setting exaggerated prices. Have you eliminated this as well?

Answer: Yes, to a certain extent due to the awareness of government controls. However, your question raises another question, and that is, why don't local and regional companies replace these international companies in executing large projects in this region so that we don't have to live in fear of being exploited by these large companies? The large local companies can employ the best foreign technical expertise as the foreign companies do. In addition long-term, stable and guaranteed contracts offered by the local companies would be attractive to this type of expertise. Therefore, the matter that should be considered by everyone is the establishment of joint large companies either for the local market or the entire region's market (the Gulf region). This may be one of our objectives.

Question: Once again I refer to expenditure policy. Some people complain of the lack of money flow and contracting companies complain of lack of opportunities.

Answer: Spending has increased but bank interest rates are high, exceeding the income of most commercial projects including contracting projects. Therefore, the national funds wanted to benefit from the high international interest rates. And this is an investment that does not need the work of classical economy. Nevertheless, this opportunity is temporary and affects the flow of local currency. It is not possible to prevent funds from them [interest rates] because the economy is free here enjoying the freedom of movement in

the fields that develop the economy and increase its revenues. The situation is temporary and funds invested abroad will return once foreign interest rates drop.

Question: Don't you believe that forming a stock exchange for bank notes will enhance the flow of currency because investment will be local? When will the Saudi stock exchange be established?

Answer: Current speculation, I am afraid, is leading to the creation of an unreal flow of currency which cannot be incorporated into other fields.

Regarding the notion of a financial market in the kingdom, it is better to delay the establishment of this market until the study on it is completed. There is no specific date for its establishment, but the government is studying the subject carefully and deliberately so as to avoid any harm that might arise, as was the case with other markets because of an unjustifiable, sharp increase followed by a sudden slump, which hurts the smaller dealers. Then there is the question: Are the current stocks of Saudi stockholding companies enough to establish an outright financial market? Perhaps, what we need in this period is the performance of the simple function of such markets, that is, to expedite the transfer of stock ownership from one stockholder to another and this is what is being done individually.

At the end, I would like to comment on the speculation that is currently taking place in our region. The stories heard about this speculation and the tenfold increase in the rate of stocks before a project is started or put into effect--this situation shakes the confidence in our region both internally and externally and affects the objective of making the region an international financial center. Moreover, letting the small national saver be carried away without reservations believing he will make a lifetime fortune but then end in nothing will cause social problems between small and big dealers. To use the term "offshore" is nonsense. It is only a way to avoid the rules and restrictions that are for the welfare of everyone, because avoiding taxes in our region is out of the question. I think the best thing is to set unified systems through the GCC so that the expansion and development of our national sector will be healthy and desirable.

Question: What has the GCC so far achieved on the economic level?

Answer: Less than 4 months have passed since the signing of the GCC economic agreement. Some of the Gulf countries have not made final ratification of the agreement. This agreement will be implemented 4 months after the day of the signing. More time is needed for implementation. The vision is clear and the desire of the parties is confirmed and enthusiastic, finance ministers will meet soon, following the meeting of the customs officials which is now in progress. Customs tariffs are currently being discussed, focusing on cancellation of tariffs among the Gulf countries on their industrial and local products and on setting uniform tariffs on the goods that come from abroad. This will add uniformity to commercial activities and protect the GCC countries' local industries. The results will be positive.

Question: Don't you think it is time for the GCC countries to stop their industrialization projects and develop fruitful joint industries?

Answer: When we talk about industrial coordination we are not talking about small industries, but big ones, such as the petrochemical, iron, aluminum and other valuable industries. These will be discussed seriously until they have been distributed on the bases of quality and location. In addition, we have to consider coordination among these industries in the field of marketing the products on international level to avoid competition and lower marketing expenses. Small industries, will be left alone. When we reach the point of uniform customs tariffs on imported goods, then we will consider the protection of the developing small industries. Once the economic agreement is fully implemented and the customs tariffs are cancelled among the area countries, each small industry will find its market in accordance with the conditions of the unified Gulf market, its profits and its competitive liability. In other words, those who invest in industry or agriculture in the Gulf, will review projects in terms of the market in the area as a whole, and not just within the local market. Thus, if it is found that the conditions of the bigger market justify going ahead with the project, then it will be implemented.

Question: What about the establishment of a joint banking industry among the GCC countries?

Answer: Some of the GCC countries have limited banking to their local banks and they refuse to allow foreign banks to operate. Other countries have become recently convinced that the presence of a large number of banks has no benefits. What I expect is that the number of local banks will be fixed (as in the presence of foreign banks in Bahrain), and then there will be a kind of cooperation among the Gulf countries in order to facilitate banking operations, to exchange branches or to cooperate in foreign operations. This will entail first establishing uniform banking policies among the Gulf countries and reaching an agreement on broad guidelines that will be followed and implemented jointly. I do not forget the possibility of establishing joint local banks to carry out specialized banking activities. The sphere of cooperation is unlimited. This is revealed whenever agreement and cooperation are practically implemented.

(C) 400/204

JIDDA PAPER SCORNS NEGATIVE ARAB CIRCLES

GF020928 Jidda AL-MADINAH in Arabic 29 Mar 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Notes on Tomorrow's Meetings"]

[Text] The Arab foreign ministers will meet in Tunis tomorrow. As usual, tomorrow we will hear this country requesting a new topic to be added to the agenda, and that country wishing to have its dispute with another country discussed, and another country demanding that its budget be bolstered in order to continue its progressive march. Tomorrow we will hear recommendations to support the revolutionaries of Ireland and El Salvador. Al-Qadhdhafi might request support for the international outlaw, "Mr Carlos."

Arab league conferences turn out like this because unfortunately there are certain Arabs in the league who consciously or unconsciously render a great deal of service to the Zionist enemy.

We all know that the [Tunis] meeting was convened by the PLO to discuss Israel's aggressions against the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Logically and conventionally, the security situation requires that such an emergency meeting be devoted to its main purpose.

It is strange however, to hear that some Arab countries are directly or indirectly trying to shatter Arab solidarity and disseminate poisons of rupture among Arab countries, as if the aim of this meeting were to make the enemy gloat over our weakness and fragmentation and enable him to continue humiliating our brothers in occupied Palestine who are appealing to us for help today.

If some people like to pursue this course in order to bridle and abort patriotic impetus, and to "abate" vehemence and curb the results of such Arab meetings, then such people must be eliminated, because the present situation makes conspicuous Arab action mandatory. Today there is no room for the flowery phrases with which we have always decorated our decisions and recommendations.

The Palestinian people badly need strength and Arab solidarity. This sublime demand was expressed by Yasser Arafat in a statement published [words indistinct] yesterday. In this statement Arafat said the Palestinians do not want anything from the Arab leaders except unity in their ranks, efforts to halt the barbarian acts perpetrated by the Zionist occupation authorities against the

Palestinian people, and efforts to thwart the enemy's plans to implement the so-called civil administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In a nutshell, these are the demands of the Palestinian people. There are many ways to serious Arab action if intentions are pure and efforts are sincere. There are many channels that, once cleared and cleaned, can be used and operated.

We would like to "whisper" loudly prior to the [Tunis] meeting that "the Arab nation has had enough slogans and has become tired of producing so many entangled problems. In 1948 the Arab nation had one problem: The Palestinian cause. Today, in 1982 the Arab nation has hundreds of problems. The problems of the Arab nation fill the sanctuaries of nations and peoples. In almost every meeting at every spot on the earth we hear of the catastrophe, persecution, humiliation, weakness and treachery of the Arabs.

This is the image of the Arabs today, oh League of Arabs in Tunis! This is the image of the Arab individual. The ordinary Arab, due to reiteration, has developed the ability to know what statements and decisions made in closed sessions. There is one simple reason for this: For more than three decades, the style of the Arab action and the mode of decisions, statements and recommendations have not changed.

We know that the Arab countries could not suddenly form a joint Arab army to go next Wednesday [for instance] to Jerusalem, Nabulus, Ramallah, and al-Birah to help the brave Palestinians there.

We realize this and we know the complexities of such an action, but we do not want the steadfast Palestinians in the occupied homeland to hear the same old song announcing the death of Arab solidarity. We want the Palestinians in the occupied homeland to hear this from their Arab League: 'We are all with you, O Palestine!'

1982/207

WEEKLY ON SYRIAN-IRANIAN COOPERATION

PM261621 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 27 Mar-2 Apr 82 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Secrets of the Syrian-Iranian Alliance"]

[Excerpts] Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam's recent visit to Iran at the head of a 40-member official delegation marked an important shift in Syria's policy toward Iraq, Iran and the Arab Gulf states.

Information received by al-Majallah on the results of Khaddam's visit to Iran indicates that the agreements concluded between the two countries are more than the agreements on oil and trade officially announced in the joint statement. Informed Iranian sources say that the present level of relations between the two countries may be termed the level of "strategic alliance." Khaddam hinted at this during his press conference at the end of the visit, when he spoke about current negotiations to join the two countries in an "Islamic progressive front."

In addition to the joint political line adopted by the two countries, military agreements were concluded between Syria and Iran, but they were not mentioned in the joint statement or the other official statements issued. Al-Majallah has learned that the "military cooperation" between Syria and Iran includes supplying Iran with Soviet-made Syrian arms. According to Iranian sources these arms are not very sophisticated and have been in Syrian stores for a long time, and Syria wishes to replace them with new weapons. Furthermore, the security and explosives experts brought by Tehran from North Korea will be replaced by Syrian experts who have actually begun arriving in Tehran. From now on Syria will be a permanent transit point for arms going to Iran from the eastern bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union, East Germany and North Korea. Iran is at present getting these arms via Libya. It is also receiving Libyan arms.

Iranian sources say that Iran has agreed to reschedule Syria's \$150 million debts to it. The Iranian regime had already waived the interest on these debts. It has now been agreed that repayment will commence in 1986 with annual installments. A joint transport network will be set up for the transportation of Syrian commodities to Iran via Turkey.

Iranian sources have told Al-Majallah that the Syrian foreign minister broached the question of the Iraqi-Iranian war and the current mediation on the war with the officials in Tehran. He particularly spoke about the mediation of the Islamic committee which visited the Iraqi and Iranian capitals recently. Khaddam advised the Iranians to accept the mediation because "Iraq is a weak position, and this is the time to get cease-fire terms favorable to Iran." Khaddam did say to the Iranians, however, that if the Iranian officials were not interested in a cease-fire Syria would still in any case side with Iran and support it against the Iraqi regime.

The informed Iranian sources maintain that Khaddam asked the Iranians to modify their policy toward the Soviet Union. He told them that it is wrong to equate the United States with the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union is "objectively an ally of Iran and the revolutionary forces in the world, whereas the United States is waging a political and military war against the revolutionary regimes."

The political talks also covered the situation in Lebanon and the Iranian authorities' attitude to the PLO. The Iranian press continued its campaign against the PLO and its Chairman Yasir 'Arafat while Khaddam was in Tehran. Khaddam advised the Iranian officials to avoid "an open confrontation" with the Palestinian resistance although, according to Iranian sources, Khaddam did say that he agreed with some of the Iranian reservations. His efforts, however, failed and the Iranian campaign against the PLO continued.

The talks also dealt with the position of the Shi'ites in Lebanon and the conflict between Libya and the Shi'ite Amal movement over the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr.

Some Iranians criticized the strong relations between Syria and the Soviet Union. They include Ayatollah Hoseyn Montazeri, the man most likely to succeed Khomeini. Montazeri in fact was critical even of Khaddam's visit. Syria was reportedly annoyed by this criticism because "Syria does not permit itself to criticize Iran's political alliances." The Iranians believe that both the United States and the Soviet Union follow one and the same policy bent on "destroying Islam."

OSD: 4400/199

TELEVISION INTERVIEWS IRAQI AGENT ON ARMS SMUGGLING

[Editorial Report] JN032048 Damascus Domestic Television Service in Arabic at 1852 GMT on 3 April 1982 broadcasts a recorded 32-minute interview with 'Abd al-Karim Shakir Murawwih from the Syrian city of Abu Kamal. 'Abd al-Karim says that he is now living in Iraq and that 2 years ago he was working for the general contractors company. He adds that he had an accident and crashed the company's car he was driving. The company forced him to pay 1600 Iraqi dinars. He, thus, faced a serious money problem. He was introduced to a Syrian citizen called Khalid Ni'mah who was living in Iraq. This latter told him that the only way to solve his problem is to join the "Iraqi party." Then 'Abd al-Karim was introduced to an Iraqi called Hamad al-Durzi alias Abu Hasan. This latter, 'Abd al-Karim adds, began to indoctrinate him on the deteriorating situation in Syria. Abu Hasan asked 'Abd al-Karim to return to the Syrian city of Dayr al-Zawr and try to organize four persons by offering money aid. 'Abd al-Karim then tells how he used to send false reports about the situation in Syria. He stresses that most of his reports were false and were made up of nothing but lies and rumors.

'Abd al-Karim then tells how he met Abu Hasan and another person called Abu Tha'ir early in March, 'Abd al-Karim says that he had the impression that Abu was responsible for smuggling weapons into Syria and that he was very close to the Iraqi intelligence. These two asked 'Abd al-Karim to smuggle weapons to Dayr al-Zawr in Syria. 'Abd al-Karim explains that there was no way to refuse this request because his refusal would be interpreted as "hesitation and cowardness" and that the fate of such a person is death. So he was forced to accept this mission, 'Abd al-Karim says that he was shocked by the amount of weapons he had to smuggle in Syria. 'Abd al-Karim adds that Abu Hasan and Abu Tha'ir asked him to hire persons to "attack any military, civil or governmental establishments and to carry out sabotage in order to instigate the people and provoke the authorities."

'Abd al-Karim then explains how he told the persons he hired to listen to the voice of Arab Syria from Baghdad which carries coded messages addressed to the hired agents in Syria to carry out sabotage actions. He then tells how he accompanied a truck loaded with weapons to Syria. In the day al-Zawr, 'Abd al-Karim met with the persons he hired and tried to find a place to hide the weapons. Eventually, 'Abd al-Karim says, the Syrian security forces discovered the weapons and he was arrested with the men he hired. 'Abd al-Karim expresses his regrets and says that he "was blinded by the money I used to receive from the Iraqis." The interview included a film showing the seized weapons which include piles of bullets, hand grenades, Kalashnikov guns, RPG-7 rockets and explosives.

BRIEFS

TACTICAL EXERCISE CARRIED OUT--Upon the instructions of President Hafiz al-Asad, commander in chief of the army and armed forces, one of our combat formations in cooperation with the air force and paratroopers has carried out a tactical exercise. The practical part of the exercise was attended by Maj Gen 'Ali Aslan, deputy chief of staff of operations and training affairs; the major general who is in charge of training affairs; and a number of the general command officers. The participating forces stormed the mock hostile defenses and developed their combat operations in the depth of the mock enemy's lines. This operation was carried out in full cooperation with the air force and the paratroopers. The mock combat circumstances were very close to those prevailing in a real fighting. The participating fighters showed great skill, efficiency and high morales. They also showed great ability to coordinate the different units of the participating forces, the air force and the helicopters. [Excerpts] [JN051646 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1615 GMT 5 Apr 82]

CSO: 4400/199

PRESIDENT GIVES VIEWS ON REGIONAL ISSUES

LD051306 Kuwait KUNA in English 1033 GMT 5 Apr 82

[Text] Kuwait, 5 Apr (KUNA)--President of the UAE Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al Nuhayyan said Monday that the Gulf war may lead to the interference of a super power in the region at the request of one of the two warring parties.

In an interview with Al Siyasah and its sister English language Arab TIMES newspaper published here, Shaykh Zayid said that he relayed this possibility to an Iranian delegation which visited his country lately.

The UAE president expressed readiness to offer any aid needed to halt the armed conflict and wondered why should such huge losses be caused while both sides were in need of all their potential.

The Iranian delegation led by the undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry renewed their non-involvement in any conspiracy in neighbouring countries and particularly of the subversive group discovered in Bahrain last December. Shaykh Zayid quoted them as saying "there could be saboteurs in Bahrain just as there are traitors in Iran."

Shaykh Zayid who is scheduled to arrive in Kuwait today on an official visit hailed the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council and described it as the ideal nucleus for an [as received] Arab unity.

The OAU leader noted in this respect that every member country has emerged stronger following the creation of the council but he added that the GCC had [word indistinct] a long way to go to further promote inter-coordination.

The Gulf president praised his country's relation with Kuwait and described it as "solid and fateful.

In reply to a question on the international condition of petroleum, Shaykh Zayid said that it is like any other commodity and highlighted the fact that oil was once sold at "three dirhams per barrel, but it has not increased and the producing countries started to gain the profits which were not theirs at first."

"It is not logical to object to those who defend their interests and rights and all what we want is to gain and not lose," the UAE leader said.

Shaykh Zayid then criticised the American stance in the Middle East as overlooking the serious events in the region in favour of Israel.

He called on the Arabs to adopt a unified stand towards the American-backed Israeli practises affirming that if such a stand is pursued then the Israeli burden would have long been eradicated.

On the OAE financial aid to Syria, Shaykh Zayid said that his country is committed to such an assistance and nothing has changed in this respect.

South Yemen is a sisterly country to which all Arab countries should be closer to and establish amicable and fraternal relations, the Gulf leader said.

Concerning recognition of the Soviet Union, he said that his country will follow the path of its brothers in the GCC on that issue.

Shaykh Zayid called for granting the new leadership of Egypt an opportunity to return to the Arab line.

CSO: 4400/206

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

PRESS REACTS TO ARAB LEAGUE MEETING

GF011000 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 0635 GMT 1 Apr 82

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 1 Apr (WAM)--Local papers comment on the resolutions adopted by the Arab league emergency meeting. The papers concentrate on the recommendation dealing with opening the fronts to guerrilla action.

Al-Ittihad notes that Jordan and Lebanon expressed reservations over opening the Arab fronts to guerilla action. This makes this recommendation a "mere slogan and invitation and not a resolution." The paper continues: "In view of the conditions and restrictions in the Arab League Charter and in view of the current Arab situation, nobody can argue that Jordan and Lebanon did not have the right to express reservations over this resolution so long as they see that this position preserves and serves their interests and realize that opening their fronts to Palestinian action subjects them to dangers and hazards that they cannot tolerate."

The paper points out that this issue has another side which can be explained by the fact that opening the fronts should be just one step. "The whole process is what we call supreme Arab strategy." The paper calls for reviewing joint military leadership and ensuring that the resolutions are in harmony with the current stage. The paper stresses that "opening these files does not obstruct action in the direction of opening the fronts because waiting for a strategic military balance to be achieved with the enemy will only lead to lost opportunities and a waste of time."

Al-Wahdah describes the Arab League's recommendation as a limited Arab agreement. It stresses the importance of achieving genuine Arab solidarity in order to support the courageous resistance of the Arab Palestinian people in the occupied territories "while these new episodes are taking place in the bloody dispute between our people in the occupied territories and the occupation forces which get unlimited support from the United States."

The paper demands that the Arab countries define their position toward the United States, which is opposed to Arab aspirations, before presenting aid to the resistance. The paper notes that the Arabs did not commit any aggression against the United States to make it adopt such a position that supports their enemy. The paper points out that "all U.S. interests are in the Arabs' hands

and all of the Arabs' disasters come from the United States. The United States is the one that supports the Israeli enemy in Lebanon, the Golan and Jerusalem. It is the country that destroyed the nuclear reactor in Baghdad and supports the Israeli threat to the Gulf." The paper adds that in return for that the Arab position is divided, "and this was clear in Tunis yesterday during discussion of the most important issue--opening Arab borders guerrilla action." The paper warns against misinterpreting this call as limiting the battle with Israel to Palestinian guerrillas only. The paper says: "Such a view is the territorial confrontation of the danger that threatens the national presence." [sentence as received]

The paper stresses that confrontation of the invasion of settlements is "a national responsibility first and last." The paper says that, as the Palestinian resistance has a basic, introductory and participating role, pan-Arab action is important since "it is the only reaction to loss of Arab solidarity and the direct reason for Arab dispersion."

The paper notes that Truman announced the establishment of Israel in 1948 in the absence of Arab unity. Also in the absence of this unity, Reagan in 1982 announced full support for the Zionist entity against the Arab friends of the United States.

CSO: 4400/206

BRIEFS

FOREIGN MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE--Dubayy, 1 Apr (WAM)--Al-Khalij, which is published in al-Shariqah, describes the final communique issued by the Arab foreign ministers as including pallid and empty resolutions ignoring the Palestinian working paper which calls for opening the borders to guerilla action and reservations by a number of governments on plans to recruit Palestinians who are of age. The paper says: "In light of this situation, has the Palestinian not the right to enquire about the importance of this press fuss calling for denunciation of the United States and the Camp David accords at a time the Arab foreign ministers did not approve the opening of even 1 meter of Arab borders with occupied Palestine, which are thousands of miles long, while this citizen fights with stones." The paper calls on the Palestinian leadership to answer these questions before the Arabs fighting in the occupied territories. The paper stresses that the Palestinian issue is the first issue of the Arabs. It adds that "the more correct, realistic and irrationally aligned our resolutions toward Palestine are, the more our speeches, announcements and official statements will be sincere on other issues at the national level." The paper concludes by expressing regret because "the meeting of the Arab foreign ministers was not satisfying the many Arabs outside the occupied territories." It wonders about the reaction of people in the occupied territories. [Excerpt] [GF011100 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 0700 GMT 1 Apr 82]

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